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It is intriguing to observe how in the last 15 years the problem of climate change has 
forced itself onto the scientific, political and societal agenda. Taking into account the na-
ture, complexity and global scale of the problem, it is remarkable the rate at which a na-
tional and international scientific infrastructure (with the Inter governmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) as its main body) has taken shape. This development is of great 
importance, as governments and other actors benefit from reliable and authoritative sci-
entific data. 
Politicians have become rapidly aware of the significance of the problem. The Parlia-
ment in the Netherlands ratified the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change without any debate. Three years after ratification, the House of Repre-
sentatives decided to conduct its own investigation on the subject, in order to better un-
derstand the nature of the problem and to be able to develop proposals for climate poli-
cies. From this moment on there was consensus in the Netherlands’ political arena on the 
nature and importance of this environmental issue. 
Society also showed a rapidly growing interest in the subject. Industry acknowledged 
that dealing with the problem of climate change posed both a burden and a challenge. 
Environmentalists turned the problem into one of their most important issues. Public 
awareness became slowly but steadily familiar with this environmental threat, for exam-
ple through the relationship that was shown between extreme weather events and climate 
change. These developments have led to the formation of a diverse group of people that 
have great knowledge on the climate problem. For this reason, it is now possible to make 
use of this knowledge through a participatory integrated assessment (PIA), in order to 
formulate long-term targets for climate policy. This report benefits from the results of 
these developments.  
Herein lies the great importance of this type of scientific work. First of all it draws the 
attention of policy makers to the necessity of, and the different strategies for, addressing 
this problem. Second, the ecological responsibilities of key stakeholders are highlighted 
by the presentation of the most recent scientific insights. It is then possible to get a better 
grasp of the problem in terms of knowledge, environmental ethics, political objectives 
and costs. Furthermore, this methodology establishes a pool of knowledge and insights 
with regard to the long-term nature of the problem, which can consequently be used re-
peatedly for short-term political purposes. This can only be successful, however, if sci-
ence remains transparent and acknowledges the need for clear communication to politi-
cians and other stakeholders. An appropriate method is to involve the responsible actors 
in increasing scientific insights and the formulation of sound policy responses.  
 Institute for Environmental Studies xii 
In this way, it is possible to better understand each other’s language and to stimulate 
one’s own responsibilities.  
This report shows that the formulation and articulation of long-term climate change con-
trol targets is still very much like finding one’s way through thick fog. Much is still un-
clear and the risk of taking the wrong turn is ever present.  
The Netherlands have a strong interest in following the right course to climate change 
stabilisation, simply because of its geographical location and vulnerability. This report 
underlines this fact. Undoubtedly, the scientific results presented here merely constitute a 
first step. There is a need for further research, together with the international scientific 
community, in order to better grasp the environmental boundaries of our actions and the 
impacts of greenhouse gas emissions, and to further develop and shape the process and 
contents of the Netherlands’ climate policy. The irreversible nature of the problem 
obliges us to do so. 
 
Eimert van Middelkoop 
Chairman of the 1996 Parliamentary Research Commission on Climate Change 
(Voorzitter Klimaatcommissie1996 van de Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal), 
and Member of the Senate.  
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Joyeeta Gupta, Bas Amelung, Harro van Asselt, Marcel Berk, Hendrik Buiteveld, Edwin 
Dalenoord, Lars Hein, Maud Huynen, Onno Kuik, Rik Leemans, Pim Martens, Jan  
Mulder, Albert Oost, Michiel Schaeffer; Koos Verbeek and Mick van der Wegen. 
On the basis of the participatory integrated assessment (PIA) of the conditions under 
which climate change is likely to become dangerous for the Netherlands, this report  
concludes: 
1. Despite the inherent uncertainties in the science, climate change, per se, is seen as a 
serious environmental problem in the Netherlands; 
2. There is a strong preference for articulating the long-term goal in targets and time-
tables; 
3. On the basis of the PIA, a set of expected long-term impacts on the Netherlands has 
been tentatively identified. The temperature change with respect to pre-industrial 
levels are related to the following perceived reasons for concern; 
 
Note: Perceived reasons for concern in the Netherlands. N.B. impacts are for 2100. 
 
4. The mitigation costs are high, but these costs should be evaluated against the costs of 
(adapting to) climate change impacts. Furthermore, the costs of mitigation measures 
can be spread over a long time period, and such costs can also lead to innovation and 
knowledge development. 
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5. The driving factors for engaging in discussions on dangerous climate change in the 
Netherlands are the losses to unique ecosystems such as the Wadden Sea and the 
coastal belt; the high economic, but also socio-political costs of coastal adaptation; 
the implications of the changing precipitation regime for navigation, agriculture, and 
infrastructure; impacts on tourism and health; irreversible and abrupt events with 
high associated risks; and last but not least important - the impacts on vulnerable so-
cieties and countries especially in the developing world; 
6. 24 indicators have been identified as important indicators of climate change for the 
Netherlands and these can be prioritised in terms of social and scientific criteria (i.e. 
are they socially important and scientifically strong) into 7 categories; The above ta-
ble integrates the scientific and social ranking, but can also be read diagonally. The 
top left corner shows indicators that are both scientifically sound and socially appeal-
ing. The bottom right indicators are less directly attributable to climate change and 
perhaps less appealing as social indicators but are nevertheless seen as important by 
social actors. Reading from top left to bottom right, we can identify seven categories 
of priorities. They are plotted below with respect to two axes, which are ranked from 
1 to 5; 
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7. An initial PIA of acceptable risks and threshold levels for the Netherlands is  
provided below; 
Perceived threshold levels in the Netherlands: Results of dialogues and extrapolation. 
Priority Indicator Acceptable risk Not acceptable 
Access to clean drinking 
water 
That there is a temporary ban 
on washing cars; or watering 
gardens 
That children cannot take 
baths; or you cannot drink 
water from the tap; 
Death from heat waves Mortality remains stable An increase in mortality 
Allergies and other 
chronic sicknesses due 
to longer pollen season 
 Structural increase in 
chronic sicknesses 
A 
Rate of sea-level rise 20 cm per century > 50 cm per century; 
> 3 mm per year, because 
of the devastating effects 
on the Wadden sea 
Water quality (number 
of weeks one cannot 
swim) 
An increase of 50% from cur-
rent levels;  
An increase of 200%; 
Structural effect annually  
Navigability of rivers Incidentally less load Over four weeks less load 
Over two weeks less load 
Water temperature An incidental rise leading to 
fish kills 
Structural rise leading to 
loss of biodiversity; 
Code red: Electricity is 
rationed, because of the 
impact on electricity pro-
duction 
Spread of infectious dis-
ease 
An increases in the chance of 
falling ill 
If adaptation is no longer 
possible, or if the costs for 
adaptation are out of  
proportion  
B 
Floods Incidental increases Structural increases  
affecting property values 
Productivity of land Incidental losses Structural losses  
Absolute sea-level rise Marginal increases > 0.5 m too costly 
Effect on work and sec-
tors 
Marginal changes Income inequality  
increases 
Disappearance of species Incidental losses Where the legal norms are 
exceeded and structural 
losses 
C 
The number of major 
skating events (Elfsteden 
tochten) 
Less than current levels Less than once every ten 
years 
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Priority Indicator Acceptable risk Not acceptable 
Effect on income Incidental loss of income No growth as result of im-
pacts for one year; If 
Netherlands competitive-
ness is affected 
Change in biodiversity Incidental changes Loss of key species and 
ecosystem functions 
D 
Melting of glaciers Incidental changes Structural large-scale 
Impact on the Gulf 
Stream 
Negligible chance Increase of probability 
Rate at which the beach 
disappears 
When the beach can be easily 
replenished 
When replenishment is too 
expensive affecting  
tourism 
E 
Instability through 
North-South impacts 
At current levels Should not increase  
structurally 
Disintegration of the 
Antarctic 
Negligible chance Increase of probability 
Global access to drink-
ing water 
Should meet Millennium tar-
gets 
Should not become worse 
than today 
F 
Storms Current levels Should not increase  
structurally 
G Access to food Current problems When this leads to interna-
tional instability and  
significant increase in  
financial inequality 
 
8. Back-calculating to global temperature levels and concentration levels: Local climate 
thresholds for impacts need to be converted to global indicators, because of the lar-
ger-scale context of global warming and climate policy. For example, temperature 
change averaged over The Netherlands is projected to increase with a factor of about 
1.1 as compared to the global mean. When local impact thresholds have been trans-
lated to global indicators, the latter need to be related to GHG concentration targets, 
before the implications for near- to mid-term emission pathways can be determined. 
The dominant uncertainty in this step is in the value of the climate sensitivity. This is 
the equilibrium global-mean surface-air temperature increase resulting from a dou-
bling of the CO2 (equivalent) concentrations in the atmosphere compared to pre-
industrial levels. By use of recent probability estimates of this parameter, risk as-
sessment becomes possible, which is a useful method for evaluating policy options in 
the context of major uncertainties. In this approach, the question is not which con-
centration level results in limiting global-mean temperature to a maximum defined 
by the impact thresholds? Rather, questions like this need to be rephrased to which 
concentration levels result in a probability of at least x% that global-mean tempera-
ture will be limited to a maximum defined by the impact thresholds? Obviously, set-
ting threshold levels and assigning a pursued probability level (x%) is the task of  
policy makers and stakeholders; 
9. Although there are good reasons to focus more on temperature related long-term  
targets, the project team concluded that both temperature and GHG emission related 
targets should be considered; 
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10. Two recent Dutch scientific reports present prima facie contradictory evidence of the 
feasibility of taking medium-term measures of achieving a –30% reduction of emis-
sions. It appears that while the technological and economic feasibility of reducing 
emissions is high, stakeholders may not be as supportive. At the same time, some of 
the large EU member states are also committing themselves to medium and long-
term targets in the area of climate change; 
11. In response to the key question: what should the Netherlands’ perspective be on 
long-term targets; the scientists concluded that; 
• Beyond 2 oC global warming in relation to pre-industrial levels, there is consen-
sus that the climatic and ecological system could become unstable and irreversi-
ble impacts may become inevitable; 
• It should be noted that 2 °C, also implies huge losses to some low-lying countries 
and some ecosystems;  
• The 2 °C target may already have been exceeded if the sensitivity of the climate 
system to emissions is higher than currently expected; in other words if the cur-
rent emissions of aerosols is masking the enhanced greenhouse effect to some ex-
tent; (However, the IPCC has not yet made any firm assessment of the situation 
as yet); 
• Taking all the above into account, it was agreed that on the basis of the current 
science, a 2 °C target in combination with current expectations that this coincides 
with a 500-550 ppmv CO2 eq. concentration level seems to be the most reason-
able long-term target for the Netherlands. 
From a political perspective, there were some discussions: 
• Modifying a 2 °C target to a 3 °C target would reduce the urgency for action and 
increase the risk of instability in the system; this risk was not seen as politically 
acceptable. Besides, beyond 3 oC the biosphere could become a source rather 
than a sink of GHGs which could lead to fast, additional increases in atmospheric 
greenhouse gas concentrations and further, strong temperature changes; 
• Reducing a 2 ºC target to something lower does not seem at all feasible, espe-
cially because of the short-term social and economic implications; 
• Should the science indicate that the climate system is more sensitive to emissions 
this would only imply that the urgency to take measures will increase drastically, 
and this is an additional argument for not relaxing the 2 °C target; 
• The perspectives of other large EU member states on the issue strengthens the 
political argument since the Netherlands is then not alone in this perspective. 
This research was a cooperative effort of seven research institutes and involved a  
maximum of 30 stakeholders. The results of this research need to be further discussed 
and tested with a much more broad group of scientists and stakeholders in order to seek 
greater accuracy and legitimacy. 
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The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change of 1992 (FCCC 1992) 
has adopted a long-term target of stabilizing greenhouse gas emissions: 
“The ultimate objective of this Convention and any related legal instruments that the 
Conference of the Parties may adopt is to achieve, in accordance with the relevant 
provisions of the Convention, the stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in 
the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference 
with the climate system. Such a level should be achieved within a time-frame suffi-
cient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food 
production is not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a 
sustainable manner.” 
However, the above text does not specify by when and at what level concentrations 
should be stabilized. It does, though, give certain conditions. More than a decade has 
passed since the Convention was adopted and the climate regime is inching forward with 
targets to control the emission levels of countries. The question is: Are these targets in 
line with the efforts needed to control climate change before it becomes too dangerous? 
Or given the inertia in the climate system, are these targets far too low and an inadequate 
response to the climate change problem.  
Recognizing this problem, the Netherlands government interpreted Article 2 of the 
FCCC as follows:  
• The global average temperature should not rise above a maximum of 2 ºC of  
pre-industrial levels; 
• The rate of temperature change should be less than 0.1 degrees Celsius per decade; 
and;  
• Sea-level rise should be limited to a maximum of 50 cms (VROM, 1996: 88-89).1 
In preparing for the Kyoto negotiations, the EU Council also adopted a long-term  
climate policy goal to limit global warming to less than 2 ºC and a concentration level of 
                                                   
1
  The IPCC reports show that the average annual temperature is 15 ºC. In the last 900.000 
years the global average temperature was never higher than 17 ºC. The last 10.000 years the 
temperature variations were smaller than 2 ºC. Ecosystems can adapt naturally to climate 
change, without the loss of biodiversity, if the increase of temperature is less than 0.1 ºC per 
decade. 
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550 ppmv of CO2 emissions (EC, 1996).2 Since then these policy goals have not been  
re-evaluated, although new targets are being discussed and will be adopted in 2005. 
The question now is: Are these targets still valid given the new science available and the 
perspectives of key social actors? 
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Methodologically, two points are of vital importance:  
• The first is that ‘dangerous’ is not a term that can be defined by scientists alone, 
since danger is a question of the risk societies are willing to take in relation to an ex-
pected problem. It is a question that can only be articulated through a process of dis-
cussion and dialogue between social actors. This calls for the use of concepts and 
tools from public interest science, post-normal science and participatory integrated 
assessment (PIA)3; 
• The second point is that since the impacts of climate change will not be similar nor 
evenly experienced all over the world and across generations, the danger levels asso-
ciated with climate change will be different to different countries and to different 
ecosystems. From a political perspective there are two issues: - the first is that al-
though climate change is seen as primarily a global problem, politically there has 
been a tendency to see adaptation as primarily a local problem (Bodanksy, 1993). 
The second is that there is a governance structure for global problems in which states 
negotiate primarily on the basis of national interests, although the problems may well 
be perceived as global. This implies that there is a fundamental mismatch between 
the global scale of the problem and the national scale interests on the basis of which 
the problem is being dealt with.  
Thus, in order to determine the Netherlands perspective for the long term it is of  
importance: 
• To assess the available science in terms of primarily impacts on the Netherlands; 
• Undertake a science-policy dialogue; and;  
• Highlight how social actors perceive the impacts at global to local levels.  
There are two ways of discussing long-term targets. One is to begin with national posi-
tions on concentration levels and then understand the underlying arguments and values; 
the other is to begin with indicators of impacts, identify threshold levels and work back 
to concentration levels (see Figure 1). 
 
                                                   
2
  These two are not compatible goals and possibly reflects a compromise between those who 
wanted the tougher target of 2 ºC (equivalent to a 450 ppmv CO2 emissions and 550 
ppmvCO2-eq., and those who wanted a weaker target).  
3
  These scientific theories call for integrating participatory approaches in normal scientific 
practice in order to increase the value of the scientific results. Such approaches are in  
particular considered relevant where the public interest is important, where the science is  
uncertain, the risks high and decisions urgent.  
Re-Evaluation of the Netherlands’ Long-Term Climate Targets xxi
		



	

	

 

	
	

	

	
 
Figure 1. The two approaches for analysing long-term targets. 
In this project, we chose the latter method. This is because the specific philosophy of this 
project was that discussing a long-term target in terms of concentration levels (450 ppmv 
- 1000 ppmv) or temperature levels (0.5 °C rise - 3 °C rise) is too abstract for most peo-
ple to react to. It would make more sense to talk in terms of indicators of climate change 
impacts that people can directly relate to in their daily lives. The first step was to identify 
on the basis of a study of the impacts of climate change on the world, Europe and the 
Netherlands, what would be the possible types of indicators that are of scientific signifi-
cance for the Netherlands. The stakeholder discussions would help to identify the key 
indicators that are likely to have a greater appeal to members of society. Having first 
identified what are the most important indicators from a Netherlands’ perspective, we 
then tried to develop arguments about the possible reasons why people should choose for 
a certain threshold level for danger in relation to each indicator. Having spent a second 
session discussing these with key stakeholders, we then tried to use the key arguments 
generated by the stakeholders in discussion with the scientists to identify indicators, rank 
them in order of social and scientific importance, attribute threshold values to these and 
then see if we could make links back to concentration levels/ temperature and hence 
emission levels. The back-calculation approach used in this project can be shown in  
Figure 2.  
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Figure 2. Back calculating from impacts to emission levels. 
In order to address the assessment questions, the project team chose a participatory inte-
grated assessment method. In our interpretation of this method, we first defined the prob-
lem, then we assessed the science and stakeholder inputs. We summed up the scientific 
information available on the problem of climate change with a special emphasis on the 
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impacts on the Netherlands in fact sheets. We undertook interviews with stakeholders in 
the Netherlands on the need for long-term targets and possible definitions thereof. We 
organized two rounds of workshops with stakeholders, at which the latest scientific in-
formation was presented, to allow for a science-policy dialogue. The purpose of provid-
ing this information to the stakeholders and listening to their views on the subject was to 
understand the arguments that play a prominent role among stakeholders in deciding 
how the long-term goal of the Netherlands should be articulated. On the basis of this dia-
logue we identified relevant indicators for the Netherlands, threshold levels for danger-
ous impacts, and back-calculated to the possible concentration levels and long-term tar-
gets on climate change. In other words we decided to take a Netherlands’ perspective on 
climate change (see Figure 3).  
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Figure 3 The structure of the project. 
#	
	
	
Climate change is seen as a serious problem 
The first critical question is: Is climate change seen as a serious problem within the 
Netherlands?  
An assessment of the current state of the science on climate change shows that that there 
has been an increase in the global temperature in the last millennium and in the last cen-
tury; that these changes can be related with observed changed in the global atmospheric 
composition, and it is very likely that there will be a rise in temperature and accompany-
ing impacts in the 21st century and beyond (IPCC WG 1, 2001). The scientific commu-
nity in the Netherlands has confidence in these results.  
There are some sceptics in the Netherlands whose key arguments are that the scientific 
reports are politically motivated consensus reports, and thereby not scientific; that the 
use of the word uncertain throughout these reports shows how bad the science is; that 
there is empirical evidence which is allegedly not being taken into account; that certain 
scientific results and certain scientists are excluded from the process; that IPCC scenar-
ios are based on unrealistically high growth rates for the South, and that in the final 
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analysis the costs of taking measures are so high and the returns so low, that it does not 
make sense to take measures (Labohm et al., 2004).  
The response to these questions were that the IPCC reports represent the best available 
science; and that the consensus concerns the description of the scientific literature, not 
the science as such (i.e. the scientists agree to disagree on many points); that the use of 
the word uncertainty reflects the integrity of the scientists and not the dubious nature of 
the science; that nothing is a priori excluded and as new scientific evidence emerges it 
will be taken into account; that the scenarios of future emissions do assume that develop-
ing countries will become richer in the future; and that even though the costs of taking 
measures are high relative to the possible impacts especially in the case of the Kyoto 
Protocol, it merely represents an (important) first step (Gupta et al., 2004). 
A debate between the stakeholders revealed that once the critique of the climate change 
science was made transparent, the stakeholders still perceived the climate change prob-
lem as a serious problem, meriting substantial action.  
 
There is a strong preference for articulating the long-term goal in targets and  
timetables 
The second critical question is: Should we frame the long-term climate change problem 
in terms of targets and timetables?  
The issue of long-term targets and timetables was brought to the fore in 1992 in Article 2 
of the UNFCCC. Since then, there has been no real articulation of this Article. This, in 
itself, reflects the political difficulties in attempting to do so. The literature reveals that 
those opposing targets and timetables argue that there is incomplete knowledge, diverg-
ing impacts world-wide, different values in assessing risks, and since such a long-term 
target is closely linked with issues of how responsibilities will be divided among coun-
tries. Therefore, they argue that it would be impossible to come to (a) a scientific evalua-
tion of what is dangerous; and (b) political consensus at the global level on what is dan-
gerous. Besides they argue that stabilizing concentrations of GHGs, does not lead di-
rectly to a stabilization of the impacts. The sea level will continue rise for a long time 
thereafter. Meeting the Kyoto targets is a first, small step towards stabilizing concentra-
tions, so small that critics doubt the usefulness of such a step. Hence, the argument is 
that efforts can best be channelled into alternative mechanisms for reducing emissions, 
instead of getting bogged down in intractable controversies (e.g. Pershing & Tudela, 
2003). President George Bush articulated this sentiment as follows: “No one can say 
with any certainty what constitutes a dangerous level of warming, and therefore what 
level must be avoided”4 
Others argue that the adoption of a long-term quantified objective will provide the scien-
tific rationale for the political process, will provide the framework for countries to see if 
they are on track towards achieving these goals, ensure that the negotiations are on track, 
and send clear signals to industry and society. They quote the precautionary principle 
that lack of scientific evidence should not stand in the way of decisions especially where 
irreversible effects are expected. Finally, the methodological objections are shortsighted 
                                                   
4
  http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/06/20010611-2.html.  
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since participatory integrated assessments help in assessing such ‘unstructured’ and 
‘wicked’ problems (cf. Rijsberman & Swart, 1990; Evans, 2002; Gupta et al., 2003). 
The Netherlands’ government is inclined towards adopting long-term targets as can been 
seen from the 1996 report (VROM, 1996) and the re-emergence of the idea of discussing 
medium term targets in political discussion in 2004. The adoption of the target did not 
lead to significant protests in the Netherlands and that can be seen as prima facie evi-
dence that stakeholders either support the view or trust the government’s perspective on 
this. Stakeholders participating in this process did see Article 2 as important and their 
participation indicates that most felt that, despite the scientific and social challenges in 
the process, an effort had to be made to identify what would be dangerous to the Nether-
lands and global society. They argued that unacceptable outcomes of climate change 
would include irreversible outcomes, loss of inhabited land in some parts of the world, 
loss of growth opportunities in developing countries, and high economic costs to the rich 
countries. In theory, a long-term target is useful because it helps to match long-term sci-
entific and short-term political scales, and provides the justification for short-term action. 
In practice this does not automatically imply that the long-term targets will be acceptable 
to all. Although for industry stakeholders the long-term target does not necessarily pose 
a problem, since it is in line with current short-term targets of some industry, they might 
not accept strong medium-term targets. For the insurance industry, the perception shared 
was that there is no real problem, because if the impacts increase the industry will in-
crease the premiums; in other words they can adjust fairly easily. The critical issue of the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs appears to be the effect on the Netherlands’ ability to 
compete on the international market, especially in the context of US non-participation in 
the regime. 
 
There are clear long-term scenarios of expected impacts on the Netherlands 
The third critical question is: what are the likely scenarios for the Netherlands? The 
Royal Netherlands Institute for Meteorology (KNMI) has prepared three scenarios for 
the possible impacts on the Netherlands that corresponds to different levels of tempera-
ture rise in 2100. These are shown in Table 1. 
Table 1. KNMI Climate scenarios for the Netherlands in 2100. 
Temperature +1ºC +2ºC +4 to +6ºC 
Mean summer precipitation +1% +2% +4% 
Summer evaporation +4% +8% +16% 
Mean winter precipitation +6% +12% +25% 
Intensity in winter precipitation +10% +20% +40% 
Frequency of intense winter  
precipitation 
2 times as high 4 times as high 10 times as high 
Sea-level rise +20 cm +60 cm +110 cm 
Note: These values are relative to 1990 levels. 
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Scientists perceive the following impacts as critical for the Netherlands 
The fourth question is: What are the likely impacts on the Netherlands?  
Global warming increases temperatures and thereby interferes with the hydrological cy-
cle. These changes will affect food production, access to water, ecosystems, health, tour-
ism and the coastal zones.  
The Netherlands will be seriously affected by the changes in the water system. It is ex-
pected, for example, that the winter discharges into the Rhine and Meuse will increase, 
while the summer discharge will decrease. A rising sea level will hamper the discharge 
into the sea. The seepage and salinity in areas around the IJsselmeer is expected to in-
crease. Inundations and salt-water intrusion will become more common. There will be 
water shortage in the summer (see Table 2). Rising temperatures and falling quantities 
will affect the availability of cooling water for industry and the power plants.  
Table 2. Water shortage.  
Shortage Soil Shortage surface water 
Present Present 2050(+1°) 2050(+2°)  Present  2050 (+1°) 2050 (+2°)  
Average year 21  25 (+19%)  28 (+36%)  5,7  5,8 (+2%)  6,0 (+4%)  
Extreme dry year  143  153 (+8%)  165 (+17%)  12,4  11,7 (-6%)  12,2 (-2%)  
Source: Arcadis et al., 2002. 
Specialized species (species with specific environmental needs) and the least mobile 
species are likely to be seriously affected, and less specialized species will flourish. We 
can already see sub-tropical and tropic lichen species in the Netherlands. For each degree 
warming, tree lines will shift 300 km pole-wards and about 15-20% of all terrestrial 
vegetation will change composition. The increased warmth may lead to a lengthening of 
the pollen season. A 1ºC increase in water temperature can lead to the death of coral 
reefs. These impacts could lead to species extinction and alteration of ecosystems. 
Although the flooding is unlikely to have serious physical human health consequences, 
the psychological effects may be quite severe. Higher temperatures may lead to in-
creased mortality. Longer pollen seasons could lead to increase in chronic sicknesses 
such as allergies and asthma. Vector-borne diseases are likely to increase, in particular 
the Lyme disease.  
In winter, climate change could have an effect on the number of ice-skating events (e.g. 
Elfstedentocht). While tourists and tourism services may be flexible, tourism infrastruc-
ture is more vulnerable. A rising sea level implies a coastal squeeze (more pressure on 
“soft” coastal areas like wetlands and beaches combined with an increase in hard protec-
tion measures like the construction of sea dikes). Large infrastructural investments will 
be necessary to protect the Netherlands. Changes in the global climate may have a strong 
impact on the coastal zone by the changes in hydrology (river discharges into open sea), 
hydraulic phenomena (wave/storm-climate, sea level and sea-level rise), morphology 
(sedimentation patterns, coastal retreat), ecology (terrestrial and marine) as well as many 
aspects of human use (safety, socio-economic developments).  
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Possible impacts on the Netherlands can be tentatively visualised as follows: 
 
Figure 4. Perceived reasons for concern in the Netherlands. 
Note: Perceived reasons for concern in the Netherlands N.B. The impacts are for the end of the 
21st century. This is a more communicative version of the original, more scientifically sound 
figure, which can be found in Chapter 8. 
 
Adaptation options to climate change: A proactive approach necessary  
The fifth question is: what are the adaptation possibilities for climate change? The adap-
tation options for climate change have been examined on the basis of the stakeholder 
consultations, as well as through an assessment of current scientific understanding of ad-
aptation options. During the stakeholder consultation process, stakeholders discussed po-
tential types of adaptation options, and priorities in the implementation of adaptation 
measures. Based upon the stakeholder participation process, the main adaptation options 
have been further examined on the basis of recent scientific literature.   
We examined the adaptation options for climate change on ecosystems, food production, 
water management, health, tourism and coastal zone management. For ecosystems, the 
most important adaptation option is to ensure the resilience of ecosystems in order to en-
sure the maintenance of their capacity to cope with the climate change induced modifica-
tions of their abiotic environment. Besides climate change, ecosystems are also under 
threat from a range of other factors that lead to the loss of species and modification of 
ecosystems, such as pollution, land use conversion, and overexploitation. Reducing these 
other threats will in many cases be easier and less costly, than reducing the impacts of 
climate change. Agricultural systems can adapt to climate change through changes in 
crop choice, water management, reclamation of land, research programs and organisation 
structure. Some farm level adaptation strategies, such as changes in planting and harvest 
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dates, crop rotation and crop varieties, can be incorporated without large changes in 
management practises. The adaptation to extreme events is particularly cumbersome, this 
requires timely action and long-term capital investments, e.g. in water storage reservoirs. 
Costs of adaptation options for ecosystems and the agricultural sector are, as yet, not 
known in detail. Regarding water management, adaptation will require substantial in-
vestments in upgrading the retention, storage, and discharge systems. The cost which are 
needed in water management in dealing with floods and droughts amount to some €1.2 
billion, based on the +2 °C climate scenario for the year 2100. Possible adaptation 
strategies to mitigate the health effects of climate change cover a wide spectrum, includ-
ing adapted building regulations, enhanced urban planning, early warning systems and 
improved water quality treatment systems. This requires substantial changes in our regu-
latory framework, as well as expensive adaptations to our building infrastructure. For the 
tourism and recreation industry, the adaptation options depend upon the response of tour-
ist to changing climatic conditions, It is generally expected that they will become more 
flexible in booking a holiday as a result of uncertain weather in their potential holiday 
locations. In addition, specific investments may be required to offset the impacts of addi-
tional smog, extreme events, or to adjust the environment e.g. through (energy intensive) 
snow canons on ski-pistes. The coastal zone’s response is largely depending on the rate 
of external changes, in particular sea-level rise. Adaptation is required, in particular, to 
maintain the shoreline and decrease coastal erosion rates. A strategic and proactive ap-
proach to coastal erosion is needed for the sustainable development of vulnerable coastal 
zones and the conservation of coastal biodiversity. 
 
Costs, however important, are seen as complex and relative 
The sixth question is: What will all this cost and how should we deal with the cost issue?  
In determining the costs of climate change, one needs to add the costs of mitigation of 
net GHG emissions, costs of adaptation to the impacts, and the costs of the residual im-
pacts. The more one invests in mitigation, the less the other two costs are at a global 
level. At a national level, the relation is less clear. In determining costs, one needs to 
have a baseline scenario of how societies would otherwise have developed, information 
about the policy regime, the flexibility of the economic and energy systems and the insti-
tutional infrastructure, the rate and nature of technological progress in mitigation tech-
nology and the co-benefits of mitigation measures. There are so many uncertainties in all 
these issues that the projections of costs become a complex issue.  
The total discounted costs of stabilizing emissions at 450 ppmv have been estimated to 
lie between US$ 2.5-18 trillion dollars; at 550 ppmv they have been estimated to be 
about US$ 1-8 trillion and for 650 ppmv about a range of US$ 0.5 to 4 trillion has been 
estimated (IPCC 2001). But these costs do not take into account the lower need for 
costly adaptation measures, nor do they take account of the damage costs of climate 
change impacts. Cost estimates of the stabilization target of 550 ppmv for Europe range 
from direct mitigation costs of 0.5 to 1 percent of GDP to income losses of 2 to 6 percent 
of GDP in 2040. For the world these estimates range from 1 percent, respectively 1 to 5 
percent of GWP in 2040. If co-benefits are taken into account costs may reduce  
substantially. 
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Such numbers are seen differently. If compared to current world income of 20 trillion per 
year, the investment appears gigantic. If viewed in terms of the delay in economic 
growth, the costs appear to be reasonable.  
Given all these considerations, one can argue that mitigation cost estimates cannot read-
ily be used as thresholds, in the sense of “this cost is clearly too high” or “this cost is just 
acceptable”. Nevertheless, policy makers need advice on the costs of policy. 
Although the stakeholders argued in favour of having the best available knowledge on 
costs of policies, during the discussions of indicators and thresholds, they found that they 
were able to engage in a useful elaboration of arguments of why a particular outcome 
was unacceptable, independent of the costs. The key cost challenge for the Netherlands 
was articulated in terms of the loss of competitiveness argument in relation to other 
countries such as the US.  
 
The driving factor for engaging in discussions in the Netherlands  
The seventh question is: What are the driving factors for the Netherlands in engaging in 
discussions on abating climate change? 
The project shows that the Netherlands will be most seriously affected by the impact on 
the water system and then associated impacts. However, most of these impacts did not 
appear to be in themselves very serious, and it did appear that technically speaking the 
Netherlands could possibly cope with many of the impacts. However, stakeholder argued 
that a passive attitude could not be justified because: 
• This did not take the loss of biodiversity at national to global levels into account; 
• The costs of adaptation for the low-lying parts of the Netherlands would not be  
negligible; 
• The mere fact that Netherlands can technically deal with the rising sea-level, does 
not mean that the society wants to be locked within high walls;  
• The irreversible and abrupt events had very high associated risks and these needed to 
be avoided at all costs; and 
• The Netherlands cannot be seen as an isolated actor in the international society, and 
it needs to take into account impacts that occur elsewhere; 
 
24 indicators ranked in six categories are seen as relevant for the Netherlands  
The eight’ question is: What are the relevant indicators for the Netherlands, and how can 
one rank them?  
On the basis of the scientific information, stakeholders identified 21 national level  
indicators and 3 international level indicators. These include: 
• Water quality: The problem of blue algae and botulism are seen as serious threats to 
water quality in the Netherlands and will affect the recreation and tourism industry 
by making water unsafe to swim in; 
• Access to water: There is an expectation that the quality and quantity of water avail-
able to the households may be reduced by climate change, leading to restrictions in 
water use;  
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• Navigability of rivers: Climate change is expected to have an influence on water  
levels in the navigable rivers thus influencing transport in the rivers and the transport 
sector as a whole; 
• Water temperature: The rise of the water temperature may both affect biodiversity 
and fish stocks and have socio-economic impacts, through the rationing of electricity 
related to cooling water availability; 
• Agricultural productivity: Climate change is likely to influence agricultural  
productivity by influencing the quality and quantity of water available for crops;  
• Absolute sea-level rise: Climate change is expected to lead to a rising sea level; this 
continuous rise is expected to have a continuing impact on the Netherlands, long  
after concentration levels are stabilized; 
• Rate of sea-level rise: An absolute sea-level rise implies that the sea-level is rising 
continuously. This is of immediate relevance to defining response actions of society; 
• Spread of infectious disease: A rise in local temperatures may be accompanied by 
the spread of infectious diseases; the most serious identified threat was the Lyme dis-
ease spread by ticks. This could influence both the health sector and recreation  
possibilities; 
• Death from heat waves: Another potential impact of the rise in summer temperatures 
is the rise in death rates especially of senior citizens. This may, however, be  
compensated by a decrease in death rates in the warmer winter months; 
• Increased length of the pollinating season: It is anticipated that the length of the  
pollinating season will increase; if so this will have immediate impacts on chronic 
sicknesses such as allergic responses and asthma; 
• The rate of disappearance of beaches: A rising sea level can be dealt with by build-
ing dikes and dams (although at considerable cost), but not without severe conse-
quences for beaches in the Netherlands. This will have impacts on the recreation and 
tourism sector; 
• Reduced opportunities for ice-skating: With warming, there will be reduced  
opportunities for ice-skating and especially the 11 cities ice-skating event that the 
Dutch are so keen on; 
• The effects on national income: There is an expectation that unilateral policy action 
in the Netherlands will have negative impacts on national income;  
• The effect on other macro-economic factors, such as employment, vulnerable sec-
tors, growth rates: Some sectors may in particular be vulnerable especially if energy 
prices rise as a result of energy related choices. As a counter effect climate change 
measures may have a positive spin-off; 
• Floods: Extreme events will lead to, inter alia, floods in the Netherlands. Such  
flooding can have large consequences on infrastructure as well as human health and 
society;  
• Storms: Other extreme events include storms. These are not expected to have quite 
as severe an impact as floods in the Netherlands; 
• Changes in the biodiversity: The biodiversity in the Netherlands is expected to 
change with the changing environment; 
• Melting of glaciers: Glaciers are projected to continue their widespread retreat dur-
ing the 21st century; 
• Disintegration of the West-Antarctic ice sheet leading to a 1 metre extra sea-level 
rise per century for many centuries: An important international impact that is of  
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direct relevance to the Netherlands is the possible disintegration of the West  
Antarctic ice sheet and its influence on the Netherlands;  
• Changes to the Gulf Stream: Another impact is the possibility of a major change to 
the North Atlantic warm gulf stream leading to significant changes in the European 
climate; 
• The disappearance of species: It is expected that ecosystems in Europe will shift pole 
ward by 300 kilometres for every degree warmer. This will lead to a gradual extinc-
tion of species in this part of the world. Particularly vulnerable regions in the  
Netherlands include the Wadden Sea.  
Indicators purely of an international nature that were also seen as critical for the  
Netherlands included: 
• Access to drinking water world-wide: Current access to drinking water world-wide is 
already a serious problem as recognized by the Millennium Development Goals; but 
it is expected that the climate change problem will exacerbate the situation much  
further; 
• Access to food world-wide: As a result of changing temperatures and rainfall  
patterns, local access to food will also probably change negatively in most parts of 
the developing world;  
• Impacts on North-South equity per se: The impacts of climate change are expected to 
be highly visible in the developing world. Coral reefs are already bleaching, glaciers 
are already melting and rainfall patterns are changing. This is expected to have a 
negative influence on the security in developing countries, and may have negative 
repercussions on the developed world.  
On the basis of a social and scientific ranking process stimulated by the stakeholder  
discussions, the indicators can be prioritised as follows (Table 3). This table integrates 
the scientific and social ranking, but can also be read diagonally. The top left corner 
shows indicators that are both scientifically sound and socially appealing. The bottom 
right indicators are less directly attributable to climate change and perhaps less appealing 
as social indicators but are nevertheless seen as important by social actors. Reading from 
top left to bottom right, we can identify seven categories of priorities. 
 
Speculating on acceptable and non-acceptable threshold levels for society 
The ninth question is: What are appropriate threshold levels per indicator?  
On the basis of the science-policy dialogues, we were able to reach an initial analysis of 
possible acceptable risks and threshold levels. The information in this table is based on 
the work of different break-out groups and extrapolations on the basis of the arguments 
made during the workshops. The latter was necessary as the break-out groups were not 
able to discuss all the different indicators at great detail; but there was a clear line in the 
arguments. These are shown in Table 4. 
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Table 3. Prioritising on the basis of the ranking of scientific and social criteria. 
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Table 4. Perceived threshold levels in the Netherlands: Results of Dialogues and  
extrapolation  
Priority Indicator Acceptable risk Not acceptable 
Access to clean drinking 
water 
That there is a temporary ban 
on washing cars; or watering 
gardens 
That children cannot take 
baths; or you cannot drink 
water from the tap; 
Death from heat waves Mortality remains stable An increase in mortality 
Allergies and other 
chronic sicknesses due 
to longer pollen season 
 Structural increase in 
chronic sicknesses 
A 
Rate of sea-level rise 20 cm per century > 50 cm per century; 
> 3 mm per year, because 
of the devastating effects 
on the Wadden sea 
Water quality (number 
of weeks one cannot 
swim) 
An increase of 50% from cur-
rent levels;  
An increase of 200%; 
Structural effect annually  
B 
Navigability of rivers Incidentally less load Over four weeks less load 
Over two weeks less load 
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Water temperature An incidental rise leading to 
fish kills 
Structural rise leading to 
loss of biodiversity; 
Code red: Electricity is 
rationed, because of the 
impact on electricity pro-
duction 
Spread of infectious dis-
ease 
An increases in the chance of 
falling ill 
If adaptation is no longer 
possible, or if the costs for 
adaptation are out of pro-
portion  
 
Floods Incidental increases Structural increases affect-
ing property values 
Productivity of land Incidental losses Structural losses  
Absolute seal level rise Marginal increases > 0.5 m too costly 
Effect on work and sec-
tors 
Marginal changes Income inequality in-
creases 
Disappearance of species Incidental losses Where the legal norms are 
exceeded and structural 
losses 
C 
The number of major 
skating events (Elfsteden 
tochten) 
Less than current levels Less than once every ten 
years 
Effect on income Incidental loss of income No growth as result of im-
pacts for one year; If 
Netherlands competitive-
ness is affected 
Change in biodiversity Incidental changes Loss of key species and 
ecosystem functions 
D 
Melting of glaciers Incidental changes Structural large-scale 
Impact on the Gulf 
Stream 
Negligible chance Increase of probability 
Rate at which the beach 
disappears 
When the beach can be easily 
replenished 
When replenishment is too 
expensive affecting  
tourism 
E 
Instability through 
North-South impacts 
At current levels Should not increase  
structurally 
Disintegration of the 
Antarctic 
Negligible chance Increase of probability 
Global access to  
drinking water 
Should meet Millennium  
targets 
Should not become worse 
than today 
F 
Storms Current levels Should not increase  
structurally 
G Access to food Current problems When this leads to interna-
tional instability and  
significant increase in fi-
nancial inequality 
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Back-calculating to global temperature levels and concentration levels 
Local climate thresholds for impacts need to be converted to global indicators, because 
of the larger-scale context of global warming and climate policy. For example, tempera-
ture change averaged over the Netherlands is projected to increase with a factor of about 
1.1 as compared to the global mean. When local impact thresholds have been translated 
to global indicators, the latter need to be related to GHG concentration targets, before the 
implications for near- to mid-term emission pathways can be determined. The dominant 
uncertainty in this step is in the value of the climate sensitivity. This is the equilibrium 
global-mean surface-air temperature increase resulting from a doubling of the CO2 
(equivalent) concentrations in the atmosphere compared to pre-industrial levels. By use 
of recent probability estimates of this parameter, risk assessment becomes possible, 
which is a useful method for evaluating policy options in the context of major uncertain-
ties. In this approach, the question is not which concentration level results in limiting 
global-mean temperature to a maximum defined by the impact thresholds? Rather, ques-
tions like this need to be rephrased to which concentration levels result in a probability 
of at least x% that global-mean temperature will be limited to a maximum defined by the 
impact thresholds? Obviously, setting threshold levels and assigning a pursued probabil-
ity level (x%) is the task of policy makers and stakeholders. 
 
Temperature or concentration targets 
The next question is whether one should focus on temperature levels, concentration lev-
els or a combination of the two. In case the GHG concentrations are stabilized at 650 
ppmv the temperature increase will only remain below 2 ºC if the climate sensitivity is 
low. With a high climate sensitivity of 4.5 ºC, neither stabilization levels will meet the 2 
ºC target. To some extent, these time-dependent results also depend on the climate model 
used. For stabilization at 550 ppmv CO2-eq. the probability of limiting temperature in-
crease to 2 ºC is about 33% and 50% respectively. For stabilization at 650 ppmv, this de-
crease to about 10 - 33%. A 100% probability is unachievable, because of the uncer-
tainty in probability estimates, but also because of other uncertainties in the climate 
change cause-and-effect chain than assessed in this report. An important observation is 
that the probabilities depend non-linearly on concentration levels. For the 2ºC target the 
probability of achieving this target increases most rapidly with decreasing concentrations 
at medium-to-low stabilization levels. 
Because of large inertias in the climate system, the full temperature consequences of sus-
tained variations in radiative forcing are not felt for many decades to centuries. There-
fore, if concentrations are lowered immediately after stabilization, the full consequence 
of the peak concentration is moderated. In the light of these inertias, long-term stabiliza-
tion of GHG concentrations might therefore not be the most sensible target, especially 
since temperature change is also a more appropriate indicator of climate change impacts 
concentrations might not be the most sensible target.  
Current estimates shows that in order to stabilize GHG concentrations at 550 ppmv CO2-
eq. global anthropogenic emissions (including both energy, industry and land use emis-
sions) will have to peak before 2020 at a level about 35% above 1990 levels. By the 
2030s emissions would need to have returned to 1990 levels. For stabilizing at 650 ppmv 
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CO2-eq. global emissions could peak later at a higher level and need to return to 1990 
levels at a much later stage. Low stabilization levels leave little room for optimisation: 
e.g. for stabilizing at 550 ppmv CO2-eq. the global emissions need to peak within 20 
years from the present-day, or concentrations will exceed this level. At higher stabiliza-
tion levels emission profiles can be varied concerning gas mixture and/or over time, in-
cluding reduction delays compensated by steeper reductions later on. 
In response to the question, should the focus of a long-term target be on concentrations, 
temperatures or something else, the arguments were as follows: 
• A focus on global-mean temperature is useful in that it is logical from a scientific 
perspective, closer to impacts, representative of a number of impacts, easy to verify, 
understandable; even if not entirely appealing and too abstract for society; 
• A focus on concentrations is useful because it relates directly to emission levels, 
even though it is more abstract for society and somewhat further away from impacts. 
It would appear that the stakeholders were somewhat neutral on this. 
 
What are other countries doing? 
The Netherlands is a small country with marginal emissions. It does not make political 
sense to investigate how the Netherlands should examine the long-term objective of the 
climate change target, if we do not know how other countries perceive the issue.  
The US clearly is not inclined to investigate long-term targets at the present moment. On 
the other hand, the EU is looking into this issue. This is not just an aberration in behav-
iour, but can be traced back to the political approaches of both countries (Kagan, 2004). 
Within the EU, initial research shows that not only does the EU itself has a target dating 
back to 1996, the UK, Sweden, France and Germany have identified long-term and 
short-term conditional targets. The French and Germans seem to like to limit warming to 
2 °C and concentration levels to 450 ppmv CO2.  
The UK and Sweden appear to be moving towards a –60% reduction for the developed 
countries in 2050 in relation to 1990 levels. Germany is considering a –40% reduction in 
2025 if other EU countries commit to a 30 % reduction. The Netherlands’ government is 
politically exploring the possibility of a –30% reduction in 2020.5 A recent Netherlands 
report argues against such a target, because it appears to be unfeasible at the moment 
from a stakeholder perspective (Hisschemöller & van de Kerkhof, 2004). However, an-
other Dutch report (Bollen et al., 2004) argues that a reduction of 30% in relation to 
1990 levels is feasible at reasonable costs if emission trading is allowed. 
 
Policy recommendations 
Having slowly worked our way back to the long-term targets, the key question is: what 
should the Netherlands’ perspective be on long-term targets?  
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  Tweede Kamer, 2003-2004, 28240., Nr. 5. 
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Figure 4. Current positions of countries on long- and short-term targets. 
The scientists concluded that:  
• Beyond 2 ºC global warming in relation to pre-industrial levels, there is consensus 
that the climatic system could become unstable and irreversible impacts may become 
inevitable; 
• It should be noted that 2 ºC, still implies huge losses to some low-lying countries and 
some ecosystems;  
• The 2 ºC target may already have been exceeded if the sensitivity of the climate sys-
tem to emissions is higher than currently expected; in other words if the current 
emissions of aerosols is masking the enhanced greenhouse effect to some extent; 
(However, the IPCC has not yet made any firm assessment of the situation as yet); 
• Taking all the above into account, it was agreed that on the basis of the current sci-
ence, a 2 ºC target in combination with current expectations that this coincides with a 
500-550 ppmv CO2-eq. concentration level seems to be the most reasonable long-
term target for the Netherlands. 
From a political perspective, there were some discussions: 
• Modifying a 2ºC target to a 3 ºC target would reduce the urgency for action and in-
crease the risk of instability in the system; this risk was not seen as politically ac-
ceptable.
 
Besides, beyond 3 ºC the biosphere could become a source rather than a 
sink of GHGs; 
• Reducing a 2 ºC target to something lower does not seem at all feasible, especially 
because of the short-term implications.6; 
• Should the science indicate that the climate system is more sensitive to emissions 
this would only imply that the urgency to take measures will increase drastically, and 
this is an additional argument for not relaxing the 2ºC target; 
• The perspectives of other large EU member states on the issue strengthens the  
political argument since the Netherlands is then not alone in this perspective. 
 
                                                   
6
  Even a 2oC target appears less feasible in the Dutch context, according to a selection of 
Dutch stakeholders (see Hisschemöller and van de Kerkhof, 2004, on the feasibility of a         
–30% target in 2020). 
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Research recommendations 
There are a number of items that need to be further researched. These include: 
• Further scientific research to increase knowledge about regional climate change and 
the associated impacts; 
• Considerable uncertainty exists in the estimates of the probability distribution of the 
climate sensitivity. An evaluation of the differences between currently applied meth-
odologies and an assessment of the associated reliability is recommended; 
• In the past decade, most research effort has been put into estimating mitigation costs 
associated with stabilization of greenhouse-gas concentrations. New research is re-
quired to evaluate peaking and overshoot profiles that might provide more cost-
effective options to achieve the same long-term climate targets; 
• Probability estimates, concentration estimates, and assessments of emission path-
ways and associated emission reduction costs are currently performed as single is-
sues by different (modelling) tools and research groups. An integrated (modelling) 
framework capturing all these issues is required in the light of inconsistencies like 
different baseline scenarios, reduction options, greenhouse-gas mixtures and climate 
system characteristics; 
• Further scientific research and discussions with national stakeholders on further 
elaboration of and the robustness of the threshold levels for the indicators; 
• In addition, in order to gain momentum for the political action needed, global sci-
ence-policy dialogues on long- term targets need to be supported. This is necessary 
since the negotiations are continuously focused on short-term goals and the long-
term perspective is often lost. 
	
This research was a cooperative effort of seven research institutes and involved a  
maximum of 30 stakeholders. The results of this research need to be further discussed 
and tested with a much more broad group of scientists and stakeholders in order to seek 
greater accuracy and legitimacy. 

Arcadis Ruimte & Milieu, HKV LIJN IN WATER, Korbee & Hovelynck B.V., RIZA, (2002). 
Droogtestudie Nederland Eindrapport fase 1 (5 maart 2002) 110605/Br3/35/000006/001.  
Bodansky, D. (1993). Framework Convention on Climate Change: A Commentary, in Yale Journal 
of International Law, 18, 451-588. 
Bollen, J.C., Manders A.J.G.M. & Veenendaal, P.J. (2004). Wat kost een emissiereductie van 30%? 
Macro-economischer effecten in 2020 van post-Kyoto klimaatbeleid, RIVM and CPB; Report 
500035001, Bilthoven. 
Eickhout, B., Den Elzen, M.G. J. & Van Vuuren, D. P. (2003). Multi-gas emission profiles for 
stabilizing greenhouse gas concentrations: Emission implications of limiting global tempera-
ture increase to 2°C. RIVM Report no. 728001026. 
EU (1996). Council Conclusions, EU Environment Council, Brussels. 
Evans, A. (2002). Fresh Air? Options for the Future Architecture of International Climate 
Change Policy, The New Economics Foundation, London. 
Re-Evaluation of the Netherlands’ Long-Term Climate Targets xxxvii
FCCC (1992). The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, FCCC  
Secretariat, Bonn. 
Gupta, J., Berk, M.M. & Asselt, H. van (2003). Defining Dangerous: Report of the Annex 1 
Workshop on Article 2 of the Climate Convention; HOT WD 1. IVM Report (W-03-35), 
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, pp. 38.  
Hisschemöller, M. & Van de Kerkhof, M. (2004). Europa, Nederland: How verder na Kyoto? 
Aanbevelingen van stakeholders voor het Nederlands EU Voorzitterschap, Platform  
Communication on Climate Change, RIVM. 
IPCC WG-1 (2001). Climate Change 2001. The Scientific Basis. Contribution of Working Group 
I to the Third Assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. In 
Houghton, J.T., Ding, Y., Griggs, D.J., Noguer, M., van der Linden, P.J., Dai, Maskell, K. & 
Johnson, C.A. (eds.). Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New 
York, NY, USA, 881pp. 
Kagan, R. (2004). Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order,  
Vintage Books, New York. 
Labohm, H., Rozendaal, S. & Thoenes, D. (2004). Man-made global warming: Unravelling a 
Dogma, Multi-Science Publishing Co. Ltd. 
Pershing, J. & Tudela, F. (2003). A long-term target. Framing the climate effort. In: Aldy et al., 
Beyond Kyoto. Advancing the international effort against climate change. Arlington, VA: 
Pew Centre.  
Rijsberman, F. & Swart, R.J. (eds.) (1990). Targets and Indicators of Climate Change, The 
Stockholm Environment Institute, Stockholm. 
VROM (1996). Memorandum on Climate Change, Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the 
Environment, The Netherlands. 
WBGU (2003). Climate protection strategies for the 21st century: Kyoto and beyond. German 
Advisory Council on Global Change. 
Re-Evaluation of the Netherlands’ Long-Term Climate Targets 1 
2,-	
			
Coordinating lead author: Joyeeta Gupta 
Lead authors: Harro van Asselt and Marcel Berk 
&"
	

This document assesses the existing literature in order to be able to come to an articula-
tion of possible long-term policy goals for the Netherlands’ government in the area of 
climate change. A participatory method has been chosen in assessing the existing litera-
ture in order to identify the possible arguments and choices that stakeholders may make 
in favour of a particular definition of risk of danger. This document provides information 
on how Article 2 of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(FCCC 1992) can be articulated, and specific information about whether and how the 
Netherlands’ government’s own articulation of the long-term goal can be updated in the 
light of new scientific information and an assessment of stakeholder perceptions. The  
information aims to be both scientifically sound and easily usable by policymakers and 
stakeholders.  
&'
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

The climate change problem is being addressed through the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change adopted in 19927 and a series of negotiated or antici-
pated protocols. The Convention provides a long-term objective in Article 2:  
“The ultimate objective of this Convention and any related legal instruments that the 
Conference of the Parties may adopt is to achieve, in accordance with the relevant 
provisions of the Convention, the stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in 
the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference 
with the climate system. Such a level should be achieved within a time-frame suffi-
cient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food 
production is not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a 
sustainable manner.” 
In 1997, the Kyoto Protocol to the FCCC was adopted. The Protocol includes quantita-
tive commitments for the developed countries and designs mechanisms to help countries 
achieve their commitments in a cost-effective manner.8 The Protocol sets an overall  
target of a reduction of 5.2% of global emissions by the year 2008-2012.  
                                                   
7
  The FCCC consists of 26 articles. It sets out a long-term goal, defines principles for develop-
ing the regime further, lists the policies and measures that countries should undertake, estab-
lishes a financial mechanism and outlines a reporting mechanism. The Convention entered 
into force in 1994 and has been ratified by 188 parties (including the EC). For a critical 
analysis of the content of the convention, see Bodansky, 1993. 
8
  For a critical analysis of the content of the Protocol see Oberthür and Ott, 1999; and Grubb et 
al., 1999. 
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This is very low in relation to the level of emission reductions that may be considered 
necessary in order to protect the earth from dangerous interference (e.g. Bolin, 1998). Of 
course, the determination of whether this is low or not depends on one’s interpretation of 
dangerous emission levels.  
The level at which the concentrations of greenhouse gases (GHGs) are eventually stabi-
lized determines the overall level of global climate change. At the same time, the level of 
climate change and the severity of its impacts are highly uncertain, particularly at the re-
gional level. Given the large uncertainties about the impacts of different stabilization 
levels it is necessary to address the question: do we need to set long-term stabilization 
targets in relation to GHG concentrations, and are concentrations of GHGs in the atmos-
phere the most appropriate indicator for setting long-term targets? 
Climate change negotiations have so far focused almost exclusively on short-term issues 
related to GHG mitigation in the first commitment period (2008-2012) and the use of 
flexibility mechanisms in the Kyoto Protocol. However, action outlined in the Kyoto 
Protocol represents only an initial step towards achieving the overall objective of the 
FCCC. During a global dialogue project on Article 2 (Gupta et al., 2003), we discovered 
that most negotiators get so involved in the nitty-gritty details of negotiating short-term 
goals on the basis of narrow national interests, that they lose sight of the long-term ob-
jective and what it implies for national commitments. It is therefore necessary to look 
beyond shorter-term imperatives in order to address this objective and contribute towards 
a sound and equitable long-term solution to the challenge of climate change.  
At the same time, the debate on ratification and entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol 
has been marked by calls to broaden the ambit of the Protocol by including developing 
country GHG mitigation commitments (e.g. Clinton, 1997). These demands have been 
countered by developing countries by references to their low cumulative and current per 
capita GHG emissions, low per capita incomes, low GHG intensity of GDP at purchas-
ing power parity, and high vulnerability and poor coping capacity to climate change im-
pacts (e.g. Gupta, 2001). There is an increasing awareness amongst developing countries 
of the implications of climate change and they demand that international climate policy 
making should not only deal with mitigation but also the issue of adaptation. There is a 
strong need for dialogue amongst policymakers and stakeholders about acceptable and 
unacceptable climate change impacts, about fair ways of dealing with the unequal distri-
bution of impacts, and about options for a fair distribution of emission control and adap-
tation costs.
 
The level of climate change impacts is related to both the overall magnitude of the 
change, the rate at which it occurs, and the ability of the natural and human systems to 
tolerate or adapt to the change. Not all systems are equally vulnerable to climate change: 
some systems are likely to adapt more easily than others (See IPCC WG2, 2001). Human 
systems may adapt more easily than natural systems, while developed countries gener-
ally have more adaptive capabilities than developing countries. In assessing dangerous 
levels of climate change, adaptation options and capabilities need to be taken into ac-
count. This raises questions about how to evaluate different types of impacts and how to 
deal with regional and social differences in impacts. This also raises questions about 
critical impacts (impacts that should guide actions) and intergenerational solidarity (i.e. 
what time horizon should be taken when considering climate change impact risks). 
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The climate change problem basically constitutes a risk problem, where climate change 
impact risks need to be balanced against the risk of climate control policies. Acceptable 
levels of climate change will be defined in relation to the possible societal consequences 
of impacts, adaptation, and mitigation efforts. An assessment of non-dangerous climate 
change thus also entails an assessment of the implications of climate change control 
policies.  
Defining “dangerous” has four critical dimensions: 
• The inherent uncertainty in climate change science: scientific uncertainties make it 
very difficult to assess the likelihood of possible climate change events and thus to 
quantify the risks of climate change (IPCC WG2, 2001); 
• The scientific difficulty for scientists to define what would be an acceptable level and 
time-frame for global concentrations of GHGs to be stabilized. This is because the 
evaluation of climate change risks is essentially a political issue and scientific  
opinions vary with regard to determining what can qualify, objectively speaking, as 
being “dangerous”;  
• The political framing of the problem where although climate change is seen as a 
global problem, the impacts and adaptation are seen as primarily local problems  
(Bodansky, 1993); 
• The scale mismatch between the problem and decision-making: While the problem 
of climate change is a global problem, decision making at the international level is 
based on countries negotiating on the basis of what are perceived to be their national 
interests. Thus, countries may appear to take responsibility for the global nature of 
the problem, but when it comes down to specifics, countries take decisions on the ba-
sis of what is perceived as an unacceptable dangerous level for themselves. 
In short, the climate change issue is characterised as an unstructured problem where both 
the values at stake, as well as the science are uncertain and subject to debate  
(Hisschemöller, 1993) and as a wicked problem since the costs of policies and impacts 
are asymmetrically distributed worldwide (e.g. Cunningham & Cunningham, 2002). This 
type of post-normal9 science problem requires a methodological framework within 
which scientists, policy makers and other stakeholders can enter into a dialogue to assess 
what level of ‘danger’ (in terms of possible impacts) could be attached to different levels 
of climate change, what could be the implications of false policy responses (policies  
being either too loose or too stringent), and hence, what long-term concentration levels 
(or alternative policy indicators) may be considered acceptable and unacceptable, and on 
what grounds (criteria/values). 
In determining what is dangerous it is important to realise two things: 
• The climate system will only respond slowly to mitigation efforts: impacts of climate 
change will continue to manifest themselves well beyond the moment global GHG 
emissions are being reduced and even after GHG concentrations have actually been 
stabilized (see Figure 2.5 and Chapter 5). This means that short-term decisions about 
                                                   
9
  Post-normal science calls for stakeholder participation where the science is uncertain, the 
stakes high and decisions imminent (Functovicz et al., 1996). 
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GHG emission control need to be evaluated from a long-term perspective, because 
they may foreclose long-term climate control options; 
• Further, although the contribution of the Netherlands to addressing the problem in 
theory reduces the need to invest in adaptation within the Netherlands, these two 
should in fact be seen as separate issues. This is because of the inertia in the climatic 
system itself and because the Dutch efforts at reducing emissions are not necessarily 
accompanied by global efforts to reduce the emissions. This raises the question of 
what long-term climate change targets would imply for global emission control poli-
cies in the short to medium term (post 2012 policies).  
In 1996, the Netherlands’ government interpreted Article 2 of the FCCC as follows: The 
global average temperature should not rise above a maximum of 2 ºC of pre-industrial 
levels; in other words the rate of temperature change should be less than 0.1 ºC per dec-
ade, and sea-level rise should be limited to a maximum of 50 cm (VROM, 1996: 88-89). 
In preparing for the Kyoto negotiations, the EU Council too adopted a long-term climate 
policy goal to limit global warming to less than 2 ºC and a concentration level of 550 
ppmv of CO2 emissions.10 Since then these policy goals have not been re-evaluated. This 
is because most of the policy attention since has focused on the negotiations of the Kyoto 
Protocol and preparations for implementations of the national commitments. However, 
with the upcoming discussions on post-Kyoto commitments and the increase in scientific 
insights into the risks of climate change and into options and cost of mitigation, a re-
evaluation has become very policy relevant again. Such a re-evaluation is also valid in 
the light of the Netherlands presidency of the European Union (EU) in the second half of 
2004. Thus, the main research question is: Do the climate policy goals need to be 
changed on the basis of the new science that is available and present valuation of the 
risks, policy efforts and socio-economic costs involved? 
Clearly, this document is not unique in its focus on Article 2. The IPCC Fourth Assess-
ment Report is now also looking at Article 2 but will not examine the values that under-
lie a determination of what is dangerous.11 Bill Hare, the international climate policy di-
rector of Greenpeace International has just completed a book on the subject (Hare, 
2003), but does not examine the values involved. The Pew Centre has set up a project on 
Post-Kyoto climate issues, based on a series of 3 international workshops on a set of 
academic papers, to be followed in 2004 by an international dialogue process.12 Fur-
thermore, the German Federal Environmental Agency (Umweltbundesamt) has pub-
lished a study that dealt with, inter alia, the ethical aspects of articulating Article 2 (Ott 
et al., 2004) and is involved in organizing workshops and discussions on Article 2.13 
                                                   
10
  These two are not compatible goals and possibly reflects a compromise between those who 
wanted the tougher target of 2˚ C (equivalent to a 450 ppmv CO2 emissions and 550 ppm 
CO2 eq., and those who wanted a weaker target).  
11
  At the last meeting at Potsdam of the IPCC Assessment Report 4 it was decided that issues 
relating to article 2 would be a cross-sectoral element for all IPCC documents. See also Pat-
wardhan et al. (2003) and Izrael (2002). 
12
  See the Pew Centre website : http://www.pewclimate.org.   
13
  See http://www.fiacc.net. 
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The objectives of this report are to: 
• Provide support to the evaluation and re-definition of the long-term climate policy 
goals of the Netherlands;
 
• Provide an overview of available science that meets the needs of the stakeholders in 
order to determine a dangerous level of climate change; 
• Evaluate the appropriateness of the indicators selected and possible alternatives from 
both societal, political and technical points of view; 
• Explore views and values of policy makers and stakeholders about acceptable  
climate change risks; 
• Assess the risks and costs associated with different long-term climate policy targets 
(in terms of avoiding unacceptable risk levels and societal consequences);  
• Evaluate the short-term implications of alternative long-term climate targets; and  
• Thereby both contribute to the way the Netherlands prepares for the international  
negotiations on the issue; and to the anticipated global and national dialogues on  
Article 2. 
The project focuses on the following specific substantive questions: 
• How can Article 2 of the FCCC be elaborated into quantitative and qualitative  
indicators for climate change control? What operational criteria could be developed 
to indicate dangerous and non-dangerous levels of anthropogenic interference with 
the climate system? What indicators can be selected that are both politically relevant 
and publicly comprehensible and appealing, and can be scientifically substantiated 
(attributable to climate change, reliable/valid, measurable, predictable)? How can  
different indicators be aggregated?; 
• What are the options for adaptation to avoid exceeding thresholds levels? What level 
of adaptation is feasible and acceptable?; 
• How can the indicator levels be related to the possible scenarios? How are the  
indicator levels and the risks of exceeding critical levels related to levels of climate 
change? How can the levels of climate change be related to long-term goals for  
stabilization of GHG concentrations? How do these long-term concentration levels 
relate to GHG emission levels on the long term and the short-term? What would be 
the implications of limiting the risks of exceeding long-term indicators thresholds 
levels for global emission control on the short- to medium term (the post Kyoto  
period)?; 
• What are the options and costs of meeting long-term stabilization targets? How are 
its feasibility and costs related to socio-economic and technological developments, 
social and institutional barriers, and the timing of mitigation efforts? How can risks 
of high future policy adjustment costs be limited (e.g. hedging)?;  
• How can we deal with the unequal distribution of climate impacts and mitigation  
capabilities? What can be the role of supporting adaptation and/or providing com-
pensation? How can mitigation costs be (e)valuated against adaptation costs/climate  
impacts?; 
• What is the value of climate indicators and long-term climate targets for developing 
an effective international climate change regime and rallying societal support for 
dealing with climate change? 
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Procedural questions include: 
• What do participants understand as key issues in Article 2?; 
• What are the key knowledge gaps that need to be addressed?; 
• Do participants believe that a discussion of Article 2 is critical for the future devel-
opment of the climate change regime?; 
• On the basis of what values and principles do participants define dangerous threshold 
levels for the various risk indicators? What are the arguments used by stakeholders to 
define dangerous levels? What are the common interests behind the different  
positions if any?; 
• Do participants understand and accept the positions of others? What are the main 
points of conflict in the dialogues? What is the nature of disagreement: is it based on 
different reality claims, value claims and/or interests?; 
• Is there social learning: do the participants get a better understanding of the positions 
of others? Does the dialogue change their views? Does the dialogue result in a  
convergence in views regarding facts, values or policy strategies (how to deal with 
Article 2)?;  
• What is the role of experts? Does the dialogue in the community of climate change 
experts result in stronger common understandings of Article 2 amongst stakeholders 
or does it hinder this? 
The strategic importance of this project lies in the fact that it focuses on: 
• Article 2, the corner stone of the Climate Change Convention; 
• The gap between science and policy and the need for a new form of science-policy 
interface; 
• Communicating IPCC science to stakeholders in understandable language; 
• Developing a methodology for understanding how ‘dangerous’ should be evaluated; 
• Engaging actively in a discussion of facts and values in order to determine what is 
‘dangerous’ climate change;  
• Communicating the results back to IPCC through standard channels of  
communication; 
• Supporting the preparations of the Netherlands government for the international  
negotiations. Negotiations on Post-Kyoto climate policies within the framework of 
the EU and the UNFCCC. 
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An indicator is information – usually quantitative – pointing to a matter (state or  
development) of some significance (Spreng & Wils, 2000: 4). It describes a system or 
process such that it has significance beyond the face value of its components. It aims to 
communicate information on the system or process (UNESCO, 2003: 33). An aspect of 
an indicator is that it is measurable – either quantitative or qualitative – over time and/or 
space. This aspect enables various forms of comparison (Astleithner et al., 2004: 9). 
The goal of climate indicators is to support the development and evaluation of climate 
policies. In general, indicators for sustainable development can provide the necessary 
guidance for policy makers in a number of ways: 
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• They can translate physical and social science knowledge into manageable units of 
information that can facilitate the decision-making process; 
• They can help to measure and calibrate progress towards sustainable development 
goals;  
• They can provide an early warning, sounding the alarm in time to prevent economic, 
social and environmental damage, and;  
• They are also important tools to communicate ideas, thoughts and values.14  
Indicators can be (Spreng & Wils, 2000):  
• Technical indicators: quantifiable indicators, applied by engineers with regard to  
initially all kinds of properties of any kind of equipment, but later also to larger and 
more complex technical systems; 
• Social indicators: indicators aimed at measuring the quality of life through statistical 
information (objective social indicators) and by leaving the choices to individuals 
(subjective social indicators); 
• Environmental indicators: indicators that measure the natural state and/or the way 
human influences affect this state; 
• Economic indicators: indicators that are used to measure the present state of the  
market or of companies (performance indicators) or to indicate a future direction 
(leading indicators); a distinction can be made between macro- and micro-economic 
indicators; 
• Sustainability indicators: indicators that have their roots in the previously mentioned 
indicators and that may serve to monitor and communicate chances for and threats to 
sustainable development. 
The main functions of indicators are simplification, quantification, communication and 
ordering. Indicators can relate and integrate information and allow comparison of  
different regions and different aspects (UNESCO, 2003: 34). Based on the functions that 
indicators perform, one can make the following distinctions:  
• Static indicators provide information on the (changes in the) state of geophysical  
systems and ecosystems; their function is to point out changes in these systems and 
the chances that these system changes occur, thereby communicating information of 
the total system to policy-makers and the public;  
• Effects indicators provide information on the (changes in risks of) (negative) impacts 
on natural and human systems due to climate change. Their function is to provide the 
basis for the valuation of impacts of climate change by measuring or estimating 
(changes in) effects and risks of climate change for the setting of set policy targets;  
• Policy indicators serve to provide information on policy targets and the current state 
of affairs in relation to those targets (to what extent has the target been achieved?). 
Their function is to provide guidance for action and measuring or estimating policy 
effectiveness. 
In applying indicators to climate change O’Neill and Oppenheimer (2002) identify as 
key indicators certain climate impacts, such as large-scale eradication of coral reef sys-
                                                   
14
  http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/natlinfo/indicators/indisd/indisd-mg2001.pdf.  
 Institute for Environmental Studies 8
tems, disintegration of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet and the weakening or shutdown of 
the large-scale circulation of the oceans.   
In general, four approaches on how indicators can be developed can be discerned: 
• The bottom-up approach where the logic goes from data to parameters to indicators;  
• The top-down approach, which follows the logic down from vision to themes to  
actions to indicators; 
• The systems approach, which bases indicators on a comprehensive analysis of  
system inflows and outputs; and 
• The cause-effect approach (commonly known as the Pressure-State-Response (PSR) 
approach or the Driving force-Pressure–State-Impact-Resource (DPSIR) or the Driv-
ing Force-Pressure-State-Exposure-Effect-Action (DPSEEA)), which subscribes to 
the logic of indicators denoting various causes and effects. (UNESCO, 2003: 37). 
This report uses a combination of the top-down and the bottom-up approaches. The  
bottom-up approaches were used by the scientists and the top-down approaches were 
used by the stakeholders. 
Although indicators can be quite useful for aforementioned purposes, there are neverthe-
less limits to their usefulness (UNESCO, 2003): 
• Spatial and temporal scale: Indicators may not be relevant for all spatial or  
geographical scales. It may not be possible or desirable to aggregate the data for 
smaller scales in such a way that it applies to a higher spatial level. Furthermore, 
whereas an indicator could be very appropriate on a regional or national level, it 
would sometimes make little sense to use this indicator at the global level, given the 
considerable differences between regions and countries. Conversely, an indicator  
related to a global state or development will not always be appropriate for smaller 
spatial scales. The foregoing raises the question of the optimal spatial scale of use for 
an indicator. The answer to this question depends on the information needed and,  
related to this, the purpose and function of the indicator. The chosen spatial scale in-
evitably influences the information presented by the indicator; choosing a higher  
spatial level will usually be accompanied with loss of detail; 
• Indicators may also not be useful for all temporal scales. For example, deaths from 
heat waves will occur mainly in summer, but annual statistics on the number of  
victims do not necessarily show this. Similarly, water availability calculated on an 
annual basis does not show water shortages or floods. It would therefore make more 
sense if the data were gathered on a seasonal basis. The temporal scale of an indica-
tor is also dependent on the chosen point in time and the period of data collection;  
• Visual presentation: With the presentation of indicator information, there is always 
the risk of simplification at the cost of scientific robustness. Whereas the end-user of 
the indicator cannot always consume all the scientific information contained in the 
indicator, simplifying this information is sometimes necessary; 
• Changes over time: If the information contained in the indicator is measured over 
time, it is possible for the indicator to point out certain trends. These measurements 
through time require that at least the data is collected in the same way and that the 
indicator remains the same. However, it is sometimes necessary to upgrade the  
indicator or the method of data collection in order to obtain the best available  
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information. This implies a choice between the best available information and the 
best results over a longer period of time;  
• Misinformation and misinterpretation: Misinformation and misinterpretation are 
risks inherently connected to the use of indicators. Firstly, indicator development in-
evitably contains some subjective elements. In order to prevent misinformation, it is 
imperative that these subjective elements are identified and described. Secondly, in-
dicators may cause confusion if it is unclear how they are defined. Therefore, they 
should be sufficiently precise.15 Thirdly, there may be certain mathematical problems 
in the process of aggregating indicators. Lastly, the data used may be unreliable. This 
problem may root from either the data collection or the data processing; 
• Data availability: The availability of proper data can seriously hamper or influence 
the choice of indicators and the information contained in the indicator. From a  
scientific point of view, it makes little sense to choose an indicator for which no or 
little information is available or can be obtained, regardless of the social relevance of 
such an indicator. If the data is not yet available, the information needs should give 
the signal that such data should be sought. If the data desired cannot be obtained, 
other indicators should be sought. 
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This section elaborates on the role of the project in a larger set of projects on interpreting 
‘dangerous’ climate change and the methodological design adopted to deal with the 
problem. 
2,3,2
		4
		
This project focuses on the Netherlands’ interpretation of Article 2. It follows up on a 
larger international project that focused on how different parts of the world interpret  
Article 2. Both are part of a design of a programme on Article 2 called Helping Opera-
tionalise article Two (HOT). The aim of these projects is to understand how stakeholders 
and scientists define danger on the basis of national and regional dialogues; and then to 
proceed to international dialogues on the same subject. Through an iterative series of 
dialogues, we hope to create scientific and social understanding of the key issues in un-
derstanding when climate change becomes dangerous to society. The projects hope to 
both contribute to the development of methodologies on this issue as well as to a better 
articulation of Article 2. Figure 1.1 shows the role of the Dutch project (the national dia-
logue) in the international series of projects. 
2,3,1	
There are two alternative designs for undertaking a science-policy discussion on Article 
2. In the first design, one can move from an understanding of the position of the stake-
holders on concentration levels and emissions, to the arguments underlying these  
positions and then to an understanding of the conflicting values. 
 
                                                   
15
  To be more specific, there should be a mechanism for cross-referencing and validating them. 
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Figure 1.1 The place of this project in the HOT programme. 
In the second design, one can ask stakeholders to identify indicators of climate change, 
define threshold levels for each indicator followed by a scientific back calculation to 
identify global concentration levels that correspond to those indicators (See Figure 1.2). 
In the HOT programme as a whole and in this project, we have chosen the second design 
as the more appropriate approach for articulating what the Netherlands’ position could 
be in relation to Article 2. There are two reasons for such an approach:  
• First, this is easier to relate to for individual stakeholders, since the approach starts 
from climate impacts. Hence, climate change becomes a more concrete item in the 
discussion; and; 
• Second, as long as discussions remain in the arena of generalities, it is often difficult 
for countries to actually understand how they themselves may be affected by climate 
impacts and how these impacts relate to concentration levels. This is not only true for 
developing countries, but also for the Netherlands, where we discovered that despite 
the enormous amount of information available, people were not really discussing the 
impacts. The underlying argument is that even if at a general level, Australia does 
not see the climate change issue as important, the Australian coral reefs will be 
among the first to be bleached; even if India does not see climate change as impor-
tant, the Himalayas will be among the first to melt with devastating consequences for 
the country. Thus, through an understanding of the impacts in terms of indicators and 
thresholds, we may find that behind vastly differing positions lie common interests 
(cf. the negotiation theory of Fisher & Ury, 1981), and from the common interests we 
may be able to move towards common positions. 
As mentioned earlier, in defining what is dangerous, the project team chose to move 
away from abstract terms such as concentration levels and average temperature to  
indicators of impacts. 
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Figure 1.2 Approach for the workshops. 
Chapter 5 explains how on the one hand we can trace the impacts of GHG emissions un-
til the impacts, and also how we can back-calculate emission targets from the acceptable 
impact levels. Figure 1.3 shows how we can trace back from indicators the appropriate 
GHG concentration levels and GHG emissions. 
 
 ! 
	
	"
 ! 

	
"
#
$
	
	




 
	
 
Figure 1.3 Calculating concentration levels and emission levels from impact indicators. 
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The project team, consisting of 7 Dutch research institutes16, adopted the following 
steps:  
• Project plan: The project partners met to discuss the scope of the project, the meth-
odology and the best way to undertake the assessment. This was done on the basis of: 
(a) their own scientific and professional knowledge; (b) the arguments underlying the 
                                                   
16
  These are: the Institute for Environmental Studies (IVM) of the Vrije Universiteit  
Amsterdam, the National Institute for Public Health and the Environment (RIVM), Wagenin-
gen University (WUR), the Royal Netherlands Meteorological Institute (KNMI), the Institute 
for Inland Water Management and Waste Water Treatment (RIZA), the National Institute for 
Coastal and Marine Management (RIKZ), the International Centre for Integrative Studies, 
Maastricht University (ICIS) and the UNESCO-IHE Institute for Water Education. 
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existing Netherlands’ policy position; (c) existing projects undertaken in programmes 
funded in the Netherlands; (d) ongoing work within IPCC; and (e) other relevant  
projects including the HOT project on Article 2; 
• Fact sheets on climate change: Each project partner prepared fact sheets on climate 
change leading to the articulation of relevant indicators of climate change for the 
Netherlands (see Appendix I); The fact sheets were subsequently elaborated into 
Chapters 2-6 of this report; 
• Interviews with stakeholders: Simultaneously, the project team interviewed 30 stake-
holders to identify the key perceptions of stakeholders in relation to Article 2 of the 
Convention (see Appendix II for a list of questions asked); 
• First integration and preparation for the science-policy workshop: This was followed 
by the preparation for the first science-policy workshop and elaboration of the design 
of the workshop; 
• Science-policy workshop 1: The first science-policy workshop was held on 26 
March 2004 and included 34 participants. The workshop concluded with specific re-
quests for information and ideas about how the indicators could be further developed 
(see Gupta et al., 2004 for a summary in Dutch and Chapter 7 for a summary in Eng-
lish); 
• Second integration and preparation for the second science-policy workshop: The  
following step was to review the workshop results, assign tasks to project team  
members and to design the second workshop. The project team only undertook an  
assessment of the literature and did not conduct any new research;  
• Presentation of the results to the Advisory Committee: The project subsequently  
presented the results of the project to the Advisory Committee on 27 May 2004 
which coincided with a meeting of the Netherlands’ Interdepartmental Task Force on 
Climate Change and took their advice on board;  
• Presentation of results to IPCC: Youba Sokona of ENDA Tiers Monde, Senegal,  
presented the findings of the International and National HOT projects to the IPCC 
meeting in Buenos Aires in Argentina, and this is reported in the IPCC Expert  
Meeting on the Science to Address UNFCCC Article 2 including key vulnerabilities 
(Gupta & Sokona, 2004); 
• Second science-policy workshop: This workshop was held on 7 June 2004 and led to 
a further discussion on the indicators and threshold levels (see Dalenoord et al., 2004 
for a summary in Dutch and Chapter 7 for a summary in English); 
• Final integration of results: The project team then extrapolated from the results of the 
workshop to develop a method for analysing the concept of dangerous and a  
conceptual framework. The final document was sent for review and revised accord-
ingly.  
The participatory integrated assessment methodology developed for this project is  
visualised below in Figure 1.4. 
&0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The report is structured as follows. Chapter 2 provides a state of the art of the current  
information available on the problem of climate change, including a section on expected 
climatic changes in the Netherlands. Chapter 3 analyses the vulnerability of groups and 
countries, perceived risks and relevant indicators of dangerous climate change. 
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Figure 1.4 A diagrammatic representation of the project process. 
 
Chapter 4 focuses on adaptation options. Chapter 5 then examines climate change 
thresholds and implications for GHG emissions. Chapter 6 then looks at the socio-
economic implications of possible climate change policy targets. Chapter 7 then exam-
ines how stakeholders perceive the issue of long-term targets, both on the basis of past 
research, current interviews with stakeholders, and the results of the workshops. Chapter 
8 then extra-polates from the research and workshops to make an internally consistent 
identification of the key indicators for the Netherlands, it examines alternative ways of 
classifying these indicators, uses a multi-criteria analytical process to prioritise the crite-
ria, identifies the acceptable risks and unacceptable threshold levels, and then relates the 
information to GHG concentration levels. The chapter finally draws some conclusions.  
After intensive debate within the project team, it was decided to provide the key  
conclusions of the report upfront in the report for easy access to the reader. A compre-
hensive summary of the report has also been placed prior to Chapter 1. 
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In recent decades many disciplines have contributed greatly to increasing the insight in 
the mechanisms behind natural climate evolution and the human influence on climate. 
This chapter gives an overview of the current scientific level of understanding of climate 
change, from the viewpoint of the natural sciences, to provide a basis for the subsequent 
chapters that deal with impacts and potential measures against dangerous human  
interference with the climate system.  
The science of climate change as a whole actually consists of many disciplines. An  
adequate understanding of the climate issue therefore requires extensive integration of a 
very wide range of insights. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)17, 
a scientific organisation founded by the United Nations, therefore periodically provides 
authoritative assessments of the complete scientific literature on climate change. This 
chapter is based on the latest IPCC Third Assessment Report (IPCC, WG1 2001).  
Additionally attention is paid to recent scientific developments, and typical aspects of 
climate change in the Netherlands. 
This chapter first discusses the global temperature changes in the 20th century (Section 
2.2) and the last millennium (Section 2.3), the observed changes in the global atmos-
pheric composition (Section 2.4), the observed impacts of global warming (Section 2.5), 
expected climate change in the 21st century (Section 2.6) and beyond (Section 2.7), and 
expected changes in the Netherlands (Section 2.8).  
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The global climate has changed significantly in the course of the 20th century. An in-
creasing body of observations gives a collective picture of a warming world and other 
associated changes in the climate system. Figure 2.1 illustrates the evolution of the 
global surface temperature in the last 140 years.  
After about forty years of relative stability the temperature was seen to undergo three 
phases of warming (1910-1945), cooling (1945-1976) and then again warming (1976-
2003). 
On the timescales involved here, climate scientists identify three important factors  
(climate forcings) that explain this evolution. 
• Large volcanic eruptions lead to global cooling due to the masking effect of the dust 
particles; 
 
                                                   
17
  See www.ipcc.ch. 
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Figure 2.1 The global surface temperature in the period 1861-2003. 
Source: Jones et al. (2003). Reproduced by kind permission of the Climatic Research Unit,  
  University of East Anglia, Norwich, U.K. to whom any queries should be directed 
   (cru@uea.ac.uk). Copyright: Climatic Research Unit. 
 
• Variations in solar activity have a direct influence on the amount of energy the earth 
receives from the sun and thereby change the global temperatures;  
• Changes in the atmospheric composition (GHGs and aerosols) influence the radia-
tion budgets, resulting in fluctuation of surface temperatures. 
 
An increasing number of studies confirm that the three phases mentioned above can be 
explained quantitatively by taking these three factors into account. The general picture 
now is that the warming of 1910-1945 can be associated with an increase in solar activity 
in the absence of volcanic activity. The cooling of 1945-1976 is explained by a sequence 
of large volcanic eruptions, in a period of solar stability. The warming of 1976-2003, un-
der the cooling influence of large volcanic eruptions and in a period of solar stability, 
primarily is to be associated with the steadily increasing enhanced greenhouse effect as a 
result of anthropogenic emissions. 
In 2001, the IPCC concluded that the human influence on climate is likely to have 
caused most of the observed warming in the second half of the 20th century. The  
scientific basis for this conclusion has been strengthened since then by a number of stud-
ies that confirm the dominant anthropogenic component in the climate forcing (see 
Figure 2.2). The question whether human activities have a significant influence on cli-
mate no longer is a subject of scientific debate. The research now is focused on further 
deepening of the understanding of the underlying mechanisms and, on the basis of these 
insights, quantifying possible future developments and impacts, with regional differen-
tiation. 
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Figure 2.2 A modelled global surface temperature (red line) from 1890-2000 compared 
to observations (blue area, the width denotes the precision). The averaged 
volcanic, solar and anthropogenic climate forcings are indicated by the  
underlying histogram.  
Source: Amman et al., 2004.  
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The significance of the warming in the 20th century can be seen in the context of a longer 
timeframe. The reconstruction of the global surface temperature before 1861 is ham-
pered by the lack of instrumental observations. One therefore has to rely on indirect 
methods that deduce temperatures from tree ring records, coral data, ice cores, lake and 
ocean sediments and borehole measurements. These so called proxy indicators are not 
evenly distributed along the earth’s surface. Notably Southern Hemisphere data are lack-
ing. Figure 2.3 depicts four reconstructions for the Northern Hemisphere temperature. 
The spreading gives an indication as to the precision that can be attached to these  
studies. The black line, by Mann et al. (1999), can be considered the most sophisticated, 
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as it is based on full hemisphere data and uses known spatial climate patterns to compen-
sate for the sparseness of the datasets. The conclusion that can be drawn from this study 
is that the global climate has been very stable in the period 1000-1900, and that the 
warming in the second half of the 20th century is exceptional. In combination with the 
reasoning in the previous section this leads to the conclusion that human activities as 
from 1950 are increasing the global temperatures to levels that are unprecedented in the 
last millennium.  
The Mann series has been criticised by Esper et al (2002) and others (see Esper paper), 
because of the handling of the tree ring data, possibly leading to an underestimation of 
natural temperature variability thereby underestimating the Medieval Warm Period. The 
Esper’s series, which is consistent with the green Briffa (2000) reconstruction in Figure 
2.3, indeed shows larger fluctuations. It is based on tree ring data only and consequently 
is restricted to extra-tropics (there are no tropical tree ring data available). One could  
argue that this leads to an exaggeration of variability because the tropics tend to exhibit 
much less variability than the higher latitudes. The Mann series also has been criticised 
by McIntryre and McKitrick (2003). They claim Mann has made significant errors in the 
data handling that are amplified by his statistical methods. Their reconstruction,  
exhibiting a very warm medieval period, is very different from the other scientific  
reconstructions and is in disagreement with historical sources (see editorial comment in 
EOS 2003). 
Climate reconstruction is an active field in climate research. The forthcoming years will 
undoubtedly yield more details about the past climate. However, it is unlikely that the 
general picture of the exceptional, rapid warming in the second half of the 20th century 
will be adjusted. 
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The present global warming thus primarily is associated with the human influence on the 
atmospheric composition. Human activities have increased the atmospheric concentra-
tions of GHGs and aerosols since the pre-industrial era. The atmospheric concentrations 
of key anthropogenic GHGs (i.e. carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide and  
tropospheric ozone) reached their highest recorded levels in the 1990s, primarily due to 
the combustion of fossil fuels, agriculture, and land-use changes. 
At present the warming effect of carbon dioxide is about as large as the effect of the 
other GHGs combined. When judging the effect over longer periods, the average life-
time, which is very different amongst these gases, must be taken into account. In that  
respect carbon dioxide also stands out in that it has a very long lifetime (many decades to 
centuries). Besides through these gases, human activity influences climate via the  
emission of dust particles and small droplets (aerosols). 
The warming effect from anthropogenic GHGs is positive with a small uncertainty 
range. That from the direct aerosol effects is negative and smaller. The cooling effect of 
aerosols through their influence on cloud formation (the so called indirect aerosol effect) 
might be large but is as yet not well quantified. Airborne soot (black carbon stemming 
from the burning of biomass, diesel oil etc.) has a warming effect, both by absorbing  
radiation and by changing the albedo of snow. 
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Figure 2.3 Four reconstructions of the Northern Hemisphere surface temperature in the 
last millennium.  
Note: the grey area indicates the uncertainty in the most advanced series; black line by Mann et 
        al. 1999.  
  
Table 2.1 Observed changes in the atmospheric composition since the pre-industrial 
era (1000-1750). 
Indicator Observed Change 
Carbon dioxide 280 parts-per-million (ppmv) from 1000-1750 to 368 ppmv in 2003 
(+31%) 
Methane 700 parts-per-billion (ppb) from 1000-1750 to 1750 ppb in 2000 (+150%) 
Nitrous oxide 270 ppb from 1000-1750 to 316 ppb in 2000 (+17%) 
Tropospheric ozone Increase by 35% from 1750 to 2000 (varies with region) 
HFC’s, PFC’s, SF6 Increased globally over the last 50 years 
Source: IPCC WG 1, 2001. 
 
The net effect of aerosols is a very important and as yet controversial topic in climate  
research. In the past the cooling effect of aerosols was inferred from “missing” global 
warming as predicted by climate models. Direct measurements that have come available 
since then seem to indicate that the cooling effect of aerosols (the “parasol effect”) may 
be much larger (Anderson, 2003, Crutzen, 2003). If that is the case the future climate 
predictions (see 2.6) may change significantly because of the worldwide effort to cut 
aerosol emissions to improve air quality. 
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Global warming has had a direct influence on weather patterns, as shown in Table 2.2.  
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Table 2.2 Observed changes in weather patterns in the 20th century. 
Weather patterns Observed changes 
Global mean surface temperature Increased by 0.6±0.2°C over the 20th century 
Diurnal surface temperature range Decreased during 1950-2000 over land: night time minimum 
temperatures increased at twice the rate of daytime maxi-
mum temperatures (likely) 
Hot days  Increased (likely) 
Cold days Decreased for nearly all land areas (very likely) 
Continental precipitation Increased by 5-10% over the 20th century in the Northern 
Hemisphere (very likely), although decreased in some areas 
(like North and west Africa and parts of the Mediterranean) 
Heavy precipitation events Increased at mid- and high northern latitudes 
Source: IPCC WG1, 2001. 
These changes in weather patterns have had, in turn, biological, physical and economic 
impacts, as summarized in Table 2.3.  
When judging the risks of further climate change, as is the subject of this assessment, in-
sight in these observed impacts is necessary (See Chapter 3). That is to say, the impacts 
often are of more direct relevance than the temperature rise itself. Besides, from a  
scientific point of view, this kind of information is very relevant because it confirms the 
global warming that is deduced from temperature measurements. Basically all indicators, 
including the above-mentioned effects on weather systems, consistently point at a  
significant warming in the last decades. 
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Scientific statements about future climate change are hampered by two different kinds of 
uncertainties that happen to be of the same magnitude. First there is the large uncertainty 
associated with the computer models that necessarily are involved, as no experiments are 
possible. It is impossible to judge the accuracy of a future climate simulation of a certain 
model on the basis of first principles. The scientific community therefore estimates the 
accuracy through the spreading in different model results. A central concept in this  
respect is climate sensitivity, that is, the ultimate rise in global temperature given a  
doubling of the pre-industrial level of carbon dioxide concentration. Current estimates of 
climate sensitivity range widely, between 1.7 and 4.2 ºC. 
Another limitation is associated with the future emissions of GHGs. This heavily  
depends on future socio-economic and technological developments that of course cannot 
be forecasted with great accuracy. 
One therefore has to resort to scenarios that sketch plausible lines along which the world 
may develop. For this reason one speaks of climate projections rather than forecasts. 
The IPCC has developed six illustrative emissions scenarios (IPCC, 2000) that each has a 
certain character, on the basis of four storylines (see). In this section we will describe possi-
ble future developments of the global climate on the basis of these scenarios. 
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Table 2.3 20th century changes in biological, physical and economic systems, related 
to global warming. 
Indicators Observed impacts 
Global mean sea level Increased by 10-20 cm 
Duration of ice cover of rivers 
and lakes 
Decreased by about two weeks in Northern Hemisphere mid- 
and high latitudes (very likely) 
Arctic sea-ice extend and thick-
ness 
Thinned by 40% in recent decades in late summer to early au-
tumn (likely) and decreased in extent by 10-15% since the 
1950s in spring and summer 
Non-polar glaciers Widespread retreat  
Snow cover Decreased in area by 10% since adequate observations are 
available (1960) (very likely) 
Permafrost Thawed, warmed, and degraded in parts of the polar,  
sub-polar, and mountainous regions. 
El Niño events Became more frequent, persistent, and intense during the last 
20 to 30 years compared to the previous 100 years. 
Growing season Lengthened by about one to two weeks during the last 40 
years in the Northern Hemisphere, especially at higher  
latitudes 
Plant and animal ranges Shifted pole wards and upwards in elevation for plants,  
insects, birds, and fish. 
Breeding, flowering, and  
migration 
Earlier plant flowering, earlier bird arrival, earlier dates of 
breeding season, and earlier emergence of insects in the 
Northern Hemisphere 
Coral reef bleaching Increased frequency, especially during El Niño events 
Weather-related economic losses Global inflation-adjusted losses rose an order of magnitude 
over the last 40 years. Part of this is linked to socio-economic 
factors and part is linked to climate change. 
Source: IPCC, 2001. 
An illustrative scenario was chosen for each of the six scenario groups A1B, A1FI, A1T, 
A2, B1 and B2. All should be considered equally sound. 
The SRES scenarios do not include additional climate initiatives which means that no 
scenarios are included that explicitly assume implementation of the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change or the emissions targets of the Kyoto Proto-
col. Carbon dioxide concentrations, globally averaged surface temperature, and sea level 
are projected to increase under all IPCC emissions scenarios during the 21st century. 
For the six illustrative SRES emissions scenarios, the projected concentration of carbon 
dioxide in the year 2100 ranges from 540 to 970 ppmv, compared to about 280 ppmv in 
the pre-industrial era and about 368 ppmv in the year 2000. The different socio-
economic assumptions (demographic, social, economic, and technological) result in the 
different levels of future GHGs and aerosols. Further uncertainties, especially regarding 
the persistence of the present removal processes (carbon sinks) and the magnitude of the 
climate feedback on the terrestrial biosphere, cause a variation of about -10 to +30% in 
the year 2100 concentration, around each scenario. 
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Table 2.4 The storylines in IPCC’s Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES). 
The A1 storyline and scenario family describes a future world of very rapid economic growth, 
global population that peaks in mid-century and declines thereafter, and the rapid introduction of 
new and more efficient technologies. Major underlying themes are convergence among regions, 
capacity building and increased cultural and social interactions, with a substantial reduction in 
regional differences in per capita income. The A1 scenario family develops into three groups that 
describe alternative directions of technological change in the energy system. The three A1 groups 
are distinguished by their technological emphasis: fossil intensive (A1FI), non-fossil energy 
sources (A1T), or a balance across all sources (A1B) (where balanced is defined as not relying 
too heavily on one particular energy source, on the assumption that similar improvement rates 
apply to all energy supply and end use technologies). 
The A2 storyline and scenario family describes a very heterogeneous world. The underlying 
theme is self-reliance and preservation of local identities. Fertility patterns across regions con-
verge very slowly, which results in continuously increasing population. Economic development 
is primarily regionally oriented and per capita economic growth and technological change more 
fragmented and slower than other storylines. 
The B1 storyline and scenario family describes a convergent world with the same global popula-
tion, that peaks in mid-century and declines thereafter, as in the A1 storyline, but with rapid 
change in economic structures toward a service and information economy, with reductions in ma-
terial intensity and the introduction of clean and resource-efficient technologies. The emphasis is 
on global solutions to economic, social and environmental sustainability, including improved eq-
uity, but without additional climate initiatives. 
The B2 storyline and scenario family describes a world in which the emphasis is on local solu-
tions to economic, social and environmental sustainability. It is a world with continuously in-
creasing global population, at a rate lower than A2, intermediate levels of economic develop-
ment, and less rapid and more diverse technological change than in the B1 and A1 storylines. 
While the scenario is also oriented towards environmental protection and social equity, it focuses 
on local and regional levels. 
 
Therefore, the total range is 490 to 1,260 ppmv (75 to 350% above the year 1750  
(pre-industrial) concentration). Concentrations of the primary non-CO2 GHGs by the 
year 2100 are projected to vary considerably across the six illustrative SRES scenarios. 
Projections using the SRES emissions scenarios in a range of climate models result in an 
increase in globally averaged surface temperature of 1.4 to 5.8°C over the period 1990 to 
2100. This is about two to ten times larger than the central value of observed warming 
over the 20th century and the projected rate of warming is very likely to be without 
precedent during at least the last 10,000 years, based on paleoclimate data. Temperature 
increases are projected to be greater than those in IPCC’s Second Assessment Report 
(IPCC WG1, 1996), which were about 1.0 to 3.5°C based on the IS92 scenarios that 
IPCC used then. The higher projected temperatures and the wider range are due primar-
ily to lower projected sulphur dioxide (SO2) emissions in the SRES scenarios relative to 
the IS92 scenarios. For the periods 1990 to 2025 and 1990 to 2050, the projected in-
creases are 0.4 to 1.1°C and 0.8 to 2.6°C, respectively. By the year 2100, the range in the 
surface temperature response across different climate models for the same emissions 
scenario is comparable to the range across different SRES emissions scenarios for a  
single climate model. 
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Figure 2.4 Future carbon dioxide and sulphur dioxide emissions for the six illustrative 
IPCC scenarios and their impacts on temperature and sea level. 
Source: IPCC WG1, 2001. 
Nearly all land areas will very likely warm more than these global averages, particularly 
those at northern high latitudes in winter.  
Globally averaged annual precipitation is projected to increase during the 21st century, 
though at regional scales both increases and decreases are projected of typically 5 to 
20%. It is likely that precipitation will increase over high-latitude regions in both sum-
mer and winter. Increases are also projected over northern mid-latitudes, tropical Africa, 
and Antarctica in winter, and in southern and eastern Asia in summer. Australia, Central 
America, and southern Africa show consistent decreases in winter rainfall. Larger year-
to-year variations in precipitation are very likely over most areas where an increase in 
mean precipitation is projected.  
Glaciers are projected to continue their widespread retreat during the 21st century. North-
ern Hemisphere snow cover, permafrost, and sea-ice extent are projected to decrease fur-
ther. The Antarctic ice sheet is likely to gain mass, while the Greenland ice sheet is 
likely to lose mass. 
Global mean sea level is projected to rise by 0.09 to 0.88 m between the years 1990 and 
2100, for the full range of SRES scenarios, but with significant regional variations. This 
rise is due primarily to thermal expansion of the oceans and melting of glaciers and ice 
caps. For the periods 1990 to 2025 and 1990 to 2050, the projected rises are 0.03 to 0.14 
m and 0.05 to 0.32 m, respectively.  
When judging the risks associated with climate change the associated increases in  
intensity and frequency of extreme climate events and their impacts, as summarized in 
Table 2.5, are of special importance.  
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Besides the gradual changes there is a chance the global climate could change abruptly 
as a consequence of global warming. The weakening or shut down of the North Atlantic 
Gulf Stream, as a result of the release of (sweet) melting water of polar ice and increased 
rainfall at higher latitudes, would result in a sudden drop in Western European tempera-
tures. Another example is the breaking and consequently the melting of the West Antarc-
tic Ice Sheet, which would result in an extra sea-level rise of one meter per century for 
many centuries, thus leading to worldwide disaster. The chance that these events will oc-
cur in the 21st century is judged very low and is not taken into account in the IPCC cli-
mate projections.  
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Inertia is a widespread inherent characteristic of the climate system. Thus some impacts 
of anthropogenic climate change may be slow to become apparent, and some could be  
irreversible if climate change is not limited in both rate and magnitude before associated 
threshold values, which may be poorly known, are crossed. 
Stabilization of CO2 emissions at near-current levels will not lead to stabilization of CO2 
atmospheric concentration, whereas stabilization of emissions of shorter-lived GHGs 
such as methane leads, within decades, to stabilization of their atmospheric concentra-
tions. Stabilization of CO2 concentrations at any level requires eventual reduction of 
global CO2 net emissions to a small fraction of the current emission level. The lower the 
chosen level for stabilization, the sooner the decline in global net CO2 emissions needs to 
begin. 
After stabilization of the atmospheric concentration of CO2 and other GHGs, the surface 
air temperature is projected to continue to rise by a few tenths of a degree per century for 
a century or more, while sea level is projected to continue to rise for many centuries (see 
Figure 2.5). The slow transport of heat into the oceans and slow response of ice sheets 
means that long periods are required to reach a new climate system equilibrium. 
Some changes in the climate system, plausible beyond the 21st century, would be  
effectively irreversible. For example, major melting of the ice sheets and fundamental 
changes in the ocean circulation pattern cannot be reversed over a period of many human 
generations. The threshold for fundamental changes in the ocean circulation may be 
reached at a lower degree of warming if the warming is rapid rather than gradual. 
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The average temperature in Europe will probably rise slightly more than the global aver-
age. In Scandinavian countries the temperature in winter probably will rise much more 
than the global average. In Southern Europe it seems that notably summer temperatures 
will rise. The future developments with regard to precipitation are inherently uncertain. 
There is reasonable scientific agreement that winter precipitation in Northern Europe 
will increase by 5-20%, particularly in Scandinavia, but also at lower latitudes. The 
changes in summer precipitation are highly uncertain. In Southern Europe it could de-
crease by more than 20%. 
An increase in heavy precipitation is expected, on both daily and yearly timescales. 
Higher temperatures enhance evaporation. 
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Table 2.5 Examples of climate variability and extreme climate events and examples of 
their impacts. 
Projected Changes during the 21st Century in 
Extreme Climate Phenomena and their Like-
lihood 
Representative Examples of Projected Impacts 
(all high confidence of occurrence in some  
areas) 
Higher maximum temperatures, more hot days 
and heat waves over nearly all land areas (very 
likely) 
Increased incidence of death and serious illness 
in older age groups and urban poor. 
Increased heat stress in livestock and wildlife. 
Shift in tourist destinations. 
Increased risk of damage to a number of crops. 
Increased electric cooling demand and reduced 
energy supply reliability. 
Higher (increasing) minimum temperatures, 
fewer cold days, frost days and cold waves 
over nearly all land areas (very likely) 
Decreased cold-related human mortality. 
Decreased risk of damage to a number of crops, 
and increased risk to others. 
Extended range and activity of some pest and 
disease vectors. 
Reduced heating energy demand. 
More intense precipitation events (very likely, 
over many areas) 
Increased flood, landslide, avalanche, and  
mudslide damage. 
Increased soil erosion. 
Increased flood runoff could increase recharge 
of some floodplain aquifers. 
Increased pressure on government and private 
flood insurance systems and disaster relief. 
Increased summer drying over most mid-
latitude continental interiors and associated risk 
of drought (likely) 
Decreased crop yields. 
Increased damage to building foundations 
caused by ground shrinkage. 
Decreased water resource quantity and quality. 
Increased risk of forest fire. 
Increase in tropical cyclone peak wind intensi-
ties, mean and peak precipitation intensities 
(likely, over some areas) 
Increased risks to human life, risk of infectious 
disease epidemics and many other risks. 
Increased coastal erosion and damage to coastal 
buildings and infrastructure. 
Increased damage to coastal ecosystems such as 
coral reefs and mangroves. 
Intensified droughts and floods associated with 
El Niño events in many different regions 
(likely) (see also under droughts and intense 
precipitation events) 
Decreased agricultural and rangeland  
productivity in drought- and flood-prone re-
gions. Decreased hydropower potential in 
drought-prone regions. 
Increased Asian summer monsoon precipitation 
variability (likely) 
Increase in flood and drought magnitude and 
damages in temperate and tropical Asia. 
Increased intensity of mid-latitude storms (little 
agreement between current models) 
Increased risks to human life and health. 
Increased property and infrastructure losses. 
Increased damage to coastal ecosystems. 
Source: IPCC WG1, 2001. 
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Figure 2.5 Projections of impacts. 
Note: Figure 2.5 shows that after CO2 emissions are reduced and atmospheric concentrations  
stabilize, surface air temperature continues to rise slowly for a century or more. Thermal  
expansion of the ocean continues long after carbon dioxide emissions have been reduced, and 
melting of ice sheets continues to contribute to sea-level rise for many centuries. This figure 
is a generic illustration for stabilization at any level between 450 and 1,000 ppmv, and there-
fore has no units on the response axis. Responses to stabilization trajectories in this range 
show broadly similar time courses, but the impacts become progressively larger at higher 
concentrations of carbon dioxide. 
 Source: IPCC, 2001.  
In contrast with the winter period, in the summer evaporation will increase more than 
precipitation, leading to greater chances of summer drought, particularly in Southern 
Europe. 
In the summer of 2003 central Europe experienced a very extreme heat wave that broke 
all records. In a recent paper Schär et al. (2004) suggest the extremity of this heat wave 
defies statistics and can be explained only by assuming that the chances on such an event 
have already shifted significantly because of global warming. A detailed analysis that 
was confirmed by several research groups has shown that the heat was greatly enhanced 
by a large-scale drought that built up in the course of the already hot summer. At some 
point the water in the soil ran out, stopping natural evaporation, thereby blocking the 
natural cooling effect associated with evaporation (c.f. sweating), and thus amplifying 
the heat to unprecedented levels. This case shows that unforeseen effects can amplify the 
impact of global warming on extreme events. It is yet too early to quantify these shifts in 
statistics. IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report to appear in 2007 will probably contain 
more information on this. 
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The Royal Netherlands Meteorological Institute (KNMI) has developed a number of 
scenarios for the Netherlands (see Table 2.6), taking the IPCC-temperature projections as 
a starting point.18 
Table 2.6 KNMI Climate scenarios for the Netherlands in 2100. 
Temperature +1ºC +2ºC +4 to +6ºC 
Mean summer precipitation +1% +2% +4% 
Summer evaporation +4% +8% +16% 
Mean winter precipitation +6% +12% +25% 
Intensity in winter precipitation +10% +20% +40% 
Frequency of intense winter precipitation 2 times as high 4 times as high 10 times as high 
Sea-level rise (both anthropogenic and  
natural 
+20 cm +60 cm +110 cm 
Note: 1990 is the reference year for this table. 
It is clear that for the Netherlands, like in many other low lying coastal areas in the 
world, climate change will pose its problems primarily through its effect on water  
management. For this reason the Netherlands government already takes far-reaching 
measurements to cope with these present and future impacts. 
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The previous chapters elaborated on the possible human influence on the climate system 
and actions taken by IPCC in order to mitigate the effects of climate change. Addition-
ally, the character of indicators that play an important role in the (international) policy 
making process was explained.  
This chapter focuses on a more specific description of relevant indicators used in the 
climate change impact debate. An important aspect is that the climate change indicators 
will be related to vulnerable sectors where impacts of climate change will lead to higher 
(and even dangerous) risks for society. 
During the process of stakeholder involvement, the following sectors and items were 
considered relevant for the climate change debate in the Netherlands: health, ecosystems, 
food supply, economy and water management with special attention to impacts on the 
coastal zone. 
In this chapter, the potential impacts of climate change are examined. It subsequently 
discusses the impacts of climate change on ecosystems (Section 3.2), food production 
(Section 3.3), water management (Section 3.4), health (Section 3.5), tourism (Section 
3.6) and coastal zone management (Section 3.7). It discusses the impacts at two scales, 
(i) the international (global) scale, and (ii) the European and national scale. The assess-
ments are based upon a review of recent scientific literature.  
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5,1,2-	
In this section, the observed and potential impacts of climate change on ecosystems at 
the global scale are analysed. These impacts are likely to be manifold and diverse, due to 
individualistic responses of each species to changing temperature and precipitation pat-
terns. The observed and potential impacts described in this section are based upon our 
experience and a concise literature review, in particular Houghton et al. (2001), 
McCarthy et al. (2001) and Metz et al. (2001). 
The main issues relevant for this assessment and their relationship are shown in Figure 
3.1. The impacts of climate change on ecosystems take place across different spatial 
scales. Hence, it is difficult to distinguish international and European scale in the as-
sessment. We therefore distinguish in this report the global impacts on ecosystems, and 
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the ecological implications at the European and national scale. The global impacts are 
described below, the European and national impacts are analysed in the next section. 
Figure 3.1 Impacts of climate change on ecosystems. 
	!	
The growing season is the period with suitable growing conditions for plant growth, re-
lated to, in particular, temperature and rainfall patterns. It is limited by dry and cold sea-
sons. Warming will relieve the cold constraints and over the last decades increases over 
the growing season have been observed in all temperate and boreal zones. Many plant 
species immediately respond to this by adjusting the timing of their leafing and flower-
ing. Such phenological responses are nowadays well-documented and show that the 
adaptive capacity of many plants to such climate change is immediate. However, these 
plant responses have consequences for other species in an ecosystem. The shifting timing 
could jeopardize long-established dependencies in many ecosystems, especially for those 
ecosystems with migratory species (e.g. Both & Visser, 2001) 
An additional consequence of the lengthening of the growing season is that the pollen 
season will start earlier and will be longer. Here, there will be a synergetic effect with N-
deposition. Such N will stimulate plant growth, part of which will be portioned into extra 
pollen production. The longer and higher pollen loads will be detrimental for people with 
hay-fever problems. 
)	
		
One of the factors that determine the distribution of species is climate. This is more ap-
parent for plant than for animal species. There are now several techniques that link spe-
cies ranges and abundances to patterns of environmental factors. Using these techniques 
to determine the change in species’ ranges under climate change, show strong individual-
Re-Evaluation of the Netherlands’ Long-Term Climate Targets 31 
istic responses of each species. Under warming most species ranges shift northwards, but 
in Europe with its east-west continental gradient, many species also shift in eastern di-
rection. The species that will adequately shift under rapid climate change are those with 
few environmental constraints, fast dispersal mechanisms and easy colonizers. Most triv-
ial weed and pest species belong to this group. Species with specific environmental 
needs (i.e. specialists), long life times and slow dispersal mechanisms are at a major dis-
advantage. Under climate change biodiversity will decline and species composition in 
many landscapes will be less heterogeneous and consist of more weedy species. The risk 
of extinction for many species that are already vulnerable will thus increase. This has re-
cently also been suggested by Bakkenes et al. (2002). These changes will lead to shifts in 
species composition and are likely to lead to an accelerated extinction of many of the 
red-list species. 
Shifts in species ranges over the last decades due to the small warming of 0.6 oC have al-
ready been observed. For example, lichen flora over the Netherlands nowadays also in-
clude subtropical and even some tropical species. Higher plants and butterflies have also 
shown significant responses. 
)	
	
	
Global and regional vegetation patterns are strongly determined by climate. Locally, dif-
ferences in soil, hydrology and land-use history become more dominant. These have 
been used since long to reconstruct historic climate on basis of plant remains (e.g. pollen 
analysis). Changes in climate will thus lead to shifts in vegetation patterns. For each de-
gree warming, tree lines shift 300 km pole wards and about 15-20% of all terrestrial 
vegetation will change species composition. The outcomes of these shifts are not always 
detrimental. Some can be positive in certain aspects. For example, shifting tree lines 
leads to more forests and potentially more carbon stored. However, some of these shift-
ing vegetation zones, such as nival, alpine and tundra zones, could well irreversibly dis-
appear. This is, for example, already happening with the unique tropical alpine vegeta-
tion on Mount Kilimanjaro. Also, shifts in vegetation take time and vegetation belts that 
move out of their climatic equilibrium, are prone to rapid deterioration by disturbances 
like pests and fires. 
It is nowadays relatively easy to depict shifting vegetation zones for different climate 
change scenarios. Robust models and indicators are available (cf. Leemans & Eickhout, 
2003; Gitay et al., 2002; Malcolm & Markham; 2000; and Hare, 2003) 
			(
Temperature and moisture availability is an important factor in many physiological and 
ecological processes. Photosynthesis of plants has a temperature optimum. Decomposi-
tion processes accelerate exponentially with increases in temperature, provided that there 
is enough moisture. Enhanced CO2 concentrations further tend to stimulate growth, but 
this is only a temporary effect that saturates rapidly. Several plant species tend to  
consume less water under such conditions. The importance of these positive and negative 
feedbacks can be assessed with models, and the potential consequence is large. The  
current understanding is that initially, more carbon will be stored with limited amounts 
of warming. This is a negative feedback on atmospheric CO2 concentrations. However, 
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some models show that, at temperature increases larger than 3 oC, the biosphere could 
well become a source, instead of the current sink, related to the release of greenhouse 
gases from boreal zones currently under permafrost. 
-
	
(
Globally by the year 2080 about 20% of coastal wetlands could be lost due to sea-level 
rise. The impact of sea-level rise on coastal ecosystems will vary regionally and will  
depend on erosion processes from the sea and depositional processes from land. Particu-
larly vulnerable are coral reefs, which may be seriously affected where sea surface  
temperatures would increase by more than 1oC above the seasonal maximum. These  
systems are also affected by increasing CO2 levels. Increased oceanic CO2 concentra-
tions affect the ability of the corals to form skeletons and grow. 
8(			
This broad term covers impacts, such as the increased eroding of beaches and coastal 
zones that are currently being eroded, as well as changes in river courses and ground-
water levels as a consequences of sea-level rise (as further discussed in Section 3.7)  
5,1,1+	
In this section, we discuss the impacts of climate change on European and national  
ecosystems. We subsequently discuss (i) changes in distribution patterns of species; (ii)  
extinction of species not able to adapt; and (iii) changes in ecosystems.  
				
	
Changing temperature and rainfall conditions are likely to result in a change of the  
distribution of species. In general, as temperature increases, species ranges can be  
expected to migrate towards the pole and, in mountain ecosystems, towards higher  
altitudes. This may result in the loss of species that are not able to adjust their distribu-
tion, and the alteration of ecosystems, see below. 
+4		
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In general, climate change will increase the risk of extinction of vulnerable species. This 
may be because the species are not able to adjust their geographic distribution, for in-
stance because they live near the top of mountains, on low-lying islands, or in patchy 
habitats surrounded by agricultural or urban land. Another cause may be that changes in 
ecosystems, such as phenological changes or changes in species composition may affect 
certain species. This may occur, for example, if the timing of flowering of a plant no 
longer corresponds with the migration pattern of an insect required for its pollination. In 
general, species with the most limited climate ranges, and the most restricted habitat  
requirements are the most likely to be affected. 
	(
The changes in ecosystems may be brought about by a range of factors, including the 
changes in species distribution, changes in food chains, changes in biochemical cycles, 
etc. Changes in food chains may result from the increased or decreased access to prey 
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species. For example, longer ice-free seasons in the artic will restrict the access of polar 
bears to seals and reduce their nutritional status and reproductive success. Enhanced bio-
chemical cycles may affect the habitat of species. In addition, changes in rainfall patterns 
may disrupt whole ecosystems, in particular in cases where lower rainfall in systems  
already under water stress. These types of long term changes may also reduce the  
resilience of ecosystems to other pressures. For example, increased droughts may reduce 
the resilience of rangelands to high grazing pressure. 
Because of their diversity and complexity, the overall impacts of climate change on eco-
system are difficult to capture in a specific set of indicators. However, Figure 3.2 
presents the potential impacts on a range of ecosystem types (including global impacts), 
based upon best current knowledge (Hare, 2003).  
 
Figure 3.2 Visualization of climate change impacts on some ecosystem types. 
Source: WBGU, 2003. Reproduced by kind permission of the WBGU. Copyright WBGU. 
The risk of adverse impacts due to different climate-related parameters increases with 
the magnitude of climate change. Global mean temperature rise since 1861–1890 is used 
as proxy. The figure presents a global summary of expected adverse impacts upon some 
examples of global ecosystem types, in the form of a highly aggregated conceptualiza-
tion. Regional impacts may be more or less severe than the global averages shown. The 
figure does not reflect a quantitative approach but a fuzzy assessment of risks, based on 
case studies and reviews. The assessment takes into account only the magnitude of  
climate change, not the rate of change (WBGU, 2003). 
5,1,59		
The uncertainties related to the impacts of climate change on ecosystems are manifold 
and significant. Uncertainties relate to what extend species and ecosystems will be able 
to adjust to changing climatic conditions – in a world with many other strong pressures 
on remaining ecosystems and species (deforestation, invasions of exotic species,  
pollution, land use conversion, overexploitation of certain species, etc.). It is the com-
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bined impacts of climate change and other disturbances that will determine the fate of 
biodiversity, at the national, European and international levels. Specific factors that  
contribute to the uncertainty include: (i) the impacts of multiple changes in the ecosys-
tem on individual species (e.g. changes in temperature and rainfall combined with a 
change in the amount or timing of feed available); (ii) impacts of changes in oceanic  
currents on marine species including the whole food chain from plankton and algae up to 
top predators and whales; (iii) the possibility of species to adjust through migration or 
adaptation to a changing habitat.  
&6
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This section briefly discusses the impacts of global climate change on global food  
production. The impacts of climate change on food production and agriculture depend on 
the vulnerability of regional agricultural systems, and the adaptive capacities of local and 
national populations and economies. Relevant factors in determining the response of  
agricultural systems to climate change include temperature, precipitation, CO2 fertiliza-
tion and socio-economic conditions such as market access, technology and the availabil-
ity of resources needed for adaptation (IPCC, 2001). In the mid-latitudes, a moderate in-
crease in temperature may raise crop production provided that water availability is not 
compromised. However, in the tropics, crops are often close to their thermal optimum, so 
that regional warming may instead result in reductions. Extreme weather events are 
likely to negatively influence crop production substantially, either directly or through in-
crease of pests (WBGU, 2003). Below, we discuss the specific impacts on crop yields 
and fisheries yields. 
	(	
The impacts on crop yields are difficult to predict as they are strongly location specific, 
and as they are guided by different mechanisms that may counteract or reinforce each 
other. The IPCC Technical Paper on Climate Change and Biodiversity (Gitay et al., 
2002) indicates that already overall net primary productivity of terrestrial vegetation is 
increasing leading to the accumulation of carbon in these ecosystems. As a result,  
agricultural productivity may also increase. In addition, increasing temperatures may 
lead to an expansion of the agricultural zones northwards towards the Tundra areas. 
However, reductions in rainfall in relatively dry areas (the Mid-western USA has been 
mentioned as a potential example), if effected, will lead to a loss of productivity in these 
zones. An increase of extreme events (drought, storms, frost) may also affect agricultural 
productivity. 
	
			
A major factor determining the impact of climate change on fisheries production is the 
potential change in stratification in the oceans. Surface nutrient supply could be reduced 
if ocean stratification reduces the supply of major nutrients carried to the surface from 
the deep ocean. In regions depending upon this as the main nutrient source, stratification 
would reduce marine productivity. Temperature changes may affect the distribution of 
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fish species, such as tuna and sockeye salmon. Moreover, changes in ocean currents, or 
increases in El Niño activity could have a major impact on regional fisheries - as in the 
case of Peruan fisheries in El Niño years. 
Table 3.1 Global warming and impacts on food production in developing and  
industrialized countries. 
Impacts GMT 
Increase  
(oC) 
Developing Countries  
1.0-1.7 Cereal yields decrease in most tropical 
and subtropical regions (* to **).  
Reduced frost damage to some arable 
crops (***). Increased heat damage to 
some arable crops and animal herds 
(***). 
Cereal yields increase in many high- 
and mid-latitude regions (* to **).  
Reduced frost damage to some arable 
crops (***). Increased heat damage to 
some arable crops and animal herds 
(***). 
1.4-3.2 Stronger decrease of cereal crops in the 
tropics and subtropics (* to **); mixed  
effects in high- and mid-latitude regions 
(* to **). 
Mixed effects upon cereal yields in 
high- and mid-latitude regions 
(* to **). 
1.5-2.0 Income of poor farmers in developing 
countries declines (* to **). 
 
1.6-2.6  Australian crop yields begin to decline 
after initial increase. 
>2 Large drops in yield of maize and sugar-
cane in small island developing states. 
 
European crop production increases 
(except Portugal, Spain, Ukraine). US 
agriculture suffers losses after previous 
gains. 
>2-2.5 Crop yield losses in developing countries.  
>3 Crop yield losses in developing countries. 
A group of 65 countries loges 16% of  
agricultural GDP; Africa and India lose, 
China gains. 
 
>2.0-6.4 General reduction in cereal yields in most 
mid-latitude regions (* to **). General 
increase in food prices (* to**) 
General reduction in cereal yields in 
most mid-latitude regions (* to **). 
General increase in food prices  
(* to **). 
>2.6 Asia: net losses in rice production begin  
>4.2  Entire areas in Australia out of  
production. 
Note: The asterisks indicate confidence levels (where given in the literature):  
*** high (67–95%), ** medium (33–67%), * low to medium (5–33%). GMT global mean 
temperature, pre-industrial level. Source: WBGU, 2003. Reproduced by kind permission of 
the WBGU. 
As with the impacts on ecosystems, the impacts will be highly site-specific, and difficult 
to capture in a general set of indicators and threshold values. Moreover, as the impacts 
will differ locally, it is very difficult to define global thresholds. However, Table 3.1  
presents a general overview of the potential impacts of climate change on global food 
production. 
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The considerable uncertainties in climate change make it difficult to pinpoint the impacts 
of climate change on European and national agriculture. However, some general obser-
vations can be made. In general, the major impacts relate to changes in rainfall,  
temperature and extreme events including floods.  
	

Broadly speaking, the IPCC scenarios (IPCC, 2001) show a reduction of precipitation in 
the Southern half of Europe. The large majority of this area has a rain deficit throughout 
the year, and in particular during the growing season. Hence, for this part of the  
continent, a significant negative impact can be expected. This impact will be most severe 
in countries that have few opportunities to cope with increasing water deficits, such as 
Spain. For the wetter, Northern half of Europe, an increase in rainfall is expected, in  
particular at higher latitudes (Scotland, Scandinavia). The impact of this will be small, as 
these countries do not have rainfall shortages. 

Modest increases in temperature may be beneficial for European agriculture, in  
particular at higher latitudes where temperature limits the growing season (Scandinavia, 
Northern Russia). The impacts in Southern Europe will be small, with C4 plants (cereals, 
maize) most resistant to elevated temperatures. 
+4		
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The most pronounced impact of climate change on European food production might be 
related to the impacts of extreme events including floods, droughts and hailstorms. If 
these would increase, the consequences for agriculture would be significant. The Nether-
lands would be particularly affected related to its location in the delta of the Rhine and 
the Meuse, but floods may also substantially hamper agriculture in central Germany and 
parts of France, as demonstrated by recent floods in the countries.  
5,5,59		
The uncertainties are substantial. They relate to the precise, local changes in climatic 
conditions, the ability of farmers to adapt to these changing conditions, as well as the 
responses of the individual crops and the possibilities to develop and promote more  
resistant crops, e.g. to extreme events.  
&7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The impacts on water management are discussed subsequently for the European scale 
and the Netherlands. This section analyses the potential impacts at the European scale, 
addressing, (i) flooding; (ii) droughts; and (iii) the hydrological cycle. 
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Flooding is the most common natural disaster in Europe and, in terms of economic  
damage, probably the most costly one (Estrela et al., 2001). Serious flooding has oc-
curred in the last decade in several European countries ranging from the Mediterranean 
region (Greece, October 1994, Italy 1994 in the Piedmont area) to the northern counties 
(Sweden and Norway, 1995). In the English midlands, the flood from the Easter week-
end 1998 caused severe damage and the loss of lives. In France, 42 people died in 1992 
during the flash flooding in Vaison-la-Romaine, basin wide floods caused widespread 
disruption and losses in the Rhine and Meuse basins in 1992, 1993 and 1995, and excep-
tional flooding struck the Po in 1994. In 1997 severe flooding occurred in several parts 
of Europe: in Greece (January), the Czech Republic, Poland (July) and in Spain and  
Portugal (November). More recently are the floods (Elbe, Danube and Rhone) in the 
summer of 2002, which caused severe damage and also caused casualties. 
 !			(
The demand for European water resources increases from 100 km3/year in 1950 to 550 
km3/year in 1990 (Estrela et al., 2001). This demand is expected to increase further. As 
the pressure on water resources continues to grow, Europe is becoming increasingly  
vulnerable to the effects of meteorological drought. Recent severe and prolonged 
droughts have highlighted Europe’s vulnerability to natural hazards. Large areas of 
Europe have been affected by drought over the past 50 years. 
In addition, several regions in Europe are dependent on dwindling groundwater supplies. 
Groundwater supplies are less susceptible than surface water to short-term climate  
variability; they are more affected by long-term trends. Groundwater serves as the base 
flow for many streams and rivers. In many areas, groundwater levels are very likely to 
fall, thus reducing seasonal stream flows. Surface water temperature fluctuates more  
rapidly with reduced volumes of water, likely affecting vital habitats. Small streams that 
are heavily influenced by groundwater are more likely to have reduced stream flows and 
changes in seasonality of flows, likely damaging existing wetland habitats. Pumping 
groundwater at a faster rate than it can be recharged is a major concern, especially in  
areas that have no other supplies. 
	(	(
Continuous warming is the most consistent result among all the GCM integrations of  
future climate, both globally and over Europe. Model integrations also suggest a  
continued upward trend in winter precipitation in mid- and high-latitude Europe (IPCC, 
2001) and point toward further retreat of European glaciers (Schneeberger et al., 2001). 
Changes in precipitation extremes, such as an increased proportion of heavy rains and 
occurrence of very wet seasons are also projected for the future (e.g., Grabs et al. 1996; 
Frei et al., 1998; Middelkoop et al., 2001; Räisänen & Joelsson, 2001; Jones & Reid, 
2001; Palmer & Räisänen, 2002). For Europe these studies suggest that annual rainfall 
will increase in Northern Europe and decrease elsewhere; temperatures will rise every-
where and potential evapotranspiration will generally increase. The foreseen change in 
temperature and precipitation will influence the hydrological cycle in a significant way, 
and changes can be expected in the occurrence of floods and droughts.  
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The expected sea-level rise will also influence the European coastal water systems,  
especially the low-lying deltas. Discharge of water to the sea will become more difficult. 
5,:,1	
For the Netherlands, the impacts on the main drainage basins are discussed, respectively, 
relating to Rhine and Meuse, Lake IJsselmeer and the North Sea Canal, and the Rhine 
and Meuse estuary. Subsequently, impacts on regional water systems, water shortages 
and water surface temperatures are examined.  
	/
Climate change will lead to a change in the discharge regime of the Rhine. The discharge 
regime will change from a combined rainfall/snowmelt regime to a regime dominated by 
rainfall. The discharge in winter and spring will increase whereas the discharge in  
summer and autumn will decrease (Figure 3.3) (Middelkoop et al., 2000). The change in 
the discharge of the river Meuse will be proportional with the change in projected pre-
cipitation. The discharge will increase in the winter season. The effect on the summer  
discharge for the Meuse is however less clear (De Wit et al., 2001; 2002). 
 
Figure 3.3 Relative change of the monthly mean discharge of the River Rhine (at  
Lobith) calculated with Rhine flow in combination with UKHI-GCM  
Source: Middelkoop et al., 2000. 
It is expected that the design discharge of the river Rhine will increase with about 5% 
per degree temperature increase (Middelkoop et al., 2000). The present design discharge 
is 16,000 m3/s. It must however be kept in mind that a discharge of about 18,000 m3/s is 
the maximum discharge that can reach Lobith (Silva, 2003). The Meuse, a typical rain 
river, will react more directly on changes in precipitation. It is therefore expected that the 
design discharge of the Meuse will increase with 10% per degree temperature increase. 
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Due to sea level rise the discharge of water from the lake IJsselmeer into the Wadden 
Sea and from the North Sea channel into the North Sea is hampered. The amount of  
water that has to be discharged in winter will increase. This will have the following  
consequences (Buiteveld & Lorenz, 1999): 
The extreme levels of IJsselmeer and Markermeer will rise, namely to the same extent as 
the sea-level rise. In general there will be greater fluctuations in lake levels, especially in 
the winter. In very dry summers the lake level may even decrease. The average lake  
levels will increase with half of the sea-level rise. 
In the North Sea Canal and Amsterdam-Rhine Canal higher water levels will occur more 
frequently and for longer periods, because at IJmuiden it is becoming more difficult to 
discharge water under free fall. This means that, in the event of a sea-level rise, more 
will have to be pumped out.  
The seepage and with that the salinity in areas surrounding the IJsselmeer will increase 
by 10%. In the summer the limited water supply will result in water shortage. Due to the 
changes the following functions are affected: 
• Safety; 
• Water supply for agriculture; 
• Water discharge from the regional water system to the Ijsselmeer; 
• And functions that will be influenced by the change in lake levels, such as recreation. 
	/(
In the lower part of the Rhine and Meuse there are two aspects which will change due to 
climate change (Jacobs et al., 2000). Due to lower summer discharge in combination 
with a sea-level rise it will become more difficult to discharge water into the North Sea. 
As a consequence there will be more salt water intrusion, which threatens the fresh water 
supply in that area. The salinity of the water taken may not be too high: a critical level 
equal to 215 mg/kg is presently the upper limit. During periods of very low river flow 
and high tide, the salinity of the water in the northern part of the estuary may temporarily 
exceed the critical level for water intake. At the station along the Hollandsche IJssel,  
water intake becomes limited when the Rhine discharge at Lobith drops below 1200 
m3/s. 
Higher discharge in combination with sea-level rise and possibly more frequent or more 
intense storm surges will affect the safety. 
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The regional hydrological systems in the coastal zone are more sensitive to climate 
change than the regional water systems in the upper part of the Netherlands because they 
are exposed to sea-level rise and changed precipitation patterns, as well as soil subsi-
dence. Due to the increase of the extreme precipitation the discharges from the regional 
water system will also increase in future with 5% till 20%. The number of bottlenecks 
where water problems or inundation occurs and the frequency of inundations will  
increase. Salt water intrusion, through estuarine system and through ground water seep-
age, is expected to increase due to sea-level rise.  
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Lower discharge of the river Rhine will affect navigation, the fresh water supply for the 
regional water system, drinking water supply, and as mentioned the salt water intrusion 
will increase.  
Water shortage as occurred in the summer 2003 will become more frequent in the future. 
The economic damage will increase, up to several billions of Euros in extreme dry  
summers. Due to climate change the available amount of fresh water will decrease  
during summer. At the same time it is expected that more fresh water is needed due the 
economic growth. The fresh water shortage will therefore increase with 10 to 20%, see 
Table 3.2 (Arcadis et al., 2002). 
Table 3.2 Water shortage. 
Shortage Soil Shortage surface water 
Present Present 2050 (+1°) 2050(+2°) Present 2050 (+1°) 2050 (+2°) 
Average 
year 
21  25 (+19%) 28 (+36%) 5,7  5,8 (+2%) 6,0 (+4%) 
Extreme 
dry year  
143  153 (+8%) 165 (+17%) 12,4  11,7 (-6%) 12,2 (-2%) 
Source: Arcadis et al., 2002. 
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Climate change will affect the impact of water cooling by industry and energy produc-
tion. Water shortage will lead to shortage of cooling water. This problem will be en-
hanced when the water temperature increases due to climate change. The discharged 
cooling water may not be higher than 30 °C. With increasing water temperatures the ca-
pacity will decrease and will affect the energy production.  
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Although several potential effects of climate change have been identified, a series of  
uncertainties remains. Some crucial uncertainties refer to: 
• Prognoses of magnitude and spatial variations of future changes in storm-climate; 
• The effects of a changing storm climate on geomorphology and ecology; and 
• The relation between geomorphological changes and ecological impacts. 
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Human health is profoundly affected by natural systems such as the ecology of pests and 
pathogens, food supplies, water supplies, and weather patterns. The link between 
weather and diseases is illustrated by the seasonality of many diseases. 
Climate change is likely to influence human health in various ways. However, the various 
parts of the globe will be affected in very different ways due to differences in sensitivity, 
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exposure and adaptive capacity. Climate change may affect health both directly and  
indirectly, see Figure 3.4. 
 
Figure 3.4 Health effects of climate change. 
Some geographical areas will experience more harmful changes in their climate (expo-
sure) than others. In addition, some (sub-)populations can be more sensitive to these 
changes or may be less able to adapt to them in order to reduce the effects. Examples of 
vulnerable subpopulations include the poor, children, elderly, malnourished people, the 
chronically ill, people living in coastal areas, urban dwellers and non-immune populations. 
The extent to which human health is affected depends on: 1) the exposure to climate 
change and its consequences; 2) the sensitivity of the population to the exposure; and 3) 
the ability of affected systems and populations to adapt (WHO, 2003). The vulnerability 
of a (sub-)population depends on factors such as population density, level of economic 
development, food availability, income level and distribution, local environmental  
conditions, pre-existing health status, and the quality and availability of public health 
care (Woodward, Hales et al., 2000). For instance, in 2001, a group of Dutch stake-
holders (e.g. health professionals, policymakers, interest groups, scientists) generally  
expected that the Netherlands would be capable of coping with possible health effects  
resulting from climate change. They expected allergy effects and adverse health effects 
due to poor air quality to be the most important health effects in the Netherlands. In  
addition, the stakeholders thought that the effects of storm and floods could also be im-
portant; although the number of victims may be small, the effects of the incidents are 
very serious (van Ierland et al., 2001). Health impacts in many other parts of the world are 
expected to be much more severe than those in the Netherlands. For example, climate 
change is projected to have a significant influence on the increase in vector-borne  
diseases in developing regions. The global burden of diseases attributable to climate 
change has recently been estimated for five geographical areas. Analysing only the  
better-studied health outcomes (food and water-born disease, malaria, natural disasters, 
risk of malnutrition), the level of climate change that has occurred since the baseline  
period (1960-1990) was estimated to have caused 150,000 deaths and 5.5 million DA-
LYs (Disability Adjusted Life Years) in the year 2000, but Table 3.3 shows that there 
were large geographical differences (WHO, 2003).  
 
 
Climate change
Direct health effects
Temperature-related effects
Storms and floods/ Sea level
Indirect health effects
Vector -born diseases
Water
- related diseases
Food-related diseases and malnutrition
Air quality
Allergies 
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Table 3.3 Estimated impacts of climate change in the year 2000. 
Region Total DALYs (1000s) DALYs/million population 
African region 1894 3071.5 
Eastern Mediterranean region 768 1586.5 
Latin America and Caribbean region 92 188.5 
South-East Asian region 2572 1703.5 
West Pacific region* 169 111.4 
Developed countries ** 8 8.9 
WORLD 5517 920.3 
Source: WHO, 2003; * Without developed countries; ** and Cuba. 
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This section discusses the potential health impacts of climate change at the national and 
European level. We discuss (i) health effects on floods; (ii) temperature effects; (iii) pol-
len allergies; (iv) water-related diseases; (v) food related diseases; (vi) air quality; and 
(vii) vector-borne diseases. 
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Climate change is likely to induce changes in the magnitude and frequency of extreme 
precipitation events, sea-level rise and associated flooding. In the Netherlands, disease 
risks from flooding are greatly reduced by a well-maintained sanitation infrastructure 
and public health measures. Hajat et al. (2003) conclude that in Europe the effect of 
floods increasing the risk of disease outbreaks appears relatively infrequently, while 
mental health disorders, like depression and anxiety, are most likely the most important 
health effects. 
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The direct influence of temperature on health is demonstrated by the observed increase 
in mortality during past heat waves (Table 3.4). Much of the excess mortality attributable 
to heat waves is related to cardiovascular and respiratory disease. Extreme cold also re-
sults in an increase in mortality (Huynen, Martens et al., 2001). Global climate change is 
expected to be accompanied by warmer summers and milder winters. Some studies 
(Langford and Bentham, 1995; Martens, 1997; Martens & Huynen, 2001) suggest that in 
many temperate or cold regions a decrease in mortality in winter would possibly coun-
terbalance the increase in mortality during summer. But one also has to account for in-
creased climate variability, which could result in a mortality increase in winter due to 
cold spells. In addition, the ageing of the Dutch population is expected to increase future 
vulnerability to thermal stress.  
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Climate and weather conditions influence the timing and duration of the pollen season, 
the amount of pollen produced and the geographical distribution of flowering plants 
(Huynen & Menne 2003). In the Netherlands, climate-induced changes in pollen  
production may affect a large number of people. 
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Table 3.4 Increased mortality during heat waves. 
Heatwave Impact on mortality 
London, July-August 1995 (Rooney et al., 1998)  8.9% increase in mortality over 5-day period  
London, 1976 (McMichael & Kovats 1998)  15% increase in total mortality,  
approximately 520 excess deaths 
Belgium, 1994 (Sartor et al. 1995) 13.2% increase in mortality in the elderly 
The Netherlands, 1982, 1983, 1990, 1994, 1995, 
1997 (Huynen, Martens et al. 2001) 
12.8% increase in mortality, approximately 
39.8 excess deaths per heatwave day 
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Diseases associated with water are varied and cover multiple environmental pathways. 
One of the most significant water-borne diseases associated with the public water supply 
in Western Europe is cryptosporidiosis, which has the potential to infect very large  
numbers of people. However, there is insufficient evidence to estimate whether climate 
change would have an impact on this disease. It is unlikely that water-borne diseases will 
become a serious threat in the Netherlands. There may be some health implications, 
however, due to an increase in imported cases from less developed regions (e.g. cholera) 
and from bathing in coastal and surface water of poor quality (e.g. blue algae). 
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Climate change could increase the occurrence of food-borne diseases like Salmonella 
and Campylobact (e.g. the development of microbes in food is temperature-dependent). 
However, high standards with regard to hygiene in the Netherlands are likely to prevent 
any substantial increase in these diseases. Worldwide, food security and malnutrition 
remain major concerns of climate change, but it is highly unlikely that the Netherlands 
will be seriously affected. 
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Weather conditions influence air quality via transport and formation of pollutants and 
can also influences air pollutant emissions (e.g. increased energy demand). Air pollutant 
problems due to climate change are expected to be more serious in cities. 
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Several important infectious diseases are transmitted by vectors such as mosquitoes or 
ticks. It is anticipated that climate change will affect the vector species, as well as the  
infective agents (parasites). As a result, global climate change may cause the following 
changes in vector-born disease transmission: a) the overall incidence and duration of the 
transmissions season in particular sites may increase or decrease and b) the geographical 
distribution of disease transmission may change (Kovats et al., 2003). Vector-borne  
infectious diseases that are believed to be sensitive to climate change are summarised in 
Table 3.5. With regard to malaria, there may be an increase in risk of occasional local P. 
vivax summer epidemics and it is also possible that the Mediterranean vector An. labran-
chiae may expand into central and Western Europe, presenting a potential for P. falciparum 
malaria infections. However, the chances of the return to a situation of endemic malaria in 
the Netherlands remain very low due to, for example, an excellent health care system. There 
could be health implication as a result of the import of malaria cases from less developed 
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regions. A rather new tick-born disease called Lyme disease is now highly prevalent in 
much of Europe and it is likely that climate change will increase the occurrence of Lyme 
disease in the Netherlands. 
Table 3.5 Vector-borne infectious diseases considered being sensitive to climate 
change. 
Vector Diseases 
Mosquitoes Malaria, filariasis, dengue fever, yellow fever, West Nile fever 
Sandflies Leishmaniasis 
Triatomines Chaga’s disease 
Ixodes ticks Lyme disease, tick-born encephalitis 
Tsetse flies African trypanosomiasis 
Blackflies Onchocerciasis 
Source: Kovats et al., 2003. 
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Although several possible health effects have already been identified, many uncertainties 
about the link between climate change and health still exist. We identified the following 
information needs: 
• Which indicators of the health effects of climate change can be identified? 
• What are the most important uncertainties with regard to the identified health effects 
and indicators? 
• What range of health impacts can be expected when there is a global warming of  
2 °C (Article 2, FCCC)? 
• How can the acceptable health risk be defined? 
• Can this acceptable health risk be translated into climate change thresholds? What 
level of climate change is dangerous from a health point of view and what adapta-
tions are feasible? 
• Which rate/level of climate change should be considered the maximum allowable 
change from a health perspective? 
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Tourism is one of the world’s largest economic sectors. It is estimated that tourism di-
rectly employs about 8 million people in the European Union, representing roughly 5% 
of total employment and of GDP (the Dutch shares are similar), and 30% of total exter-
nal trade in services. Worldwide, the shares attributable to tourism are 2.8% for total 
employment and 3.8% for GDP (WTTC, 2004). 
Tourism is also one of the world's most climate-dependent economic sectors. In some 
cases, climatic conditions act as a tourist attraction in their own right; in other cases they 
affect landscapes and influence tourism indirectly. Statistical analyses by Maddison 
(2001), Lise & Tol (2002), and Hamilton (2003), and a simulation study by Hamilton, 
Maddison & Tol (2003) show the relevance of climatic factors as determinants of tourist 
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demand. Climate factors are responsible for a large share of the estimated 100 million 
tourists (Mather et al., in press) that currently visit the Mediterranean region on an an-
nual basis, spending close to 100 billion US dollars. Note that the appreciation for a des-
tination’s climate is a relative one, always co-depending on the climate in the tourist’s 
home region. It is the difference in climate that counts. The relative climatic attractive-
ness of regions varies over the year, co-determining the holiday season. 
Landscapes, broadly defined, are also major factors in attracting tourists. Many ski en-
thusiasts visit the Alps in winter, because they expect to find good snow conditions 
there. Snow reliability and the length of the winter-sports season both depend on the Al-
pine climate. Similarly, the presence of a large variety of flora and fauna in a region tend 
to increase its attractiveness to tourists. Climatic conditions determine the distribution of 
species to a considerable extent. They also influence the availability of resources that are 
used by tourism, such as drinking water and energy (e.g. through the availability of cool-
ing water for power plants). 
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Climate change will alter the relative climatic conditions in Europe. Agnew and Viner 
(2001) explored the impacts of climate change on a range of different destinations. Viner 
and Amelung (2003) reported on the wider issues that surround the interactions of cli-
mate change with tourism and the environment. Climate change can have both direct and 
indirect effects on tourism. The direct roles of climate and climate change can be thermal 
(factors related to thermal perception by tourists, e.g. temperature, humidity), physical 
(e.g. wind, air quality) or aesthetic (e.g. sunshine) in nature (De Freitas, 2001). The indi-
rect impacts are on landscapes and resources availability. Below, we examine (i) the im-
pacts on demand; (ii) the impacts on supply; (iii) impacts on landscapes; and (iv) impacts 
on resources. 
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A limited number of tailor-made climate indices (maximum score: 100) have been com-
posed for tourism that incorporate the thermal, physical and aesthetic roles of climate; a 
few of them have been applied to climate change to assess its effects on climatic attrac-
tiveness for tourism. Using an index developed by Hatch (1988), Rotmans et al. (1994), 
it was found that the Mediterranean will lose much of its attractiveness in summer, while 
summer conditions will improve in the countries in the north of Europe. With the tour-
ism climatic index developed by Mieczkowski (1985), Amelung and Viner 
(forthcoming) similar conclusions are reached (Figure 3.5). Whereas in a typical south-
ern European destination such as Antalya (Turkey) conditions are projected to improve 
in spring and autumn and worsen in summer, conditions for De Bilt (Netherlands) are 
projected to improve in spring, summer and autumn: the high season will start earlier and 
end later. 
In addition, Amelung and Viner conclude that summer will cease to be the most pleasant 
season for tourism, which it is now in all of Europe (see Figure 3.6a). In the second half 
of the century, a large share of the Mediterranean is projected to be characterised by a 
bimodal distribution, with the most pleasant conditions occurring in spring and autumn. 
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Figure 3.5 Historical and projected scores on Mieczkowski's tourism climatic index 
(TCI.). 
Note: Data is for throughout the year for the typical southern city of Antalya and the Dutch  
   weather station of De Bilt.  
These changes will likely induce a significant share of Dutch and other northern  
European tourists to spend their summer holidays in their own region instead of the 
Mediterranean region. Such shifts may be reinforced by climate policies that affect 
transport. Currently, the air travel industry is in a favoured position: taxes on kerosene 
and VAT rates on tickets are low, and emissions from international transport are not in-
cluded in the Kyoto Protocol. Changes in this situation are almost inevitable, and these 
will most likely lead to significant increases in travel costs. 
               (a)                     (b) 
Figure 3.6 Climatic seasonality in tourism in the historical situation of (a) 1961-1990, 
and in the future situation of (b) 2070-2099 (SRES A1F scenario). 
(See Figure 3.5b for the results of the SRES A1F scenario of rapid climate change). 
Not all types of tourism are equally climate dependent. The climatic conditions required 
for Sun-Sea-Sand tourism, for example, are much stricter than those required for cultural 
tourism. In the first case, the climate is a primary motive for visiting a particular area, 
while in the second case it is not, although weather conditions may influence tourists’  
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ultimate activity patterns in the destination area. It can therefore be safely assumed that 
climate change will have a greater impact on climate dependent tourism (such as beach 
tourism) than on weather sensitive tourism (such as cultural tourism). In urban areas, 
however, the level of smog is known to increase with temperature. As a result, climate 
change may well lead to deteriorating health conditions in Europe’s cities in the summer 
season.  
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The amount of precipitation and the frequency of extreme weather events are expected to 
increase in the Netherlands in the coming decades. Extreme events can damage tourism-
related real estate and infrastructure. The number of great natural catastrophes has almost 
tripled since the 1960s, increasing the overall cost to the world's economies eightfold, 
and the cost to the insurance industry fifteen fold between the 1960s and the 1990s 
(Schinzler, 2001). This trend is projected to continue as a result of climate change. In 
particular areas that are prone to hurricanes or floods, such as small island states in the 
Caribbean or Pacific, are at risk. Damage to the Dutch tourist industry will likely be  
relatively small compared to other climate change effects. Insurance premiums may 
however increase significantly. 
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Climate change will affect the natural and cultural attractions in destinations. For  
example, landscapes are expected to change as a result of shifting ecosystems, and in-
creased levels of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere will potentially increase weathering 
or accelerate deterioration of materials (Smith et al., 1998), affecting cultural heritage. 
Snow is an essential element of a landscape to be suitable for winter sports, which are 
very popular among the Dutch. Today, 85% of Switzerland’s 230 ski resorts can be  
considered snow-reliable; they are located 1200 meters above sea level. If the snow reli-
ability line were to rise to 1500m as a result of climate change (year 2030 - 2050), the 
number of snow-reliable ski resorts would drop to 63%. According to rough estimates, a 
temperature change of one degree in the Alps can shift the snow line up by 100 to 200 
metres (Schär et al., 1998). If the line of snow reliability rises to 1,800 metres, under a 
more acute warming scenario, only 44 percent of skiing regions would be snow-reliable 
(Bürki et al., 2003). 
Coastal zones are particularly vulnerable to climate change as a result of sea-level rise 
and an increased frequency of extreme events. At the same time, these coastal zones are 
where most tourism is concentrated. On the Dutch coast, sea-level rise will increase the 
transport of sand from the western coast towards the Wadden Sea; simultaneously, the 
projected increase in gale frequency will accelerate the erosion of beaches and dunes. 
For the Netherlands, which has a substantial tidal difference, the consequences of a 
gradual sea-level rise are expected to be limited. The situation is different for the  
Mediterranean, in which tides do not play a major role. Coastal facilities are typically 
adapted to a narrow range of water levels. Any significant sea-level rise will jeopardise 
the coastal infrastructure, including marinas, in the Mediterranean. For small island 
states in the Caribbean and the Pacific, popular among tourists, threats from sea-level 
rise are existential; these states may completely vanish.  
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Climate change is likely to have an impact on nature and landscapes, two major factors 
of attraction in tourism. Ecosystems will be forced to migrate towards the poles; some 
species and ecosystems will be better able to follow this speed than others, so that  
species compositions change. As a result, nature and landscapes will start to look differ-
ent. The relevance of these changes will differ between tourists depending on their ‘love 
for nature’, which can vary from superficial to deep and lasting (Lengkeek, 2000). Most 
tourists’ love for nature is somewhere in between these two extremes, with aesthetics be-
ing more important than in-depth knowledge of natural systems. It is therefore likely that 
landscape changes will only affect tourism if the landscape’s aesthetic qualities are  
significantly altered. The effect of climate change on nature also has a health component: 
the temporal and spatial distributions of allergies and diseases will change. In the Neth-
erlands, for example, the pollen season will be extended, affecting millions of tourists 
suffering from hay fever.  
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Water use should be seen as an important issue, because many regions face water  
scarcity. Tourism often seems to accelerate existing problems because tourists shift their 
water demand to other regions, often water scarce areas like coastal zones. Water con-
sumption by tourism is relatively high. WWF (2001) reports that the average tourist in 
Spain consumes 440 l per day, a value that increases to 880 l if swimming pools and golf 
courses are taken into account. This compares to an average use of, for example, 135 l 
per day in Germany (Gössling, 2002). In many tourist destinations, especially in south-
ern Europe, peak demand for water from tourism coincides with peak demand from other 
sectors, such as agriculture. In addition, precipitation is often lowest in the holiday sea-
son. Climate change is predicted to exacerbate this situation. Competition for water  
between tourism and other sectors will become fiercer in many regions of Europe, in  
particular in the holiday season. On the popular island of Majorca, for example, soil 
moisture and groundwater levels will almost certainly decline in the 21st century. Most 
of Majorca’s water is currently supplied from groundwater sources (Kent et al., 2002). 
These sources are under further threat as a result of sea-level rise, leading to contamina-
tion of freshwater sources. 
The hot summer of 2003 has shown that water shortages and high water temperatures 
can also have major effects on power plants that rely on water for cooling purposes; in 
France and the Netherlands the situation was critical. During heat waves the need for 
cooling is not only urgent in the power stations, but in society at large, which results in 
an increased demand for energy to power the air-conditioning. 
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Although tourism is a climate dependent industry, little is know about the influence of 
climatic conditions on visitation levels, profitability, and tourist attractions and facilities. 
The impacts of climate change are therefore highly uncertain. Major uncertainties  
relate to: 
• The climate sensitivity of destination choice processes; 
• The climate sensitivity of recreation patterns; 
• The level of beach erosion; 
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• The long-term impact of heat waves on the selection of holiday destinations; 
• Climate thresholds of profitability in the tourist industry; 
• The level of water scarcity in dry holiday areas; 
• The impact of climate policies on transport prices and volumes. 
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Although the coastal zones in different parts (climate zones) of the world face different 
impacts of climate change in terms of rise in sea level, in frequency and magnitude of 
storms, cyclones and typhoons and in sea water- and air temperature, the following 
global key concerns can be formulated:  
• The world’s largest cities (>10 million people) are located in the coastal zone. These 
cities face major population growth which, combined with the impacts of climate 
change, result in a huge increase of the risk (from 200 million people at risk in the 
coastal zone in 1990 to 400 million in 2050);  
• Large-scale climate related processes (like the Gulf Stream, El Nino) influence both 
large-scale and local ecosystems (like migrating fish, coral reefs in international  
waters). An international policy approach is necessary;  
• Mangrove forests are specifically vulnerable to small changes of water level and 
temperature. This will have a major negative impact on;  
• The ecosystems of mangrove forests and related ecosystems; 
• The natural coastal protection by mangroves. 
• The institutional framework is not capable of developing and executing adequate 
policies to threats of sea-level rise and population growth in the coastal zone due to 
lack of resources. This holds especially for developing countries; 
• In a socio-economic sense, developing countries will become relatively more vulner-
able to the effects of climate change. Especially, ecosystems will suffer from this. 
Examples are: 
• 
 Coastal wetlands disappearing due to coastal erosion and coastal cultivation 
(aquaculture); 
• Estuarine ecosystem disappearing due to the use of all fresh (river) water by  
human beings. This is partly the result of adapted water management because of 
hydrological change related to climate change; 
• Sediment supply to the coast by rivers is disappearing due to damming of river, 
resulting in unwanted coastal erosion; 
• Lack of natural fresh (ground-)water resources in the coastal zone due to  
extensive human use and changing hydrological regime (rainfall). 
For a reference to the situation in the Netherlands, two examples from studies between 
1995-2000 under the Netherlands Climate Change Studies Assistance Program 
(NCCSAP) show the impacts of climate change on the coastal zone for (semi)tropical 
climates in the table below.
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Table 3.6 Impacts of climate change on the coastal zone. 
Country Climate scenario Economic  
scenario 
Impacts (without adaptation meas-
ures with 100 cm SLR in 2100) 
Bangladesh 
 
SLR: 100cm/100yr 
Prec:     monsoon     +33%  
             winter         +22%  
Evapor. monsoon    +15 % 
             winter         +20% 
River discharges 
(no upstream develop-
ments taken into account) 
          Peak flows  +13% 
          Low flows     -22% 
Cyclone intensity   +25% 
-BAS 3.4% ann. 
Growth 
 GDP up to 2010 
- High Devel: 
5,7%. 
- 90% of population at risk of  
annual flooding in 2010 with 10cm 
SLR  
 
- Up to 10% of GNP at risk  
annually in 2010 with 10 cm SLR  
 
- Up to 100,000 km2 area at risk for 
annual flooding with 10 cm SLR in 
2010  
Vietnam SLR: 100cm/100yr 
  
- 5-10% 
ann.growth up to 
2025 
- Difference 
mountains-coast 
-Ca 17 million people at risk due to 
annual flooding 
 
- Ca US $ 17 billion (80% of GNP) 
at risk due to annual flooding 
 
- Ca 1,750 km2 at risk (60% of 
Vietnam´s coastal wetlands)  
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The key potential impacts on the coastal zone at the European level are: 
• Spatial differences in sea-level rise over Europe due to differences in vertical land 
movement and in local sea-level rise; 
• Effects of storm frequency and magnitude, and of temperature rise are not yet fully 
understood, but may vary considerably per location; 
• Millions of people are at risk in the coastal zone (in the year 1990: 26 million  
people), most of them living in the cities located in low lying areas at the North Sea, 
North Atlantic and the Mediterranean coasts that are of significant socio-economic 
importance;  
• A growing number of people in the future at risk by flooding from sea due to:  
population growth in coastal areas, rate of sea-level rise and lack of protection meas-
ures taken (the increase ranges from 300 to 130000 % by the year 2080 depending on 
the sea-level rise and the protection measures taken);  
• Ecological values of salt marshes and wetlands are under pressure (the current area 
of 10000 km2 faces a loss of 6 to 25 % by 2080), due to coastal squeeze where the 
area of salt marches diminishes due to coastal erosion at the sea side and hard  
protection measures at the land side; inundation of intertidal area due to sea-level 
rise; and socio-economic activities indirectly polluting and disturbing and directly 
taking over salt marsh areas; 
• There is a need for integrated (multi-disciplinary) and cross-border (international) 
strategic management approaches, addressing the human utilisation of the coastal 
zone and preservation of ecosystems given the sea-level rise. 
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In the Netherlands, the Wadden Sea and adjacent North Sea coast are particularly  
vulnerable: The main climate change impacts on coastal zones are examined below,  
respectively with reference to (i) morphology; (ii) ecology; (iii) changes in storms; (iv) 
combined impacts; and (v) impacts on human use. 
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Sea-level rise, a changed river discharge and the changes in the storm-climate and wave-
action will result in a changed morphology along the Dutch coast. The following impacts 
are expected:  
• The rate of sea-level rise is strongly determining tidal marsh and -flat development. 
Above a critical level they will not be able to keep up with sea-level rise by sedimen-
tation, and by consequence flats and marshes may ‘drown’. For tidal marshes this 
critical level of sea-level rise is 8.5 mm/year; for tidal flats in larger tidal basins 3 
mm/year, and in small tidal basins 6 mm/year;  
• Stronger wave attacks and more extreme torrential rain events may induce increasing 
cliff erosion of tidal marshes leading to a decrease in areal; 
• The effect on tidal flats of changes in storminess and wave climate are still very  
uncertain; 
• The increasing sediment demand in the tidal basins, will trigger a faster erosion of 
the sandy North Sea coasts. Combined with the direct effect of a rising water level, 
estimates of the total coastal erosion in the Netherlands show an increase of 250% at 
6 mm/year and of 330% at 8.5 mm/year, relative to the erosion at the present rise 
level of 2 mm/year;  
• Higher water levels will also influence the unprotected parts of barrier islands, 
probably resulting in a start of acceleration of erosion. 
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The changes in the ecology of the coastal zone, due to climate changes, are expected to 
be relatively minor until 2050. However, from 2050 estimates of ecological changes due 
to increasing air- and water temperatures are: 
• Faster growth of bacteria; 
• Change in species of phytoplankton (also due to changes in the nutrient-supply); 
• A growing concern on the import of new and possibly harmful algae via ballast wa-
ter in ships, accelerating the invasion of new species;  
• An increase of sea grasses; 
• A shift in species on land and in the sea. For example a strong impact on different 
fish populations is expected since fish cannot adapt well to changing temperatures. 
		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Changes in hydro- and morphodynamic conditions are expected to have the following 
ecological impacts: 
• A decrease of relatively immobile epibenthos like oysters and mussels;  
• Changes in extreme discharge of fresh water will probably only have local effects, 
although salinity stratification may influence estuaries; 
• Local shifts in species could be expected due to shifting brackish gradients;  
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• On the barrier islands changes in plant species in the lower dune valleys and a  
possible enhancement of peat growth might be expected as a result of higher ground 
water tables due to sea-level rise; 
• In general, the biomass of benthos in the Wadden Sea will probably decrease due to 
a decrease in shoal height; 
• Loss of tidal-marsh habitat due to an expected increase in cliff erosion;  
• Shifts in fish species using the Wadden Sea as a nursery, due to morphological 
changes. 
		
Different factors combined can have the following ecological impacts: 
• Viral infection may increase due to habitat loss for different species and increased 
river discharges; 
• Bird abundances and species assemblages may change due to the change in food 
availability and a change in the areal extent of roosting and foraging grounds, due to 
erosion of (lower) tidal flats and to temperature changes;  
• In general it is thought that mammals may be influenced by the change in availability 
of food species; however, the exact effect is not known; 
• A decrease of high shoals and viral infections might influence the success of the 
common seal in the Wadden Sea;  
• Changing temperature and salinity, wind directions and seawater temperatures, river 
discharges and changes in the North Atlantic Oscillation-index, may induce much 
more, still unknown ecological changes. For example it is not known if the growth-
rate of zooplankton species will increase or decrease due to climate change. 
-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The general impacts on the human use of the coastal zone are analysed below. In  
addition, the expected ecological “impacts” for the period 1990-2090 are summarised in  
Table 3.7.  
• The protection function of the coastal zone against flooding of the hinterland will be 
weakened and the risk of damage will increase, leading to the need of counteractions 
and extra investments for nourishments and coastal protection works;  
• Harbour infrastructure will need some extra investments to adapt to higher water  
levels; 
• Gradual changes in tourism may change (not expected in the first 50 years, except if 
water quality changes due to, for instance, new toxic algae) due to changes in  
eco-system; 
• Changing possibilities of the fishing industry due to the changes in the eco-system. 
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Although several potential effects of climate change on the coastal zone have been  
identified, a series of uncertainties remains. Some crucial uncertainties refer to: 
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Table 3.7 Expected ecological “impacts” for the period 1990-2090. 
Reduction marshes  20 km2  
Reduction intertidal areas 224 km2 
Benthic primary production 6.4 % increase for total area 
Sedimentation of organic matter 20 % decrease per unit area 
Biomass filter/deposit feeders 36.8 % increase for total area 
Source: ISOS 1991 document. 
 
Sea level rise:  
• A lot of research has been done on the global sea level rise with a high range in 
model outcomes. Still, there is a high uncertainty on the absolute level to be reached 
in future; 
• As a result, the local effects (ie. sea level rise for the North Sea and the associated 
wave climate) are unclear; 
Storm climate: 
• Prognoses of magnitude (extreme values) of future storms;  
• The variations in time and space of the changing storm-climate; 
• The effects of a changing storm climate on geomorphology and ecology. 
Ecology 
• The relation between ecological impacts and geomorphological changes. 
Scenarios and methods for adaptation: 
• It is yet unclear how society can and will react on the long term effects of climate 
change.  
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On the basis of the analysis in this chapter, we conclude that the following indicators are 
of relevance to the situation in the Netherlands. In the area of ecosystems, indicators in-
clude shifts in species ranges, shifting of vegetation belts, change in growing season, 
changes in biochemical cycles, increased flooding of (coastal) ecosystems, hydrological 
changes in estuaries, changes in distribution patterns of species, extinction of species not 
able to adapt, and changes in ecosystems.  
In the area of food supply, the most important indicators are at the global level and in-
clude the impacts on crop production, and fish migration and production. Apart from the 
direct impact, food supply is especially important for developing countries, where large 
parts of the population are working in (small scale) agriculture and fishery, thus forming 
the major “employer” in remote areas. At the national level, food supply is not necessar-
ily affected. 
The largest impacts on the Netherlands will occur via the impact on water management. 
Important indicators for the impact of climate change on water management include 
flood risk, water shortage, energy supply (allowable cooling water discharge),  
navigability of rivers, salt water intrusion, impacts on drinking water, irrigation water, 
industrial water, and the increasing length of drought periods. 
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The impacts on health can be categorised as direct (via rise in temperature) and indirect 
(e.g. via infectious diseases, allergy) impacts. Analysing only the better-studied health 
outcomes, the level of climate change that has occurred since the baseline period (1960-
1990) is estimated to have caused 150.000 deaths and 5.5 milion DALY’s in the year 
2000, with large geograhical differences. Health impacts in many other parts of the 
world are expected to be much more severe than those of in the Netherlands. In 2001, a 
group of Dutch stakeholders generally expected that the Netherlands would be capable 
of coping with possible health effects resulting form climate change. They expected al-
lergy effects to be the most important health effects in the Netherlands. Other useful in-
dicators for climate related health effects in the Netherlands include mortality during 
heat waves and the spread of certain infectious diseases like Lyme disease.  
Tourism can be subdivided into climate and weather depending tourism. Only the first 
kind of tourism, in which the destination chosen is based more on the local climate than 
on the cultural values, is important in the climate debate. 
Tourists and tourist services are flexible in their capacity to adapt to climate changes. 
However, the tourism infrastructure is more vulnerable. The more investments done in 
the past, the more vulnerable the area will be.  
Changes in the global climate may have a strong impact on the coastal zone by the 
changes in hydrology (river discharges into open sea), hydraulic phenomena 
(wave/storm-climate, sea level and sea-level rise), morphology (sedimentation patterns, 
coastal retreat), ecology (terrestrial and marine) as well as many aspects of human use 
(safety, socio-economic developments). These aspects have their own characteristic  
adaptation capacity (with different spatial and time scales). For the coastal zone, the 
most important indicator is the rate of relative sea-level rise (rise in mm/year)  
determining the capacity of a system to adapt to the new conditions. 
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In the previous chapter, the impacts of climate change have been discussed. Analysis of 
the scales, magnitudes and potential socio-economic and ecological consequences of 
these impacts allows the assessment of the need to enact policy aimed at adaptation to 
these impacts. 
This chapter analyses the adaptation options to climate change for the relevant sectors. 
During the stakeholder consultation process, stakeholders discussed potential types of 
adaptation options, and priorities in the implementation of adaptation measures. Based 
upon the stakeholder participation process, the main adaptation options have been further 
examined. The assessments are based upon a review of recent scientific literature.  
We will subsequently discuss the adaptation options for climate change on ecosystems 
(Section 4.2), food production (Section 4.3), water management (Section 4.4), health 
(Section 4.5), tourism (Section 4.6) and coastal zone management (Section 4.7). We will 
discuss adaptation options themselves, and we subsequently indicate, for each category 
the indicators and thresholds that have been identified by the stakeholders as critical for 
adaptation, i.e. stakeholders indicated that adaptation in order to avoid the related thresh-
olds was their key priority in dealing with climate change. 
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It is important to remember that ecosystems are dynamic systems that have a certain re-
silience to adapt to changing environmental conditions. The main issue at stake is there-
fore not that environmental factors change, but that they are changing so rapidly (tem-
perature, rainfall, extremes, etc.).19 In addition, ecosystems are increasingly exposed to 
other threats, such as eutrophication and physical disturbance (roads, buildings, etc.) in 
the Netherlands and other densely populated areas, as well as overexploitation of many 
natural resources (forests, fish stocks) worldwide. These other threats act in conjunction 
with, and may exacerbate the problems caused by climate change.  
                                                   
19
  Hence, Article 2 UNFCCC aims to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations at a level to  
prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system “within a time-frame 
sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change”. 
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Obviously, it is highly important to monitor changes in ecosystems and species distribu-
tion and behaviour in order to be able to respond adequately to climate change induced 
pressures on ecosystems.  
Generally speaking, adaptation measures for ecosystem may be divided into two  
categories (van Ierland et al., 2001):  
• Measures aimed at creating conditions under which species have sufficient  
possibilities to adapt; and 
• Measures aimed at reducing other threats to ecosystems (such as disturbance,  
acidification, overexploitation). 
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In two ways, favourable conditions can be created for the adaptation of ecosystems. 
First, ecosystems can be connected and given the space to adjust. This is important to  
ensure that species with restricted mitigation capacities are able to resettle themselves 
following climate change. An example of this is the Ecological Main Structure (EMS) 
proposed for the Netherlands. Ideally, an EMS should also be realised in a European 
context. If completed, this will enhance the migration possibilities of species through the 
countries. Note that this may require re-evaluation of our definition of exotic species; if 
Southern species move into the Netherlands, they may need to be considered part of the 
indigenous ecosystems under the altered climatic conditions. Second, ecosystem  
resiliencies should be maintained in order to ensure that ecosystem keep the intrinsic  
capacity to adjust to climate change. Resilience depends upon a range of factors, such as 
the biodiversity and the nutrient status of the system (e.g. Scheffer et al., 2001). 
/		(
As climate change induced disturbance act jointly with other threats to ecosystems (such 
as disturbance, acidification, overexploitation), it is possible to partly mitigate the  
impacts of climate change through reduction of other disturbances, such as recreation, 
land use conversion, disturbance, etc. (which also helps to maintain ecosystem  
resilience).  
:,1,1-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
Indicators to monitor the ecological impacts of climate change, and the effectiveness 
need to be specified at both the species and the ecosystem level. A possible outlook for a 
set of global indicators at the species level is presented below. In Table 4.2, the key  
national indicators and thresholds, as identified by the stakeholders, are presented. A 
complicating factor for stakeholders appeared to be the identification of acceptable and 
unacceptable levels of loss of species and biodiversity. Legal norms for species loss are 
not well defined; although there are several national, supranational and international 
laws and agreements that define the requirements on species protection, there is no 
specification of which loss of species would be acceptable.  
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Table 4.1 Threatened and extinct species per species group. 
 No. of  
species in 
group 
Approx.  
proportion of 
group as-
sessed 
Threatened 
species in 
2000 
% of total in 
group threat-
ened 
Extinct  
species 
Vertebrates 
 Mammals 
 Birds 
 Reptiles 
 Amphibians 
 Fishes 
 
4,763 
9,946 
7,970 
4,950 
25,000 
 
100% 
100% 
<15% 
<15% 
<10% 
 
1,130 
1,183 
296 
146 
752 
 
24% 
12% 
4% 
3% 
3% 
 
87 
131 
22 
5 
92 
Invertebrates 
 Insects 
 Molluscs 
 Crustaceans 
 Others 
 
950,000 
70,000 
40,000 
>100,000 
 
<0.1% 
<5% 
<5% 
<0.1% 
 
555 
938 
408 
27 
 
0.06% 
1% 
1% 
0.02% 
 
73 
303 
9 
4 
Plants 
 Mosses 
 Confiers, cy-
cads, etc. 
 Flowering 
plants 
 
15,000 
876 
 
138,000 
 
<1% 
72% 
 
<9% 
 
80 
141 
 
5,390 
 
0.5% 
16% 
 
3.5% 
 
3 
1 
 
86 
Source: CBD, 2002. 
Table 4.2 Selected key national indicators and thresholds. 
Indicator Acceptable risk Unacceptable risk 
Loss of species  Where the legal norms are exceeded 
Changes in biodiversity   
Source: Stakeholder interviews. 
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Agricultural systems can adapt to climate change through changes in crop choice, water 
management, reclamation of land, research programs and organisation structure (van  
Ierland et al., 2001). Some farm level adaptation strategies, such as changes in planting 
and harvest dates, crop rotation and crop varieties, can be incorporated without large 
changes in management practises. Longer term planning is required to stimulate research 
on drought tolerant crops, enhanced irrigation techniques and other adaptation tech-
niques. The adaptation to extreme events is particularly cumbersome, this requires timely 
action and long-term capital investments, for example in water storage reservoirs.  
Climate change may particularly affect rangelands, where livestock keeping is the most 
important agricultural activity. The impacts of climate change need to be assessed in 
consideration of the current degradation of such systems through overgrazing, as in for 
example the Sahel. Hence, adaptation options also need to consider the two impacts, in 
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particular because it has recently been shown that high grazing pressure reduces the  
resilience of such systems for climate variability and droughts (Hein & Weikard, 2004). 
Adaptation options involve reduction of grazing pressures, as well as enhancing the live-
stock markets in these countries so that the farmers can more adequately respond to 
drought by selling livestock.  
In the Netherlands, the impacts on other agricultural sectors, such as dairy farming or 
greenhouses are expected to be small (van Ierland et al., 2001). Higher groundwater  
levels in the west due to wet summers may reduce the grazing potential. The greenhouse 
gas sector may benefit from higher atmospheric CO2 levels, and higher temperatures 
(which reduce the energy demand), but it may be adversely affected by extreme events 
(hail storms, droughts). Adaptation options will have to be sought in terms of specific 
measures, such as enlarging water storage reservoirs. 
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A table presenting a preliminary set of indicators to monitor the impacts of climate 
change, and the effectiveness of adaptation measures, on agricultural production is listed 
in Table 4.3. Stakeholders points-of view on crucial indicators and thresholds at the level 
of the Netherlands is indicated in Table 4.4. 
Table 4.3 Potential indicators to monitor agricultural adaptation measures. 
Indicator Units 
Crop yields, per hectare, per crop Ton/ha 
Areas per crop  Ha 
Irrigation needs per crop l/ha 
Percentage of drought resistant crop varieties used % 
Planting dates Date 
Harvest dates Date 
Costs of adaptation measures, such as reservoirs Euro/year 
 
Table 4.4 Selected key national indicators and thresholds. 
Indicator Acceptable risk Unacceptable risk 
Productivity to land  When the losses are structural 
Access to food   
Source: Stakeholder interviews. 
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The Commission Water Management 21st century (CWB21, 2000) was formed in re-
sponse to a number of floods by the end of the end of the 20th century. The question it 
needed to answer was: “how to prepare our water management for the 21st century”. The 
main strategy of retention/storage/discharge is expected to improve flood safety and  
reduce water shortage while creating opportunities for nature and recreation. The  
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commission also calculated the costs which are needed in water management in dealing 
with floods and droughts (around €1.2 billion). The commission calculated the additional 
yearly costs up to the year 2050 which are needed to adapt to the effects of climate 
change, based on the +2 °C climate scenario for the year 2100. For the head water  
system (Rhine and Meuse, IJsselmeer Area and the coast), these amount to € 180  
million. For the regional water systems, the adaptation costs are some € 45 million  
Based on the work of CWB21 it can be concluded that it should be possible to mitigate 
the effect of a moderate climate change for the water sector. Several studies were initi-
ated after WB21, such as the “Droogtestudie Nederland” and the study on the additional 
discharge capacity of the sluices of the IJsselmeer. Also in the key planning decision 
(PKB) “Room for the River” higher design discharge due to climate change is an issue. 
The possible measures are estimated as follows: 
• Rhine and Meuse: Due the expected higher design discharge of river Rhine and 
Meuse studies have been done to investigate the mitigation options. At the moment 
the process of the PKB Room for the River is running. The aim of the PKB is to  
describe the measures that are needed with which it is possible to comply with the 
design discharge by the year 2015. However the PKB Room for the River not only 
looks at these short-term goals. It also has to investigate if the measures which have 
to be taken for the short-term goals fit with (additional) measures which are neces-
sary to cope with a further increase of the design discharge of the Rhine up to 18.000 
m3/s and the Meuse of 4600 m3/s for the end of this century;  
• Lake IJsselmeer and North Sea Canal: In order to maintain the lake level dynamics at 
the present level, up to the year 2050, plans are made to expand the discharge  
capacity. The start of the building of the extra discharge sluices is foreseen for the 
year 2008 and has to be ready by the year 2013. The foreseen budget will be about  
€ 242 million. Increase of the capacity of the pumping station at IJmuiden will be  
realised by the mid of 2004. This measure must guarantee that the dynamics of the 
water levels in the North Sea Channel will stay at the present levels and can be  
maintained at these levels in future (next 50 years); 
• Regional water system: The regional water system has to be adapted to discharge the 
larger quantities. Because of the increasing sea level this can only be done by  
increasing pumping capacity;  
• Water shortage and low river discharge: Lower discharge of the river Rhine will  
affect navigation, the fresh water supply for the regional water system, drinking  
water supply, and as mentioned the salt water intrusion will increase. The damage for 
agriculture will increase the next 50 years up to 25 to 35 % per hectare. The total 
economic damage will vary from half million Euro in an average year up to several 
million Euro in an extreme dry year. Also nature will suffer from fresh water  
shortage. In extreme dry years irreversible damage can occur. The distribution of  
surface water within the Netherlands will be adapted in order to prevent irreversible 
damage. The so-called “Verdrogingsreeks”, which regulates the priority of the water 
distribution in drought situations, will be changed; 
• Surface water temperature: Climate change will affect the impact of water-cooling 
by industry and energy production. Water shortage will lead to shortage of cooling  
water. This problem will be enhanced when the water temperature increases due to 
climate change. The discharged cooling water may not be higher than 30 °C. With 
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increasing water temperatures the capacity will decrease and will affect the energy 
production. Mitigation is possible by transferring power plants to places with better 
cooling possibilities. 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Picture from RWS Netwerk June 2004. One of the two additional pumps for 
the discharge station IJmuiden. This is at the moment the discharge station 
with the largest discharge capacity in Europe. 
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The climate impact studies on water management in general use the +2 °C scenario 
(2100). For the determination of the increase in capacity of the discharge sluices of the 
IJsselmeer this scenario is used. The studies studied indicate that the effects of climate 
change can be dramatic, however when the mitigation or anticipation starts in time it 
should be possible to adapt. Problems occur when changes go faster than expected or 
when no anticipation takes place. In that case risks can be unacceptable. Because water 
management in general uses the +2 °C scenario, stronger increase can be indicated as an 
unacceptable risk.  
Critical thresholds include: 
• Design discharge Rhine and Meuse: In the PKB Room for the River takes in to  
account a future increase of the designs discharge based on the +2 °C scenario for 
2100. Increase of the design discharge of Rhine above 18.000 m3/s and for the Meuse 
above 4600 m3/s could be indicated as unacceptable;  
• Navigation: The indicator for navigation on the Rhine Branches is the OLR  
(Overeengekomen Laagste Rivierstand). The water level may be lower than the OLR 
in 5% of the time;  
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• Surface water temperature: Water temperature is critical for the aquatic ecosystem. 
At the moment the threshold level is 30 °C. Temperature of surface water is impor-
tant for cooling water for energy production and for industrial cooling water; 
• Blue green algae: In stagnant water and lakes the presence of blue-green algae can be 
used as an indicator. There is a positive relation of the temperature with the presence 
of (unwanted) blue-green algae. 
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Populations with a low adaptive capacity are more vulnerable to the health effects of 
climate change than populations with a higher ability to adapt; what may be manageable 
for one region may be overwhelming for another. Table 4.5 shows that possible  
adaptation strategies to mitigate the health effects of climate change cover a wide spec-
trum. A simple example is that of reducing the extra deaths and episodes of serious ill-
ness experienced by urban populations during extremes of heat. Adaptation options 
could include ‘weather-watch’ warning systems, better housing design, climate-related 
urban planning (to reduce the ‘heat island effect’), and greater access to emergency 
medical care. 
A population’s adaptive capacity concerns the ability to adjust to climate change in order 
to moderate potential damages, to take advantage of opportunities, or to cope with the 
consequences. It is determined by factors like economic resources, technology,  
information and skills, infrastructure, institutions and equity (WHO, 2003). The success 
of adaptation strategies will also rely on the involvement of local and national  
communities in the decision-making process, which in turn is dependent on an effective 
programme of information sharing and dissemination. As far as possible, adaptive  
interventions should be undertaken on the basis of evidence that demonstrates their ef-
fectiveness. Little is known about the biological or passive adaptation of humans to  
climate change. Most assessments of the health impacts of climate change have not  
addressed adaptation explicitly. 
The health status of a population is an important integrating outcome that reflects a range 
of other environmental impacts. Therefore, awareness of the potential health impacts of 
climate change should have substantive implications for policy-making in the various 
"upstream" sectors (environment, industry, public water supplies, construction, agricul-
ture, etc.) that would mediate some of the effects of climate change. Many adaptation  
options may have benefits beyond those associated with climate change, as they include 
measures such as the strengthening of the public health infrastructure, health education, 
and monitoring and surveillance. 
In 2001, a group of national stakeholders (e.g. health professionals, policymakers,  
interest groups, scientists) argued that the Netherlands will be capable of coping with  
possible health effects resulting from climate change. Possible measures that they  
frequently mentioned to reduce the impacts included education and monitoring. 
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Table 4.5 Adaptation options for reducing the health impacts of climate change. 
Health  
outcome 
Legislative Technical Educational-
advisory 
Cultural and  
behavioural 
Temperature-
related  
effects 
Building guide-
lines, greater  
access to 
(emergency) 
medical care 
Housing, public 
buildings, air-
conditioning,  
isolation, heating, 
urban planning 
Early warning 
systems, maintain 
hydration,  
surveillance and 
monitoring 
Clothing, siesta 
Storms and 
Floods 
Planning laws 
(e.g. land use), 
building guide-
lines, ban precari-
ous residential 
placements, eco-
nomic incentives 
for building 
Urban planning, 
storm shelters, 
construct strong 
seawalls, fortify 
sanitation systems 
Early warning 
systems, disaster 
preparedness  
programmes,  
surveillance and 
monitoring 
Use of storm  
shelters 
Air quality Emission  
controls, traffic  
restrictions, air 
quality standards 
Improved public 
transport, cata-
lytic converters, 
smokestacks 
Pollution warn-
ing, surveillance 
and monitoring 
Carpooling 
Allergies Planning laws 
(e.g. land use) 
 Early warning 
systems, surveil-
lance, monitoring 
Remain indoors 
Water related 
diseases 
Watershed  
protection laws, 
water quality 
regulation, en-
force high stan-
dards of hygiene, 
greater access to  
(emergency) 
medical care 
Improved water 
treatment,  
improved sanita-
tion and water 
storage, screening 
of pathogens 
Public education 
campaign, boil 
water alerts, early 
warning systems, 
surveillance and 
monitoring 
Hygienic good 
practices  
behaviour, boil 
water 
Food-related 
diseases 
(incl. Malnu-
trition) 
Enforce high 
standards of  
hygiene, greater  
access to (emer-
gency) medical 
care, access to  
international aid 
agencies and dis-
tribution networks 
Improvements in 
food preparation 
and storage, 
screening of 
pathogens 
Public education 
campaign, early 
warning systems, 
surveillance and 
monitoring 
Hygienic good 
practices  
behaviour 
Vector-born 
diseases 
Vaccination  
programmes and 
enforce vaccina-
tion laws, greater 
access to (emer-
gency) medical 
care  
Vector control, 
vaccination,  
impregnated  
bednets, install  
window screens, 
habitat control 
Public education 
campaign,  
surveillance and 
monitoring 
Use of impreg-
nated bednets, 
window screens, 
and tropical insect 
repellents, water 
storage practices, 
self inspection 
(for Lyme  
disease) 
Adopted from the cCASHh website and McMichael & Githeko (2001). 
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Much can be gained through preventative healthcare, such as improved knowledge  
combined with financial incentives that result in adaptive behaviour. Special attention 
has to be paid to vulnerable sub-groups. The group of stakeholders largely disagreed, 
however, about the question whether or not the adaptation strategies could be realised 
with limited extra investments or not (Box 4.1) (Van Ierland, De Groot et al., 2001). 
 
Box 4.1: Costs of adaptation strategies (van Ierland et al., 2001). 
Can the Dutch population reduce the health effects of climate change with limited extra investments? Opinions 
about this topic differed greatly within a group of Dutch stakeholders, which is illustrated by their comments: 
• Investments are relatively small in comparison with other countries and other sectors in the Netherlands; 
• Globalisation also requires investment elsewhere; 
• We will have to put money in education. Dependent on this we will have to decide whether extra  
investments are necessary; 
• In a well devolved health care system, relatively not much extra has to be invested to cope with the expected 
effects; 
• Extra investments in the up-levelling of dikes and coastal works seem necessary; 
• It will cost much extra, for example the up levelling of dikes and drinking water supply. 
 
Adaptive measures directed to health could also have impacts on other sectors. Examples 
include (van Ierland et al., 2001): 
• Air-conditioning influences energy consumption and air-quality); 
• Reducing air pollution leads to constraints on transport; 
• Infrastructure change may harm ecosystems in many areas; 
• There could be some positive influence on hydrology and possibly ecosystems, for 
example if the water storing capacity of river zones are extended; 
• Infrastructural adaptations and the up-levelling of dikes may have a negative effect 
on flora, fauna and ecosystems; 
• Reclaiming wetlands to reduce the growth of contagious diseases would be  
disastrous for our vanishing wetlands; 
• The promotion of reforestation and tree planting to reduce the CO2 emissions may be 
useful in other areas, like the reduction of temperatures in urban areas, noise  
reduction and the control of the air quality; 
• Positive effect of infrastructural measures to ensure the insurance options of risks 
(like the prohibition of house construction in the river foreland); 
• Energy policy less based on fossil fuels (to reduce air pollution), also in the transport 
sector, may possibly lead to a greater efficiency in using more clean production  
systems, which can only be favourable for the sectors themselves. 
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Policy measures are necessary when health risks are considered to be undesired or  
unacceptable. ‘Health risk’ is generally taken to be the probability of injury, disease or 
death under specific circumstances (Hunter & Fewtrell, 2001). Subsequently, the accept-
able health risk concerns the accepted level of this probability. In Dutch environmental 
policy, the chance of death is the dominant factor in establishing standards. With regard 
to hazardous substances without a threshold (e.g. carcinogens) the Maximum Permissi-
ble Risk (MPR) of dying is one in a million per year, while for substances with a thresh-
old value (a value below which effects are unlikely to occur) the MPR is the same as the 
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health-based advisory guidelines (RIVM, 2001). In the UK, the Health and Safety  
Executive also defines acceptable health risks in terms the annual risk of dying  
(Table 4.6) (RCEP, 1998). 
One other definition of acceptable risk, which is widely accepted in environmental  
regulations, is if lifetime exposure to a substance increases an individual’s chance of de-
veloping cancer is one in a million or less (this has become a sort of golden standard) 
(Hunter & Fewtrell, 2001). The US Environmental Protection Agency and the World 
Health Organization (WHO) also both use the lifetime risk of becoming ill in order to set 
standards for carcinogen concentration in drinking water (Table 4.6) (Cotruvo, 1988; 
WHO, 1993). 
Table 4.6 Established acceptable health risks with regard to harmful substances. 
Country/Institution Established acceptable health risk with regard to harmful substances 
Netherlands MPR* carcinogens: annual risk of dying of 10 –6 (one in a million)  
MPR non-carcinogens: according to health-based advisory guidelines 
(RIVM 2001). 
USA (Environmental 
Protection Agency) 
Target reference risk range for carcinogens in drinking water: lifetime 
risk of developing cancer between 10-4 (one in 10,000) and 10-6  
(one in a million) (Cotruvo 1988). 
UK (Health and Safety 
Executive) 
Acceptable risk at which no further improvement in safety is needed: 
annual risk of dying of 10 –6 (RCEP 1998). 
World Health  
Organization 
Guideline for carcinogens in drinking water: lifetime risk of  
developing cancer of 10-5 (WHO 1993). 
* MPR= Maximum Permissible Risk. 
Another sensible approach would be to consider accepted health impacts in terms of the 
total disease burden of a population and to define the acceptability in terms of falling  
below an arbitrary defined level. However, in reality some difficulties might arise when 
adopting this approach (Hunter & Fewtrell 2001). The public based approach towards 
accepted health risks is based on what is acceptable to the general public. Perceived risks 
often do not agree with factual/scientific risks assessments. Bennet (1999) identified 
several ‘fright factors’ that influence the public’s concern about risks and the public’s 
risk acceptance (Box 4.2). In addition, acceptable health risk can also be defined using 
an economic approach (Hunter & Fewtrell 2001). In The Netherlands, the need to  
include economic consequences in health risks assessments is recognized (RIVM, 2001).  
Based on the above, one can conclude that, in establishing the acceptable health risk of 
climate change, several approaches are possible:  
• To determine the maximum acceptable risk of dying due to climate change; 
• To determine the maximum acceptable risk on morbidity due to climate change; 
• To determine the maximum acceptable burden of disease level attributable to climate 
change; 
• To survey public acceptance of the health risk associated with climate change  
(public-based approach); 
• To assess which climate change related health risk is acceptable from an economic 
perspective. 
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Box 4.2: Fright factors (Bennet, 1999) 
Risks are deemed to be less accepted if they are perceived to be: 
• Involuntary; 
• Inequitably distributed in society; 
• Inescapable, even if taking personal precautions; 
• Unfamiliar or novel; 
• Man-made rather than natural; 
• The cause of hidden and irreversible damage which may result in disease many years after; 
• Of particular threat to future generations, for example by affecting small children or pregnant women; 
• The cause of a particular dreadful illness or death; 
• Poorly understood by science; 
• The cause of damage to identifiable, rather than anonymous individuals; 
• Subject to contradictory statements from responsible source. 
 
Table 4.7 gives an overview of possible acceptable risk levels with regard to the health 
impacts of climate change. These can be viewed as normative threshold levels of climate 
change induced heat stress, allergic disorders or infectious diseases (e.g. Lyme disease).  
Table 4.7 Possible acceptable risk levels with regard to the health impacts of climate 
change. 
Approach Possible accepted health risk levels  
Acceptable annual 
risk of dying 
One in a million (10 –6) or equal to zero.*
 
Acceptable lifetime 
risk on morbidity 
Information not available; accepted risk depends on the nature of  
disease but is likely to be higher than one in a million (10 –6) for dis-
eases less severe than cancer (e.g. allergies).  
Acceptable burden 
of disease level 
Information not available. 
Public acceptance Information not available, but health risks deemed to be less accepted 
due to nature of climate change problem.** 
Economically  
defined acceptable 
risk 
“Any risk where the costs of reducing that risk exceeds the financial 
and utility benefits that would arise from that reduction and where 
such resources required in this risk reduction would not be better 
spent on other public health issues” (Hunter and Fewtrell 2001). 
*  Based on Dutch policy. 
**  The climate change is likely to be perceived as, for example, involuntary, unfamiliar,  
man-made, the cause of hidden and irreversible damage, poorly understood by science  
(due to scientific uncertainties) and inequitably distributed in society. 
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The projected changes in climatic conditions between and within seasons would have 
profound impacts on the profitability of the tourist sectors, and on travel patterns across 
Europe. A participatory study revealed that stakeholders expect the main changes for the 
Netherlands to occur in recreation and daytrips rather than incoming tourism (van  
Ierland et al., 2001). Although tourists and recreationists often behave similarly (Wall, 
1998), there are marked differences in their decision-making processes. Recreationists 
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can respond to the weather conditions on very short notice (IISD, 1997) and quickly  
adjust their plans. In contrast tourists spend at least one night outside their usual place of 
residence, according to common definitions of what constitutes a tourist. Therefore,  
tourists depend on planning for the medium term. Wall (1998) therefore hypothesises 
that domestic tourist and recreational patterns are more stable than international ones and 
that remote destinations are more vulnerable than destinations in the proximity of metro-
politan areas. 
Tourists, in their turn, are more footloose than for example hotel owners. Most of them 
have no long-term commitment to certain tourist destinations or activities, which makes 
it relatively easy to substitute one destination for another, or one activity for another.  
Research from the United Kingdom suggests that people’s holiday planning becomes 
more spontaneous as temperature and the amount of sunshine increase (Giles & Perry, 
1998). Instead of booking a trip to more sunny resorts early in the season, people  
postpone their decisions until later in the season to see how the weather conditions  
develop at home. This would further increase the significance of last-minute trips. 
Tour operators tend to be quite flexible as well; their planning horizon is typically  
limited to a few years. They will shift their portfolio from ‘losing’ regions to ‘winning’ 
regions whose climatic conditions improve. Other segments of the tourist industry, such 
as hotels and other tourist facilities, are tied to a particular area: invested capital is high 
and so are ‘sunk costs’ that cannot be easily recovered in the short term (Wall, 1998). 
Large-scale infrastructure such as ports, airports and highways are built with even longer 
time horizons in mind: at least several decades. The higher the sunk costs, the more  
adaptation is restricted to making the best of the situation instead of just moving to  
another place. 
The spatially constrained tourist industry can respond to increased heat and smog by 
supplying improved air conditioning in tourist accommodation and by developing  
additional indoor attractions. In addition, changing seasonal patterns may trigger  
operational changes. An extended and flattened season in the Netherlands, for example, 
may allow for a more efficient use of facilities and resources.  
The Alpine countries are investigating options for adaptation to their decreasing snow  
reliability (Bürki et al., 2003). A technical innovation is the use of artificial snow, but 
this technique is expensive and energy-intensive. More importantly, it is only effective at 
below zero temperatures, i.e. the technique can solve the problem of lacking snowfall, 
but it does not solve the problem of rising temperatures. Another option is to close the 
low-lying ski resorts and open new ones at higher altitudes. This, however, is very  
expensive and it leads to an even greater spatial concentration of winter sports. A third 
option is the diversification of Alpine tourism, by developing non-snow-related activities 
and attractions or by constructing indoor ski pistes.  
In the Netherlands and elsewhere, it is common practice to counter beach erosion by 
beach recharge operations. Climate change will force the frequency of these operations 
to be increased, which is costly but technically feasible. The option of withdrawing the 
coastline may be a theoretical possibility, but will entail prohibitive costs. Countries 
around the Mediterranean may adjust to the rising sea level by lifting infrastructure and 
facilities, such as entire marinas. 
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The sustainability of water supply may prove to be a major factor determining the long-
term viability of tourism on Majorca and in many other parts of the Mediterranean and 
Europe as a whole. Desalination, water importation and conservation measures have 
been tried with only limited success so far. Other alternatives, such as rationing and 
much higher charges may provide other solutions, but cannot be implemented without 
direct negative impacts on the key industries of tourism (Kent et al., 2002). 
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Tourism is a social phenomenon. The human factor tends to reduce the relevance of ab-
solute critical thresholds. For example, northern Europeans travel to the Spanish coasts, 
because the summer climate over there is more pleasant than at home, not necessarily 
because the Spanish climate is perfectly pleasant in any absolute sense.  
The effects that climate change may have on travel patterns should therefore be studied 
for Europe or the world as a whole. As a result, the identification of absolute climate 
thresholds in relation to tourist behaviour tends is very difficult if not impossible. Indices 
such as the Tourism Comfort Index (TCI, see paragraph 3.6.2) are promising tools, but 
to date, only limited validation against arrival data has been performed. Preliminary 
analyses for Majorca suggest that TCI scores exceeding 75 are required for beach tour-
ism (Amelung, submitted ). If this threshold were generally valid, the Netherlands could 
become a destination for beach holidays if global temperature would rise by around 2.5 
degrees Celsius (equivalent to the 2050s in the A1F scenario). For the time being, how-
ever, this result remains largely speculative. 
Thresholds for the tourist industry are almost entirely economic in nature. If turnover is 
not enough to cover costs, businesses go bankrupt. Economic performance depends di-
rectly on tourist behaviour and is only indirectly related to climatic conditions. It is 
therefore difficult to express the economic thresholds in climatic terms. 
Considerable work has been done on snow reliability in the Alps, a prominent destina-
tion for Dutch winter sports enthusiasts. According to Bürki et al. (2003), the number of 
snow reliable ski resorts in Switzerland will drop significantly as a result of climate 
change (see Table 4.8). The present snow line is likely to rise by 200 to 300 metres over 
the next 30 to 50 years. In scenarios with more rapid climate change, a shift to 1800  
metres cannot be excluded. 
Results are even more dramatic for Austria and Italy, since the mountain areas in these 
countries are lower lying. Many mountain villages, above all in the central and eastern 
parts of Austria, will lose their winter industry because of climate change (Bürki et al., 
2003). Some recreational and tourist activities transcend mere economic and social rele-
vance: they are crucial for countries' national identities. For the Netherlands, the 
Elfstedentocht (a skating event) is of significant national and cultural importance. People 
may simply be opposed to losing the Elfstedentocht as a regular event, e.g. once every 
ten years. The location of such as threshold, however, can only be determined through a 
political process. 
 Institute for Environmental Studies 72
Table 4.8 Snow-reliability of Swiss ski resorts. 
1200 metres above 
sea level 
 
Snow-reliability 
1500 metres above 
sea level
 
1800 metres above 
sea level 
 
Region Number 
of ski  
resorts 
No. % No. % No. % 
Jura 15 4 27 1 7 0 0 
Alps (Vaud + Frib.) 19 16 84 7 37 4 21 
Valais 54 54 100 52 96 40 74 
Bern (ex. Jura) 35 30 86 20 57 12 34 
Central Switzerland 35 26 74 13 37 7 20 
Ticino 8 8 100 3 38 2 25 
Eastern Switzerland 18 11 61 6 33 3 17 
Grisons 46 46 100 42 91 33 72 
Switzerland 230 195 85 144 63 101 44 
Source: Bürki et al., 2003. 
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The coastal zone is a dynamic system characterised by a range of physical- and  
socio-economic processes at different spatial and temporal scales. Short-term fluctua-
tions, to a large extent interact with long-term trends. The dynamic character of the  
system is crucial when considering impacts of climate change and adaptation options of 
the coastal zone. 
Impacts and responses are, in fact, interdependent. In first instance, the magnitude of 
changes in driving processes (drivers) and in boundary conditions (pressures) determines 
the potential impact. Then, however, the response of the system by natural- and socio-
economic adaptation processes, will determine the actual impact. The system response is 
largely depending on the rate of external changes. This is the background to the  
argument in Section 4.7 that the main indicator for climate change impacts on the coastal 
zone is the rate of sea-level rise.  
The response may be different for different subsystems of the coastal zone. For example, 
the critical level of sea-level rise for tidal marshes in the Wadden Sea area is estimated to 
approximate 8.5 mm/year; for tidal flats in larger tidal basins to 3 mm/year, and in small 
tidal basins to 6 mm/year (van Goor, 2003). 
In this respect it is important to consider that several processes each have their own  
typical timescale, determining the time scale of response. Table 4.9 presents an over-
view:  
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Table 4.9 Response time scales of coastal zone impacts. 
 Process Response time scales 
Hydraulic phenomena  
 
Wave/storm-climate,  
Sea-level rise 
Immediate 
Centuries 
Morphology  
 
Sedimentation patterns,  
Coastal erosion 
Coastal retreat 
Decades 
Immediate 
Decades 
Ecology (terrestrial and 
marine) 
Species 
Ecosystems 
Immediate 
Years 
Many aspects of human 
use  
Safety,  
Short term socio-economic  
developments 
Long term socio-economic  
developments 
Years 
Years (when local activities 
need to be rearranged) 
Decades (when areas of national 
interest and scale need to be re-
arranged) 
 
An illustration of potential responses and of adaptation options to climate change, in-
volving both natural- and socio-economic processes, is presented by the European 
Commission (2004) in a EUROSION-report on sustainability of coastal zones: 
• Recommendation 1: Restoring the sediment balance and providing space for coastal 
processes: A more strategic and proactive approach to coastal erosion is needed for 
the sustainable development of vulnerable coastal zones and the conservation of 
coastal biodiversity. In light of climate change it is recommended that coastal  
resilience is enhanced by (a) restoring the sediment balance; (b) allocating space nec-
essary to accommodate natural erosion and coastal sediment processes; and (c) the 
designation of strategic sediment reservoirs. 
• Recommendation 2: Internalise coastal erosion cost and risk in planning and invest-
ment decisions: The impact, cost and risk of human induced coastal erosion should 
be controlled through better internalisation of coastal erosion concerns in planning 
and investment decisions. Public responsibility for coastal erosion risk should be  
limited and an appropriate part of the risk should be transferred to direct beneficiaries 
and investors. Environmental assessment instruments should be applied to achieve 
this. Risks should be monitored and mapped, evaluated and incorporated into  
planning and investment policies; 
• Recommendation 3: Make responses to coastal erosion accountable: Coastal erosion 
management should move away from piecemeal solutions to a planned approach 
based upon accountability principles, by optimising investment costs against values 
at risk, increasing social acceptability of actions, and keeping options open for the fu-
ture. This move should be driven by the need to restore the coastal resilience and the 
favourable sediment status and be supported by Coastal Sediment Management Plans 
(CSMPs); 
• Recommendation 4: Strengthen the knowledge base of coastal erosion management 
and planning: The knowledge base of coastal erosion management and planning 
should be strengthened through the development of information management strate-
gies. These should include dissemination of ‘best practice’ (what works and what 
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does not), provide a proactive approach to data and information management and 
promote institutional leadership at the regional levels. 
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Feasibility of the adaptation options is depending on the magnitude and rate of climate 
induced sea-level rise, and on the adaptation capacity. As indicated above, the adaptation 
capacity may differ for different subsystems of the coastal zone. Thresholds or critical 
levels of sea-level rise are related to the adaptation capacity.  
Notwithstanding the fact that the adaptation capacity is dominantly depending on the 
rate of changes, qualitative thresholds of absolute values of sea-level rise have been  
estimated on the basis of expert judgement for the social-, economic- and ecological  
subsystems of the coastal zone (Table 4.10): 
Table 4.10 Threshold levels and values of absolute sea-level rise. 
Threshold values of absolute sea-level rise (m) per subsystem of the 
coastal zone 
Threshold level 
Social  Ecological Economic 
No problem Up to 0.5 m  Up to 0.5 m Up to 0.5 m 
Significant effects 0.5 – 2 m 0.5 – 1 m 0.5 – 4 m 
Irreversible effects More than 2 m  More than 1 m  More than 4 m  
Comments: All values refer to “average global response” 
 
 
 
 
Protection activities 
have more and more 
impact on spatial 
planning and coastal 
(fishery) communi-
ties. Resettlement  
becomes an attractive 
alternative. 
Coastal ecology is 
more and more  
subject to “hard”  
protection measures 
(no tidal flats and 
marshes anymore) 
and coral reeves will 
drown. 
Protection activities be-
come too expensive in 
construction and main-
tenance, so that  
re-settlement of the ma-
jority of the coastal 
communities needs to 
take place. Valuable 
land and infrastructure 
is lost. 
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This chapter shows that adaptation options are not easy to define in precise terms, due to 
the uncertainties in the climate change processes, in particular at the mid- and longer 
term. Below, we will discuss the main adaptation options for the aspects examined in the 
study. For ecosystems, there are two types of adaptation options. These are: (i) measures 
aimed at creating conditions under which species have sufficient possibilities to adapt; 
and (ii) measures aimed at reducing other threats to ecosystems (such as disturbance, 
acidification, overexploitation). Specific measures include the creation of space for eco-
systems, e.g. through ecological networks such as the Ecological Main Structure in the 
Netherlands. 
On the same basis, estimates of thresholds of sea-level rise rates are given in Table 4.11. 
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Table 4.11 Threshold levels and value of sea-level rise rates. 
Threshold values of sea-level rise rates (mm/year) per subsystem of the 
coastal zone 
Threshold level 
Social  Ecological Economic 
No problem Up to 3 mm/year Up to 3 mm/year 2 mm/year 
Significant effects
 
3-10 mm/year 3-6 mm/year 2-10mm/year 
Irreversible effects More than 10 
mm/year 
More than 6 mm/year More than 10 mm/year 
Comments: All values refer to “average global response” 
The impacts strongly depend how the local social, ecological and eco-
nomic systems are able to adapt to the changing sea level. When these 
systems cannot follow the sea-level rise, strong and immediate action is 
finally required. 
 Coastal (fishery) 
communities and 
economies are  
endangered by more 
severe coastal  
erosion. 
This holds for coastal 
systems were,  
initially, enough 
sediment is available 
to follow the sea-
level rise. 
Budget for construction 
and maintenance of pro-
tection works is gradu-
ally more likely to  
exceed costs for reset-
tlement. 
 
 
However, as climate change induced disturbance acts jointly with other disturbances, it 
is also important to consider the option of reducing other disturbances, such as recrea-
tion, land use conversion, disturbance, etc.  
For food supply, the main impacts may be located in Australia and Africa. They are  
related to changes in precipitation that could enhance droughts, as well as increased  
impacts of extreme events, besides drought in particular also floods and storms. Whereas 
Southern Europe is most vulnerable to droughts, floods are particularly relevant to the 
Netherlands and parts of Germany and France. Adaptation options include changes in 
crop choice, water management, reclamation of land, research programs and organisation 
structure. Some farm level adaptation strategies, such as changes in planting and harvest 
dates, crop rotation and crop varieties, can be incorporated without large changes in 
management practises. However, longer term planning is required to stimulate research 
on drought tolerant crops, enhanced irrigation techniques and other adaptation  
techniques. 
Adaptation of the water sector requires a substantial number of investments in water  
control techniques including sluices and pumping stations. Specific adaptation options 
depend upon the specific characteristics of rivers and lakes. For instance, for the Rhine 
and Meuse, a number of measures are currently considered that aim to deal with an  
increase of the design discharge of the Rhine up to 18.000 m3/s and the Meuse of 4600 
m3/s for the end of this century. 
Regarding health, populations with a low adaptive capacity are more vulnerable to the 
health effects of climate change than populations with a higher ability to adapt. Possible 
adaptation strategies to mitigate the health effects of climate change cover a wide spec-
trum. A simple example is that of reducing the extra deaths and episodes of serious  
illness experienced by urban populations during extremes of heat. Adaptations could  
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include ‘weather-watch’ warning systems, better housing design, climate-related urban 
planning (to reduce the ‘heat island effect’), and greater access to emergency medical 
care. The success of adaptation strategies will rely on economic factors, as well as the 
involvement of local and national communities in the decision-making process. Dutch 
stakeholders (e.g. health professionals, policymakers, interest groups, scientists) feel that 
the Netherlands will be capable of coping with possible health effects resulting from 
climate change. Possible measures that they frequently mentioned to reduce the impacts 
included education and monitoring. Much can be gained through preventative healthcare, 
such as improved knowledge combined with financial incentives that result in adaptive 
behaviour. However, special attention has to be paid to vulnerable sub-groups.  
As for the tourist sector, the projected changes in climatic conditions between and within 
seasons would have profound impacts on the profitability of the sectors, and on travel 
patterns across Europe. A participatory study revealed that stakeholders expect the main 
changes for the Netherlands to occur in recreation and daytrips rather than incoming 
tourism. Adaptation will take place in terms of travel patters of tourists. For instance, 
they will wait longer to check climatic conditions before they decide if and where to go. 
In addition, technical options are able to partly adapt to a changing climate. For instance, 
the Alpine countries are investigating options for adaptation to their decreasing snow  
reliability. 
The coastal zone is a dynamic system characterised by a range of physical- and socio-
economic processes at different spatial and temporal scales. The dynamic character of 
the system is crucial when considering impacts of climate change and adaptation options 
of the coastal zone. The system response is largely depending on the rate of external 
changes. The main indicator for climate change impacts on the coastal zone is the rate of 
sea-level rise. Adaptation is required, in particular, to the maintenance of the shore-line 
and the decrease of coastal erosion rates. A strategic and proactive approach to coastal 
erosion is needed for the sustainable development of vulnerable coastal zones and the 
conservation of coastal biodiversity.  
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This chapter explores the implications for allowable levels of GHG emissions on the 
long and short term of setting long-term policy targets for (the impacts of) climate 
change. The point of departure of our analysis will be the present long-term climate  
targets of the Netherlands (see Chapter 1). However, we will also evaluate the implica-
tions of other possible impact threshold levels  
In order to determine allowable levels of GHG emissions we have to back-calculate from 
acceptable levels of climate change to emissions (Figure 5.1). This is not simple because 
there are major uncertainties in the cause-effect chain - the relationship between levels of 
GHG emissions and the impacts related to the human-induced climate change -,  
particularly on a regional scale.  
 
Figure 5.1 Cause-effect chain of climate change. 
For some key parameters, like the increase in atmospheric concentrations resulting from 
emissions of GHGs or the (resulting) increase in global average surface temperature, 
there are estimates of the levels of uncertainty and even of the probability distribution of 
parameter values. In other cases, like the change in climate in some regions at the local 
level, we are not even sure about the direction of the changes, as different models show 
different outcomes. Moreover, uncertainties accumulate along the causal chain. This is 
the major problem in relating indicator threshold values for “dangerous climate change” 
to levels of allowable GHG emissions for the long- and short term.  
Two different approaches can be used: 
• The first is a simple deterministic approach where we indicate the possible levels of 
climate change on a global level that may result from stabilizing GHG concentrations 
at different levels in the atmosphere and related emission pathways over this century 
that would be required. This will be mainly based on the Global Reduction Pathways 
 
 
Greenhouse 
gas 
emissions 
 
Atmospheric 
GHG 
concentrations  
 
Radiative 
balance of 
atmosphere  
 
Climate 
change  
‘back calculation’ of emission targets  
 
Climate 
change 
impacts  
 Institute for Environmental Studies 80
(GRP) study for the European Commissions (Criqui et al., 2003: Eickhout et al., 
2003);  
• The second approach is a probabilistic approach to target setting (Mastrandea & 
Schneider, 2004: Webster et al., 2003). This approach intends to deal with the  
uncertainties in the cause-effect chain in a more quantitative way by saying some-
thing about the likelihood of meeting different long-term targets when stabilizing the 
GHG concentrations at different levels. We will use this approach to say something 
about the likelihood of avoiding crossing threshold levels for indicators of dangerous 
climate change, identified in the other chapters. This first requires an assessment of 
the relationship between local versus global indicators of climate change. 
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The assessments in the previous chapters have defined impact levels and thresholds at 
many different locations and spatial scales. To assess the implications of these thresholds 
for defining global climate-change targets, one needs to link the local threshold values to 
global indicators for climate change. In particular, we want to know the ratio between 
local temperature change and global average surface temperature increase. 
General Circulation Models (GCMs) are arguably the best available tools to project  
spatial patterns of climate change indicators. However, given the large uncertainties in 
particularly regional projections of climate change it seems most appropriate to draw  
information from a suite of GCMs, instead of just using one model. In Figure 5.2a, we 
show the annual-mean ratio of local over global temperature change, averaged over 17 
GCMs. In these GCM experiments only GHG concentration changes were used in the 
projections, excluding the contribution of changes in aerosols. The patterns resulting 
from aerosol changes increase overall uncertainty, but it can be expected that their  
contribution to climate change in the long term will strongly decrease due to air pollution 
policies (See also Chapter 2). For constructing Figure 5.2, we have used the SCENGEN 
modelling tool (Hare, 2003: Hulme et al., 1995). 
On the large scale, the response of the near-surface air temperature20 is stronger for  
continental areas than for the oceans, as well as for higher latitudes compared to the trop-
ics. Over Europe, the mean ratio is 1.3ºC, with an inter-model spread (standard devia-
tion) of 0.2ºC. For the marine climate of The Netherlands this ratio is projected lower as 
1.1ºC, with standard deviation 0.2ºC. The heterogeneity, or spread in results  
between the GCMs can be expressed by the inter-model standard deviation as in the ex-
amples for Europe and the Netherlands. However, the signal-to-noise ratio, defined here 
as the mean ratio divided by the inter-model standard deviation, might be more useful. 
As shown in Figure 5.2b, over the North Atlantic Ocean the uncertainties in the response 
appear to be relatively high (low signal-to-noise-ratio). This is mainly caused by the  
uncertainties in the response of the ocean circulation, which is particularly high in the 
northern North-Atlantic. The ratios shown in Figure 5.2a can be used for relating the  
local impact indicators to the global indicators. An important caveat in this method of 
averaging GCM pattern projections is that the GCM results do not provide a randomly 
distributed sample.  
                                                   
20
 From here on simply referred to as temperature change. 
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Some GCMs are more advanced than others. In addition, model parts of different GCMs 
might be related. For the analysis at hand however, the average over many model results 
is a better starting point than selecting only one model. 
 
-180 -120 -60 0 60 120 180
-90
-60
-30
0
30
60
90
-90
-60
-30
0
30
60
90
0 - 0.25
0.25 - 0.5
0.5 - 1.0
1.0 - 1.5
1.5 - 2.0
2.0 - 2.5
2.5 - 3.0
> 3.0
 
-180 -120 -60 0 60 120 180
-90
-60
-30
0
30
60
90
-90
-60
-30
0
30
60
90
0 - 1
1 - 2
2 - 3
3 - 4
4 - 5
5 - 6
6 - 7
> 7
 
Figure 5.2 Ratio of local over global annual-mean temperature change averaged over 
17 GCMs (ºC/ºC, top panel (a)) and inter-model signal-to-noise ratio (lower 
panel (b)). 
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In order to deduce emission targets from global long-term climate targets, such as the 
Netherlands’ and EU 2 ºC temperature target, it is first necessary to relate the climate 
targets to levels of GHG concentrations in the atmosphere.  
The Climate Convention aims to stabilize GHG concentrations (See Chapter 1). It should 
be noted that stabilization of the GHG concentrations will not stop further climate 
change immediately after the point in time when stabilization is reached (‘warming 
commitment’), due to inertia in the climate system. There will not yet be an equilibrium 
in the climate system, in particular between the atmosphere and the oceans. Thus  
temperatures will still (slowly) increase for decades to centuries, while sea-level rise will 
a) 
b) 
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continue for centuries to millennia (see Chapter 2). Especially for high stabilization  
levels, it is not likely that concentrations will remain constant for millennia, the time  
period needed to reach the equilibrium climate system. In that sense using GHG stabili-
zation profiles is a hypothetical exercise. In time-dependent model experiments, it has 
been shown that in general only about 70% of the equilibrium temperature is reached at 
the time that concentrations are stabilized and only 10% of the equilibrium sea-level rise 
(Webster et al., 2003). Stabilizing the temperature increase soon after concentrations 
reach their stabilization target level would thus require that after this point in time the 
concentrations would decrease again, even more so if the aim were to stabilize sea-level 
rise. The advantage then is of course that temperature change and sea-level rise would 
stay far below the equilibrium value. 
Nevertheless many studies focused on stabilization of GHG concentrations assume these 
to remain at constant levels after stabilization. Moreover, until recently most studies only 
focused on one GHG only: CO2. However, while CO2 is the most important GHG, other 
gases presently contribute about 1/3 to the enhanced greenhouse effect (IPCC, 2001). 
The IPCC in its Third Assessment Report (TAR) has included the contribution of other 
GHGs in stabilization scenarios, but in an unsatisfying way. By assuming that these non-
CO2 gases remain unabated, the temperature increase from stabilizing CO2 concentration 
is overestimated, particularly for the lower stabilization levels (see Box 5.1).  
Here, we will take the contribution of the various GHGs into account by using the  
concept of CO2-equivalent concentrations (CO2-eq., Box 5.1). This climate metric in-
cludes the climate impact of all (Kyoto) GHGs (CO2, CH4, N2O, HFCs, PFCs and SF6) 
together, expressed as the hypothetical level of the CO2 concentration that would have an 
equal impact on the radiative balance of the atmosphere (the energy balance between in-
coming sunlight and outgoing heat radiation). The climate metrics discussed here only 
relate to these Kyoto GHGs and leave out the contribution of other GHGs (i.e. CFCs, 
HFCs) and radiative active components such as aerosols, and other ozone precursors. 
Still, this leads to some complications when calculating time-dependent concentration 
and emission pathways, because of the variation in the time period that different GHGs 
remain in the atmosphere.  
What levels of temperature and sea-level rise results from what level of CO2-eq. concen-
trations? In order to answer this question we need to look at the climate sensitivity (CS) 
of the climate system. This is the equilibrium global average surface temperature in-
crease resulting from a doubling of the CO2 (equivalent) concentrations in the atmos-
phere compared to pre-industrial levels (see Box 5.1) The value of this parameter is not 
well known. Since its First Assessment Report in 1992, the IPCC estimates its value  
between 1.5 and 4.5 ºC, with a “best guess” value of 2.5 ºC (IPCC WG1, 2001). 
Figure 5.3 shows that for a climate sensitivity of 2.5 ºC, CO2-eq. concentrations need to 
be stabilized at 550 ppmv to limit the global-mean equilibrium temperature to 2 ºC. This 
result is very much dependent on the CS assumed. If the CS would be lower than 2.5 ºC 
GHG concentrations could be stabilized at a higher level; if the CS would be higher 
GHG concentrations would have to be stabilized at a lower level.  
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Again, note that by reducing emissions further after stabilization of concentrations, the 
temperature change can be limited to significantly less than the equilibrium target in 
Figure 5.3. 
In line with these results, Eickhout et al. (2003), using the IMAGE-2.2 model in a time-
dependent analysis, report that stabilizing the CO2-eq. concentration at 550 ppmv will 
result in a maximum global mean temperature increase of less than 2 ºC in 2100 with a 
low to medium value for the climate sensitivity. In case the GHG concentrations are  
stabilized at 650 ppmv the temperature increase will only remain below 2 ºC if the value 
for the CS is at the low end of the IPCC range, and thus it is unlikely that the EU climate 
target will be met. With a high CS of 4.5 ºC, neither stabilization levels will meet the 2 
ºC target. To some extent, these time-dependent results also depend on the climate model 
used. For example, for the MAGICC climate model, used later in this chapter, CO2-eq. 
concentrations need to be stabilized at somewhat lower levels to achieve the same  
temperature targets. 
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Figure 5.3 Stabilization levels of GHG concentration and resulting global averaged 
temperature increase in case of a climate sensitivity of 2.5 ºC. 
Instead of these isolated statements depending on specific values of the CS, one would 
like to make more quantitative statements about the probability of meeting long-term 
climate targets for different levels of GHG concentrations. In recent years, there have 
been various studies estimating the likelihood of the CS to have a certain value (see Box 
5.1). The results of these estimates are so-called probability density functions (PDFs). 
Figure 5.4 shows two examples of such PDFs, based on observational climate data of the 
last centuries). These examples illustrate that the range of possible values of the CS is 
wider than the IPCC range. They also show that the research methodology is still a 
source of significant uncertainty in the probability distribution of the values of the CS 
(See Box 5.1). 
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Box 5.1: Explanation of concepts and methods 
CO2-eq. Concentration. The concept of equivalent-CO2 concentrations was developed as a simple tool to com-
pare the climatic effects of different mixes of GHGs (Schimel et al., 1997). It has been applied, for example, in 
assessments of emission abatement for several GHGs, that limits future climate impacts in some (often cost-) 
optimal way. In general, the climatic effect of GHGs is measured as the disturbing influence on the atmos-
phere’s radiative budget. Research in the last decades has identified a long list of GHGs with a positive contri-
bution to global warming. The most important are included in the Kyoto Protocol (‘Kyoto gases’), although 
others, like many gases included in the Montreal Protocol, make a considerable contribution. Most gases stay 
long enough in the atmosphere to become distributed spatially homogenous in the horizontal, like CO2. Much 
more problematic is the inclusion of forcings by aerosols (negative and positive), because the effect of these is 
highly localised geographically. In our calculations, as in most cases, the total CO2-eq. concentration only con-
cerns the Kyoto gases, but in other assessments other definitions might be used that may include aerosols. Ob-
viously, it is more complicated to define emission scenarios for stabilizing CO2-eq. concentrations than CO2 
only, because these can be reached by various combinations of gasses that also have different contributions to 
the radiative budget over time. Four ways of accounting the non-CO2 emissions have been proposed: (i) simple 
scenario assumptions (e.g. using a common non-intervention scenario (SRES A1B) for non-CO2 emissions: 
(Cubasch et al., 2001)), (ii) concentrations or radiative forcing for non-CO2 are proportionally scaled with CO2 
(e.g. about 23% of CO2 forcing: Raper et al.,1996, or a constant 100 ppmv is added to a CO2-concentration sta-
bilization target: Eickhout et al., 2003); (iii) accounting for source-specific reduction potentials for all gases 
(e.g. Morita, 2000: Swart et al., 2002) and (iv) cost-optimisation over the GHG emissions (Manne and Richels, 
2001: van Vuuren et al., 2003). We use  a scaling variant, which assumes that at lower CO2 stabilization levels, 
efficient measures would involve stronger cuts on non-CO2 emissions as well. In addition, at high CO2 concen-
tration, the radiative effect of CO2 is weaker (‘saturation effect’), thus the same concentration of non-CO2 gases 
adds more to the total CO2-eq. concentration than at low CO2 levels. A recent cost-optimised assessment sug-
gests roughly an extra 50 ppmv non-CO2 contribution at a CO2-stabilization level of 350 ppmv, increasing to 
150 ppmv non-CO2 at 650 ppmv CO2 (van Vuuren et al., 2003). 
Calculating CO2-eq. Concentration Targets. The simplest way to calculate the allowed level of CO2-eq. con-
centration stabilization from a long-term equilibrium temperature target is to use the relation 
2
2
2
2
xCO
stab
xCOstab
dT
dTdQdQ ⋅= . Here, 
22xCO
dT  is the climate sensitivity, stabdT  the global temperature target 
and stabdQ  the radiative forcing associated with a GHG stabilization target. 22xCOdQ  is the radiative forcing 
at two times the pre-industrial CO2 concentration. To calculate the CO2-equivalent concentration target 
stabeqpCO2  from stabdQ , we use the inverse of the third formulation relating radiative forcing to CO2 con-
centration from IPCC (2001): )(12 3 stabstab dQfeqpCO TAR−= . In more complex methods climate-modeling 
tools are needed. 
Probability Estimates of Climate Sensitivity. In recent years, various attempts have been made to constrain the 
uncertainty in climate sensitivity, either through analysis of General Circulation Model results (Cess et al., 
1989: IPCC, 2001: Raper et al., 2002), subjective expert judgments (Arrhenius, 1896: Morgan & Keith, 1995), 
consistency analysis based on palaeoclimatic data (Alley, 2003: Barron et al., 1995: Covey et al., 1996: Cuffey 
and Brrok, 2000: Hoffert & Covey, 1992), or based on more recent climate observations (Andronova & 
Schlesinger, 2001: Forest et al., 2002: Gregory et al., 2002: Harvey and Kaufmann, 2002: Knutti et al., 2002). 
The latter set of studies was not yet able to significantly constrain the climate sensitivity; indeed, values of up 
to 10°C cannot be excluded. Palaeoclimatic studies suggest generally lower and more constrained uncertainty 
ranges – however, today’s climate feedback processes are different from those under palaeoclimatic conditions, 
thereby limiting the applicability of results. In this chapter, two different probability density functions (PDFs) 
for climate sensitivity are used (see Figure 6.4), drawn directly from the more sophisticated recent studies. 
Firstly, Forest et al. (2002) provide an example of an observationally based estimate, in which higher values 
have been more constrained by using an expert-prior PDF. Secondly, the results of Andronova and Schlesinger 
(2001) form an example of a PDF that puts little constraints on higher climate sensitivities. In our calculations, 
we use the cumulative density function (CDF), which gives the probability at value X that the CS has a value of 
X, or less. The CDF at value X is calculated by integrating the PDF from zero to X, in other words, calculating 
from the PDF the total probability of CS values of X and lower. 
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Figure 5.4 Probability Distribution Function of climate sensitivity. 
Source: Forest et al. (2002) expert analysis (black) and Andronova and Schlesinger (2001) 
(grey).The grey area indicates the IPCC range, with the dotted vertical line  
depicting the “best guess value” of 2.5°C. 
The estimates of the CS probability distribution can be used to give an indication of the 
likelihood that certain global average temperature targets (or targets for sea-level rise) 
will be met for different levels of stabilizing GHG concentrations. This is important,  
because policy makers and society may require different levels of certainty for different 
types of risks. The certainty required for avoiding irreversible and catastrophic climate 
change impacts resulting from events, such as a full collapse of the thermohaline circula-
tion (THC), may be much higher than for preventing other negative climate change  
impacts, such as a regional loss of agriculture production.  
This can be done by first making cumulative density functions (CDFs; see Box 5.1),  
accumulating the probability of the CS to be below a certain value. Next, since a specific 
combination of concentration and temperature target implies a certain value of the CS, 
these can be used to indicate the likelihood of meeting a certain global-mean temperature 
target for various levels of stabilization of GHG concentrations. Figure 5.5 shows the 
probability levels of achieving temperature targets for the two PDFs discussed above. 
For a stabilization at 550 ppmv CO2-eq. the probability of limiting temperature increase 
to 2 ºC is about 33% (left panel) and 50% (right panel), respectively. For stabilization at 
650 ppmv these values decrease to less than 10%, resp. 33%. A 100% probability is un-
achievable, because of the uncertainty in probability estimates, but also because of other 
uncertainties in the climate change cause-and-effect chain. An important observation 
from Figure 5.5 is that the probabilities depend non-linearly on concentration levels. For 
the 2ºC target in Figure 5.5, the probability of achieving this target increases more  
rapidly with decreasing concentrations at medium-to-low stabilization levels (coloured 
arrows). 
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Figure 5.5 Probability of achieving a temperature target for a range of CO2-eq.  
stabilization levels. 
Note: This is implied by the probability distributions for climate sensitivity of Forest et al. (2002) 
(left panel) and Andronova and Schlesinger (2001) (right panel). The coloured arrows  
indicate that decreasing concentration leads to higher probability in a non-linear way. 
As indicated earlier, the required level of certainty to avoid non-linear climate change 
events with irreversible and probably catastrophic impacts may be much higher, like 
95%. While the uncertainty about when such events may happen is still very large, the 
IPCC TAR and more studies indicate that the risk of such large-scale singularities may 
increase significantly when global average temperature increases more than 5 ºC above 
pre-industrial levels. This excludes the finding also reported in the IPCC-TAR that, if the 
local average temperature on Greenland increases more than 2.7 ºC and is sustained for 
millennia, a complete melting of the Greenland ice sheet (except for some glaciers in 
high altitudes) is possible, which would result in an eventual global sea-level rise of up 
to 7 meters. Note that according to Figure 5.2, the ratio of local-to-global warming on 
Greenland is about 1-2, so that a local temperature target of 2.7 ºC corresponds to a 
global target of about 1.4-2.7 ºC. Figure 5.6 indicates that in order to avoid global aver-
age temperature to increase by 5 ºC above pre-industrial levels with a probability of 
95%, the CO2-eq. concentration would have to be stabilized below 600 ppmv according 
to Forest et al (2002). Since there exists a possibility of very high climate sensitivity  
values according to Andronova and Schlesinger (2001), their PDF estimate implies that 
CO2-eq. concentrations need to be stabilized at a lower level of 400 ppmv to attain such 
a probability of 95%. The difference in PDF shape as shown in Figure 5.4 result in  
different shapes of the curves in Figure 5.5 and Figure 5.6. The results discussed here  
illustrate the importance of reducing the uncertainty in the (PDFs of the) CS. 
As argued earlier, because of the large inertia in the climate system stabilization of GHG 
concentrations might not be the most sensible target. Concentration might be allowed to 
peak and decline afterwards (illustrated in Figure 5.7) to avoid a further increase in cli-
mate change that would result from a continued stabilization of concentrations. Indeed, 
for meeting the same long-term temperature target, concentrations may even be allowed 
to peak earlier at a higher level than for stabilizing (Figure 5.7). 
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Figure 5.6 Probability of achieving high temperature targets for a range of 
 stabilization targets. 
Note: This is implied by the probability distributions for climate sensitivity of Forest et al. (2002) 
(full lines) and Andronova and Schlesinger (2001) (dotted lines). 
As will be discussed below (section 5.4), this may be attractive for reducing the rise of 
mitigation costs, as these peaking (or overshoot) scenarios will allow for higher near-
term emission levels than stabilization scenarios.  
 
Figure 5.7 Illustration of stabilization and peaking scenarios. 
For constructing such peaking profiles and assessing the climatic consequences, the  
simple calculations used in the above and explained in the Box 5.1 do not suffice. In-
stead, a climate-modelling tool is required to link concentration levels to climate targets, 
which adds modelling uncertainty to the assessment. For the analysis below, we have 
applied the simple climate model MAGICC (Raper & Cubasch, 1996: Wigley, 2003), 
which in the past decade was also used for illustrating many global-warming issues in 
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the IPCC reports (Cubasch et al., 2001). The peaking profiles were constructed accord-
ing to the ‘Peak’ example in Figure 5.7. Emissions continue to decline with a fixed  
percentage after the concentrations reach the stabilization level, thus gradually reducing 
concentrations afterwards. This fixed percentage is the same that led concentrations from 
1990 levels to the stabilization level. Using the Forest et al. (2002) PDF estimate, for a 
peaking of CO2-eq. concentrations at 550 ppmv the probability is about 33% that tem-
perature will stay below a 2ºC target (right panel), which is equal to the value for the sta-
bilization target in Figure 5.5 (left panel). However, in case of a higher climate-
sensitivity, for which lower concentrations suffice to achieve a temperature target, the 
probability of achieving a certain temperature target is higher for the peaking profiles 
than for the  
stabilization profiles. It is a characteristic of the climate system that the time scale of the 
response is longer in case of higher climate sensitivity. Combining the slow response at 
high climate sensitivity with the implied high climate sensitivity at low concentrations 
means that the difference between the stabilization and peaking approach will be larger 
at lower concentrations (and less stringent temperature targets). Consequently, the results 
show that the probability of achieving the 2ºC target at a CO2-eq. concentration of 450 
ppmv is almost 90% in the peaking approach (, left panel) versus 75% in the stabilization 
approach (Figure 5.5, left panel).  
An advantage of using a climate model for calculating probabilities is that other  
indicators can be included, like sea-level rise. Using the same model as above, we have 
calculated long-term (year 2400) sea-level rise probabilities. It should be noted that the 
uncertainty in climate sensitivity is only one in a set of factors that give rise to the large 
uncertainties in future sea-level rise projections (IPCC WG1, 2001). For these other fac-
tors we simply assume central values for the concerned parameters in the MAGICC 
model, instead of a probability distribution approach used for the CS. The certainty of 
meeting sea level targets might therefore very well be smaller than indicated in . Never-
theless, the calculations already show the probability that long-term sea-level rise will be 
limited to 50 cm to be less than 10%, respectively 1% for the peaking of CO2-eq.  
concentrations at 550 and 650 ppmv. Thus, the probability that this sea-level rise target 
of the Netherlands is met is much smaller than the chance of achieving the 2ºC tempera-
ture target. 
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The final step in analysing the implications of long-term climate change targets is  
translating GHG concentration targets into GHG emission pathways.  
The concentrations of a particular GHG in the atmosphere is determined by the level of 
emissions and the removal by chemical processes in the atmosphere and/or absorption by 
vegetation and water surfaces (oceans).  
The rate at which different GHGs are removed is determined by their average atmos-
pheric lifetime: the time needed for halving the initial concentration. 
In order to stabilize GHG concentrations the emissions should balance the removal proc-
esses, which means in practice that very large reductions of emissions are needed, par-
ticularly for those GHGs that have a long to very long atmospheric life time. 
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Figure 5.8 Probability of achieving a temperature peaking targets (left panel) and 
long-term sea-level rise targets (right panel) for a range of CO2-eq. peaking 
levels. 
Note: This is implied by the probability distributions for climate sensitivity of Forest et al. 
   (2002). 
The time span needed for establishing this balance determines the level at which the 
GHG concentrations are stabilized. Lower stabilization levels thus require earlier and 
deeper reductions of GHG emissions than higher levels.  
In the past, efforts of constructing emission pathways for stabilizing concentrations  
particularly focused on CO2 emissions. In 1994, Enting et al. published the first co-
ordinated attempt to determine CO2 emission profiles that lead to several CO2 stabiliza-
tion levels (Enting et al., 1994). These CO2 concentration profiles, published in the first 
IPCC assessment report (Houghton et al., 1994), were called S350–S750 (which refers to 
the CO2 stabilization levels) and had smooth transitions from the 1990 level (± 355 
ppmv) to the stabilization level. Later, Wigley et al. (1996) developed an alternative set 
of CO2 stabilization profiles that departed less quickly from trends in unabated emissions 
arguing that this so-called delayed response would be more cost-effective than the S-
profiles. These WRE profiles afterwards were used for the Third Assessment Report of 
IPCC (IPCC, 2001). Only more recently, there have been attempts to include other 
GHGs than CO2 only. This shift to a multi-gas approach only started near the end of the 
90s, due to the inclusion of 6 major GHGs (CH4, N2O, HFCs, PFCs and SF6) in the 
Kyoto Protocol and the insight that a ‘multi-gas’ approach might also be much more cost 
effective (Reilly, 1999). 
Among the first studies defining multi-gas emission pathways for stabilizing GHG  
concentrations was the Global Reduction Pathway study for the European Commission 
(Criqui et al., 2003), based on analysis with the IMAGE-2.2 model (Eickhout et al, 
2003). The study focused on developing multi-gas emission profiles for stabilizing the 
CO2-equivalent concentration at 550 and 650 ppmv (Figure 5.9). In contrast to earlier 
stabilization profiles the implications of the Kyoto Protocol are taken into account.  
Figure 5.9 shows that in order to stabilize GHG concentrations at 550 ppmv CO2-eq. 
global anthropogenic emissions (including both energy, industry and land use emissions) 
will have to peak before 2020 at a level about 35% above 1990 levels. 
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Figure 5.9 Global emission pathways for stabilizing the CO2-eq. concentrations at 550 
and 650 ppmv according to the IMAGE-2.2 model (Eickhout et al., 2003). 
By the 2030s emissions would need to have returned to 1990 levels. For stabilizing at 
650 ppmv CO2-eq. global emissions could peak later at a higher level and need to return 
to 1990 levels at a much later stage. In fact, this stabilization level would allow for many 
different emission pathways for stabilizing GHG concentrations. Low stabilization levels 
leave  
little room for optimisation: e.g. for stabilizing at 550 ppmv CO2-eq. the global emis-
sions need to peak within 20 years from the present-day, or concentrations will  
exceed this level. At higher stabilization levels emission profiles can be varied concern-
ing gas mixture and/or over time, including reduction delays compensated by steeper re-
ductions later on. 
However, as discussed in the previous sections, if the long-term climate target is defined 
as a temperature target, like the 2 °C target, the concentrations may peak at a higher level 
than 550 ppmv CO2-eq. This would imply a temporary “overshoot” of the concentration 
level, but the inertia of the climate system prevents temperature to closely track this 
overshoot. In fact, if a temperature target is selected, there is no compelling reason for 
focusing on stabilizing GHG concentrations any longer, since part of the residual warm-
ing can be avoided by reducing the GHG concentration levels again. The implications of 
these peaking instead of stabilization pathways are subject of ongoing research, but it is 
clear that these will provide room for somewhat delaying global emissions to peak for 
meeting stringent targets and thus make attaining these probably less costly than in the 
case of stabilization pathways. 
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In the back-calculation of concentrations from global-mean temperature targets, the 
dominant uncertainty is in the value of the climate sensitivity. By use of recent probabil-
ity estimates of this parameter, risk assessment becomes possible, which is a useful 
method for evaluating policy options in the context of major uncertainties. For a stabili-
zation at 550 ppmv CO2-eq. the probability of limiting temperature increase to 2 ºC is 
about 33 - 50%. For stabilization at 650 ppmv this decreases to less than 10 - 33%.  
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A 100% probability is unachievable, because of the uncertainty in probability estimates 
of the climate sensitivity, but also because of other uncertainties in the climate change 
cause-and-effect chain. An important observation is that the probabilities depend non-
linearly on concentration levels. For the 2ºC target the probability of achieving this tar-
get increases most rapidly with decreasing concentrations at medium-to-low stabilization 
levels. 
Because of large inertias in the climate system, the full temperature consequences of sus-
tained variations in radiative forcing are not felt for many decades to centuries. There-
fore, if concentrations are lowered immediately after stabilization, the full consequence 
of the peak concentration is moderated. Long-term stabilization of GHG concentrations 
might therefore not be the most sensible target, especially since temperature change is a 
more appropriate indicator of climate change impacts. 
Current estimates show that in order to stabilize GHG concentrations at 550 ppmv CO2-
eq. global anthropogenic emissions (including both energy, industry and land use emis-
sions) will have to peak before 2020 at a level about 35% above 1990 levels. By the 
2030s emissions would need to have returned to 1990 levels. For stabilizing at 650 ppmv 
CO2-eq. Global emissions could peak later at a higher level and need to return to 1990 
levels at a much later stage. Low stabilization levels leave little room for optimization: 
e.g. for stabilizing at 550 ppmv CO2-eq. the global emissions need to peak within 20 
years from the present-day, or concentrations will exceed this level. At higher stabiliza-
tion levels, emission profiles can be varied concerning gas mixture and/or over time, in-
cluding reduction delays compensated by steeper reductions later on. 
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This chapter reviews recent research into the costs of climate change policies that aim at 
stabilizing GHG concentrations in the atmosphere, preferably at “safe” levels. “Costs” 
can be evaluated at different levels, for different actors and for different purposes. In  
order to avoid confusion it is useful to distinguish between three types of costs in the 
context of climate change and climate change policies:  
• Costs of mitigation of net GHG emissions; 
• Costs of adaptation to the impacts of climate change; and 
• Costs of the (residual) impacts of climate change. 
These three types of costs are interdependent. With more mitigation there will be less 
climate change and hence less need for adaptation and less residual impact costs. Given a 
level of mitigation, there is a trade-off between adaptation and residual impacts. The 
economic challenge for climate change policies is to find a mix of mitigation, adaptation 
and residual impacts that will minimize the sum of the three cost components in a way 
that is also acceptable from a distributive point of view (a fair sharing of the economic 
burdens). While the above statement is accurate for the global level, it is important to 
mention upfront that at a national level there is no trade-off between the costs of  
limitation measures and reduced efforts for adaptation. That depends on the willingness 
with which other countries participate in the process.   
This review only deals with mitigation costs. Although adaptation and direct impact 
costs are not addressed in this chapter it should be realised mitigation costs will avoid, to 
some extent, adaptation and direct impact costs in the future. Therefore mitigation costs 
can be regarded as the “gross” costs of climate change policies; the “net” costs being the 
mitigation costs less reduced costs of adaptation and impact.   
The “gross” mitigation costs can be divided into: 
• Direct costs of mitigation (the costs of technology and resources), and 
• Indirect costs because of the macroeconomic repercussions of the mitigation  
measures (on relative prices, such as wages, and trade flows) and on other positive or 
negative side effects of the mitigation measures (for example on the emissions of 
non-GHG pollutants). 
The costs of the same measure (or policy “package”) can be evaluated from different 
perspectives. For the individual household or firm, the costs of a mitigation measure will 
depend on the change in final energy prices, including taxes, subsidies and other finan-
cial and fiscal consequences. For a country (or economy) as a whole, however, taxes and 
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subsidies are no costs, but transfers from one economic agent to the other.21 For a  
country as a whole, costs are the foregone revenues of resources (capital, labour, raw 
materials and energy) that could have been employed alternatively (opportunity costs). 
Costs evaluated from the national level are called “social costs”.22  
Finally, (social) costs should not be equated with financial transactions. Costs can also 
be of a non-financial nature. Environmental costs, for example, are real costs, but they 
do not often result in financial transactions.23 
In sum, this chapter reviews recent research into the direct and indirect social “gross” 
mitigation costs of climate change policies that aim at stabilizing the concentrations of 
greenhouses gases in the atmosphere at “safe” levels. To put the cost estimates of this 
chapter in perspective, Section 6.2 briefly discusses the scope and limitations of model-
ling long-term mitigation costs. Section 6.3 discusses the “perception” of costs: when are 
costs too high? Section 6.4 presents estimates of mitigation costs, while Section 6.5  
examines potential co-benefits of mitigation options. Finally, Section 6.6 concludes. 
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To put the mitigation cost estimates of this chapter into perspective, this section briefly 
discusses the methodologies that are used to generate these estimates. The research tools 
include mathematical models that try to capture some key aspects of reality, but yet are 
simple enough to be tractable. Given the scope of the assignment – modelling global 
economic and environmental developments over the course of a century (or more) – 
there is no way that these models can be validated in any meaningful sense. Modellers in 
this area never claim to be able to predict the (economic) future; they develop “scenar-
ios”, i.e. more or less complex “what-if” exercises. “What if” the global economy would 
grow by three percent per year in the next century, what would the emissions of GHGs 
be in the year 2100? Or: “what if” climate change policies would increase the rate of 
technological progress in the production of renewable energies, what would the effect be 
on mitigation costs? 
The models cannot therefore “predict” the costs of climate change policies with any pre-
cision; their results are always contingent upon a host of simplifying assumptions that 
may be adjusted if more knowledge on economy-climate interactions is acquired. At the 
moment it is assumed that the following assumptions play a major role in the assessment 
of mitigation costs in the longer term:  
The baseline or reference scenario. What would be the developments in the economy, 
population, technology, and energy resources without climate policies? In general, the 
higher the economic and emissions growth in the baseline scenario, the higher the effort 
and therefore the costs of reducing emissions to some predetermined level. 
                                                   
21
  This does not mean that taxes and subsidies cannot lead to real costs at the national level; 
they can – and this is an important research area for economists.   
22
  The adjective “social” in social costs refers to the national perspective; not to “fairness” or 
related associations of the word “social”.    
23
  And hence, environmental costs are usually not reported in National Income statistics.  
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The mitigation policy regime. The policy regime in which the mitigation measures are 
taken can have a large impact on the mitigation costs. Key elements of the policy regime 
are the extent of country participation, the ability to select the cheapest mitigation  
options domestically and internationally through Joint Implementation, the Clean Devel-
opment Mechanism or through emissions trading, the timing of the reduction efforts and 
the flexibility of the regime in the face of unexpected external shocks. Moreover, the 
rules for the allocation of the reduction burden across countries and sources can have 
important consequences for the distribution of costs.     
The flexibility of the economic and energy systems and the institutional infrastructure. 
The costs of mitigation measures also depend on the assumptions on the flexibility of the 
economic and energy systems and the general institutional infrastructure to adjust to the 
changing economic circumstances because of the climate change policies. In general, the 
more flexible the underlying systems, the smaller the mitigation costs will be.  
The rate and nature of technological progress in mitigation technology. One of the most 
hotly debated issues of this moment is to what extent technological progress in  
mitigation technology is encouraged by climate change policies and what the effect of 
this technological progress on mitigation costs will be. Model applications use two  
alternative assumptions on technological progress: 1) an exogenous rate independent of 
any policies but based on historical trends, or 2) an endogenous rate that depends on the 
stringency of climate change policies. Proponents of the endogenous representation of 
technological progress claim that this approach is more realistic and that it leads to lower 
mitigation costs. However, not all experts agree and this is still an area of intense  
academic debate.     
Co-benefits of mitigation measures. The principal aim of GHG mitigation is to curb  
climate change. However, mitigation measures may also have co-benefits, for example 
in the form of reduced emissions of conventional air pollutants such as sulphur dioxide, 
nitrogen oxides and particulate matter.  
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Some cost estimates of GHG mitigation in the long-term, published in the Third  
Assessment Report of IPCC (IPCC WG3, 2001), sparked off a discussion on the relative 
size of these costs, with some people claiming that these costs would be “too high”, and 
others claiming that these costs would be perfectly affordable. Why is there such a  
difference in the perception of costs? 
Figure 6.1 reproduces the cost estimates from the IPCC report. A number of economic 
models estimated the total discounted costs of stabilizing CO2 concentrations at different 
levels: from 450 ppmv to 750 ppmv. The lower the final level at which GHGs are  
stabilized in the atmosphere, the lower the risks of dangerous impacts, and the lower the 
need for costly adaptation measures (e.g. against sea-level rise). However, the model es-
timates of show that the mitigation costs rise with lower stabilization targets, and they 
rise more than proportionally.   
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Figure 6.1 Some model estimated of total discounted mitigation costs of stabilizing  
atmospheric CO2 concentrations at different levels (450-750 ppmv).  
Source: IPCC WG 2 (2001).  
Total discounted mitigation costs of the lowest – and presumably “safest” – stabilization 
target (450 ppmv) have been estimated at US$ 2.5 to 18 trillion (=18x1012). Total  
discounted mitigation costs of higher stabilization targets were estimated at US$ 1 to 8 
trillion for 550 ppmv and US$ 0.5 to 4 trillion for a stabilization target of 650 ppmv.  
How high are these costs? It depends, of course, what they are compared with. A few  
examples may help to illustrate this point. 
The highest cost estimate in Figure 6.1 is US$ 18 trillion. This is a huge number in  
comparison to current world income, which is about US$ 20 trillion (Azar & Schneider, 
2002). Some economists have, therefore, over the years, warned that costs of this order 
of magnitude would pose serious risks to the world economy (Nordhaus, 1990; Linden, 
1996; Michaels & Balling, 2000). 
Azar and Schneider (2002) and others disagree with this view. They argue that the  
projected income growth over this century, which is the basis of the emissions scenarios 
on which the cost estimates have been built, is so large that even the largest estimated 
mitigation costs would do no more harm than delay an impressive [projected] per capita 
income growth over the next century by a few years. They note: “To be ten times richer 
in 2100 AD versus 2102 AD would hardly be noticed and would likely be politically  
acceptable as an insurance policy against the spectre of potential ‘dangerous’ climate 
changes by most risk-averse people.” (Azar & Schneider, 2002).   
The perception of the size of mitigation costs can also differ when the costs are  
expressed as a percentage of annual (world) income. Typically, mitigation costs of a  
policy that aims at a “safe” level of stabilization are estimated to be around one to four 
percent of world income (or Gross World Product: GWP) by around 2050. According to 
Azar and Schneider’s way of reasoning, this is still not much, given the projected growth 
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of per capita incomes. However, if one compares these costs of one to four percent of 
world income to the share of present and projected energy costs in total income, which is 
about six to eight percent and falling (2003), then the mitigation costs appear much  
larger again.  
In a reaction to Azar and Schneider (2002), Gerlagh and Papyrakis (2003) argue that the 
above comparisons make little sense. They argue that even the most extreme estimates of 
the benefits of climate change stabilization policies (i.e., measured as the avoided costs 
of adaptation measures and residual climate impacts, see Section 6.2 above), would also 
not cause more harm to world income than a few years delay in growth over the next 
century. They argue further that the real question is to what extent we allow the  
environment to deteriorate in order to gain extra income. Or in more technical parlance: 
whether it is correct to assume “that an increased consumption of man-made goods can 
[indefinitely] substitute – in terms of welfare – for environmental damages due to  
climate change” (Gerlagh & Papyrakis, 2003:327).  
Gerlagh and Papyrakis thus seem to suggest that the degree of mitigation (and the choice 
of the stabilization target) is in essence a political question that goes beyond the realm of 
conventional economics. Another interpretation is that a limited substitution between 
climate quality and money income could be a characteristic of people’s utility functions. 
This means that people’s willingness to pay to avoid climate change could be greater 
than the expected avoided costs of adaptation and residual impacts.24 There could be 
several reasons for that, including risk-aversion, ethical constraints, or distributional  
objectives when people believe that climate change impacts will disproportionally hurt 
poorer people. In this latter interpretation, the limited substitution in people’s utility 
functions (and their true willingness to pay) “only” needs to be disclosed by research to 
bring the question back into the realm of economics.  
Given all these considerations, one can argue that mitigation cost estimates cannot be 
used as thresholds, in the sense of “this cost is clearly too high” or “this cost is just  
acceptable”. Although mitigation cost estimates alone are not decisive for the final trade-
off between environmental quality and income, nobody will deny that these estimates do 
provide potentially important information about climate change policies that can and 
should be factored in into (political) decision making. The next section presents two very 
recent estimates of long-term global and regional mitigation costs. 
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Very recently, both The National Institute for Public Health and Environment (RIVM) 
and the Dutch Central Plan Bureau (CPB) published estimates of the global and regional 
mitigation costs of meeting possible climate change policy targets. This section presents 
and compares these estimates.  
                                                   
24
 Expected costs measure the product of the costs of certain events and the probability that they 
will occur. 
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RIVM carried out a study into the technical, economic and environmental implications 
of climate change regimes that aim for the stabilization of GHG concentrations in the 
atmosphere at 550 ppmv and 650 ppmv,25 respectively (van Vuuren et al., 2003a). The 
550 ppmv target is likely to limit global temperature increase below 2o C over pre-
industrial levels, while this is unlikely for the 650 ppmv target. While an increase of 2oC 
is expected to affect the most sensitive ecosystems (coral reefs, polar and mountainous 
ecosystems) and may increase extreme weather events, the risks of large-scale disconti-
nuities such as the shutdown of the North-Atlantic thermohaline circulation (THC; the 
Gulf Stream) are low. Also, the rate of temperature change is reduced in comparison to 
the unconstrained baseline, although this rate will still be above “the maximum level 
[that] ecosystems are historically adapted to” (Rijsberman and Swart, 1990) at least until 
the year 2090. The environmental risks of the 650 ppmv stabilization target are  
obviously higher: they are generally in the ‘moderate’ impact category.          
RIVM (2003) estimated the direct mitigation costs26 over this century of (various  
variants of) international mitigation regimes as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) of various world regions. The estimates of these costs are based on bottom-up 
cost assessments including energy system effects and endogenous technology develop-
ment (“learning-by-doing”). The most important conclusions are: 
• The direct mitigation costs for the 650 ppmv target gradually increase to a maximum 
of 0.3 percent of GWP (Gross World Product). The direct mitigation costs for the 
550 ppmv target rise much faster to about 1 percent of GWP in 2050 and slowly  
decrease thereafter to about 0.6 percent of GWP; 
• 
 There are significant differences in direct mitigation costs between world regions 
and between various implementation regimes. From a general perspective, four  
different groups of countries can be distinguished on the basis of their levels of GHG 
emissions and income per capita. For a mitigation profile with the 550 ppmv target, 
direct mitigation costs as a percentage of GDP in 2025 are (see Figure 6.2).   
1. 0.5 – 1 percent for countries with high emissions and high incomes (OECD); 
2. 1 – 2 percent for countries with high emissions and low/medium incomes (former 
Soviet Union, Middle East, Turkey); 
3. 0 – 0.3 percent for countries with low/medium emissions and low/medium incomes 
(Southeast and East Asia); 
4. 0 to negative costs for countries with low/medium emissions and low/medium  
incomes (South Asia, Africa).  
These direct mitigation cost estimates suggest that the overall economic effects of GHG 
stabilization policies may be limited, especially considering the fact that the reference 
growth in GDP in the underlying economic scenario is quite substantial (see also Section 
6.3 on the “perception of costs). 
 
                                                   
25
  Ppmv is a measure of concentration: parts pro million by volume. The pre-industrial  
concentration of GHG is commonly estimated to have been.  
26
  See Section 6.1 for a discussion on different cost categories. 
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Figure 6.2 Direct mitigation costs in different implementation regimes as percentage of 
GDP in 2025 for various country groups.  
RIVM points out, however, that these direct mitigation costs are only one of the ele-
ments that determine the full economic implications of the mitigation policies. Other  
important elements are the potential co-benefits of mitigation policies in the form of  
reduced emissions of conventional air pollutants (see Section 6.5) and the indirect mac-
roeconomic implications of the GHG mitigation measures. RIVM notices that, for exam-
ple for the Middle East, reduced fossil fuel (oil) revenues may be at least as important a 
cost category as the direct mitigation costs.  
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In a very recent study, CPB/RIVM assessed the full long-term macroeconomic  
implications of a climate change policy regime that aims at the stabilization of GHG in 
the atmosphere at a concentration of 550 ppmv (Bollen et al., 2004). To be able to reach 
that objective, the upward trend in global emissions should be turned down by 2025, and 
by 2040 global emissions should be almost 20 percent below their 2000 levels.  
This reduction of emissions should take place in a global economy that is assumed to 
grow by 2.5 percent per year (Europe 1.5 percent) and whose use of primary energy 
would double in the absence of climate change policies (growth of 1.7 percent per year).  
 CPB/RIVM note that the participation of developing countries in global mitigation 
would be necessary because of their strong growth of emissions. It is therefore assumed 
that all world regions would be allocated emissions quota and that the regions would be 
free to trade emissions allowances amongst each other.27 Regions with high mitigation 
costs could therefore buy emissions allowances from regions with low mitigation costs. 
Hence, the total economic impact would not only depend on direct mitigation costs, but 
also on the income received or spent on the sales or purchases of emissions permits. 
                                                   
27
  The initial allocation of emissions allowances across regions is based on an equal per capita 
emissions level. Specifically, after the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol (2012), 
regional emissions allowances contract and converge to an equal per capital level in 2050. 
For Europe this implies that its emissions allowance in 2040 would be 80 percent below its 
actual emissions in 2000. The emissions allowance of Asia and Africa would be twice their 
emissions in 2000 (but less than their emissions would have been without climate change 
policies).       
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Moreover, real income would also be affected by so-called terms-of-trade effects,  
measuring the relative prices of imports with respect to exports. Table 6.1 presents the 
estimated effects of GHG stabilization policies on the income of world regions,  
distinguishing between direct effects on GDP and income transfers because of permit 
trading and terms-of-trade effects.     
Table 6.1 Costs of stabilization at 550 ppmv in 2040*. 
 GDP Permit transfers and 
terms-of-trade 
Income 
Europe – 0.9 – 1.3 – 2.2 
USA – 0.6 – 1.3 – 1.9 
Former Soviet Union – 5.6 – 0.8 – 6.4 
Middle-east/North 
Africa 
– 6.9 0.1 – 6.8 
Asia/Africa – 2.2 2.4 0.2 
World – 1.6 0.0 – 1.6 
* In the STRONG EUROPE scenario. Source: Bollen et al. (2004). 
The effects of this GHG stabilization scenario on the global energy market are consider-
able. Under this scenario, global demand for energy remains at its present (2000) levels, 
while it would have doubled in the absence of the GHG mitigation measures. Especially 
coal is hard-struck. Its share in the global energy mix decreases from 25 percent in 2000 
to 10 percent in 2040. The global share of gas increases from 25 percent in 2000 to 34 
percent in 2040, while the share of bio fuels, solar and wind energy more than triples to 
22 percent of energy demand in 2040.28   
CPB/RIVM also assessed the effects on real national income of 1) a climate change  
policy aiming at a less stringent stabilization target of 650 ppmv, and 2) a reference  
scenario with higher growth and energy consumption (GLOBAL ECONOMY).29 The 
conclusions are that 1) the economic effects of the 650 ppmv stabilization target are near 
to negligible for the STRONG EUROPE scenario, and relatively small for the GLOBAL 
ECONOMY scenario, while 2) increased economic growth and energy consumption in 
the reference scenario (as in the GLOBAL ECONOMY scenario) would strongly  
increase negative income effects on the global and European economy up to minus 5.2 
percent for the world economy and minus 6.7 percent for the European economy.   
CPB/RIVM notes that the GHG stabilization scenario results in considerable co-benefits 
in the form of 50 to 70 percent less emissions of conventional air pollutants such as  
sulphur and nitrogen emissions. The strongest co-benefits are to be found in developing 
countries, because of their initial high dependency on coal and lax air pollution control 
policies.  
                                                   
28
  The role of carbon sequestration is assumed to be limited in this scenario (CPB/RIVM, 
2004). 
29
  In the GLOBAL ECONOMY scenario global economic growth is 3.1 percent per year and 
energy consumption grows by 2.3 percent per year. 
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The costs of stabilizing GHG emissions can in principle be compared to the avoided 
costs of adaptation costs and residual damage costs of climate change. In practice, this is 
not easy due to the large uncertainties of the latter effects and the substantial differences 
in time scales between emissions and (climate) effects. Moreover, as discussed in  
Section 6.3, it is unclear whether avoided adaptation and damage costs are a good ap-
proximation of the people’s true willingness to pay to avoid climate change because of 
risk-aversion, and ethical and distributional preferences.  
Given these limitations, it is therefore of considerable interest to assess the cost-
effectiveness of policy options to reach predetermined targets of climate change. These 
targets could, for example, be based on the application of the precautionary principle.   
For the evaluation of such policy options it is of importance to include their potential 
side-benefits, in the form of technology development and diffusion, the security of  
energy supply or the reduction of conventional air pollutants. The above-mentioned 
IPPC report reviewed many studies on the co-benefits of GHG mitigation measures. 
Some of these studies reported substantial co-benefits of an order of magnitude similar to 
the mitigation costs (expressed in US$ per tonne of carbon), while others reported very 
small co-benefits.      
The recent study by RIVM (van Vuuren et al., 2003a) found substantial co-benefits of 
stringent climate change policies (550 ppmv target) in Asia. The stringent climate 
change policies would result in a substantial reduction in the use of coal that would lead 
to a 50 percent reduction in the exceedance of critical loads for air pollution. This could 
lead to a reduction in the control costs for air pollution (sulphur dioxide) from US$ 17 to 
9 billion.        
A study by RIVM/IIASA (van Vuuren et al., 2003b) for the European Environment 
Agency found potentially sizeable co-benefits of climate change policies for the Pan-
European region (Western and Eastern Europe, including western states of the former 
Soviet Union). To illustrate the point that the co-benefits are not only a function of the 
stringency of climate change policies but also of the way that they are implemented, the 
co-benefits in terms of reduced air pollution were computed for three implementation 
strategies of the Kyoto Protocol: 
5. DOA: Domestic action only (no emissions trading); 
6. TNS: Emissions trading without “hot air”; 
7. TWS: Emissions trading with “hot air”. 
Table 6.2 shows that the mitigation costs decrease with emissions trading and the utilisa-
tion of “hot air”, but so do the co-benefits in terms of reduced air pollution. Hence, for a 
complete evaluation of mitigation options all costs and benefits (and their distribution) 
should ideally be taken into account.    
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The assessment of the costs of stabilizing GHG concentrations is subject to many  
uncertainties. Major cost-determining factors are 1) the target level of stabilization (550 
ppmv vs. 650 ppmv), 2) the reference growth of the economy and energy use in the 
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Table 6.2  Mitigation costs and co-benefits of alternative ways to implement the Kyoto 
Protocol in the Pan-European region*. 
Costs of GHG mitigation in W. Europe (bln €95) DAO TNS TWS 
Domestic measures 12 2 1 
Permits 0 5 3 
Total 12 7 4 
 
Co-benefits due to a reduction of air pollution (bln €95) DAO TNS TWS 
Western Europa -6.6 -2.9 -1.7 
Central/Eastern-Europa 0.0 -0.9 -0.6 
Russia & Western-FSU 0.0 -0.2 -0.2 
Total -6.6 -4.1 -2.5 
* Note that these cost estimates do not refer to long-term stabilization targets; they refer to the 
medium-term (2008-2012) reduction of GHGs agreed under the Kyoto Protocol.  
Source: van Vuuren et al., 2003b. 
 
absence of climate change policies, and 3) the rate of technological innovation and  
diffusion in the energy system. For the macroeconomic implications of long-term cli-
mate change policies, indirect costs (e.g. terms-of-trade effects) are as important as direct 
mitigation costs. Cost estimates of stabilization target of 550 ppmv for Europe range 
from direct mitigation costs of 0.5 to 1 percent of GDP to income losses of 2 to 6 percent 
of GDP in 2040. For the world these estimates range from 1 percent, respectively 1 to 5 
percent of GWP in 2040.  
Both the RIVM and the CPB/RIVM studies note the potential of co-benefits of GHG 
stabilization policies in the form of a reduction of conventional air pollutants. 
CPB/RIVM estimated that a GHG stabilization scenario results could result in a  
reduction of 50 to 70 percent of the emissions of conventional air pollutants such as  
sulphur and nitrogen. The strongest co-benefits are to be found in developing countries, 
because of their initial high dependency on coal and lax air pollution control policies.  
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Let us return to the problem defined in Chapter 1. The question of what is dangerous is 
dependent on societal perceptions as well as scientific information. In order to further 
understand the kinds of visions that exist in society, the following steps were undertaken: 
• 30 interviews with stakeholders were conducted (see 7.2);  
• A first workshop, with 22 stakeholders and 13 members of the research team  
participating, was organised (see 7.3); and was followed by; 
• A second smaller workshop with 10 stakeholders and 10 team members (see 7.4). 
This chapter systematically goes through the results of each of the phases. Before going 
further, it might be useful to mention that this is not a survey of public opinion in the 
country. This project is based on trying to access the key social actors and stakeholders 
who have thought about climate change and its potential impacts, in order to understand 
what their key arguments are and how they perceive the climate change problem. In 
identifying the stakeholders, the project team made an initial selection of potential stake-
holders from the different sectors and backgrounds. Of these, 60 people were short-listed 
and invited to participate in the process, in the hope that we would be able to secure 
commitment from 1/4th to 1/3rd of those invited. 
In addition to discussing the interview and workshop results, this chapter provides a brief 
overview of long-term target processes in other countries (see 7.5), before drawing its 
conclusions (see 7.6). 
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In order to achieve consistency with other projects on this issue, and to get an initial idea 
of the different stakeholder perceptions on Article 2, a round of interviews was  
conducted, with a specific set of questions (see Appendix II). An assessment of the  
interviews leads to eight inferences. 
• First, the majority of the interviewed felt that the most serious problems for the 
Netherlands were floods, sea-level rise and other issues that affect the water  
management system in the Netherlands. Other perceived dangers in the Netherlands 
were: extreme weather events; the spread of disease and health risks; lowering of the 
water level; loss of biodiversity; the migration problem; and the lack of social  
awareness in society; 
• Second, most interviewees felt that the problem with Article 2 was that it was both 
clear and unclear. It had clear criteria but was unclear because it did not include  
security issues, irreversible events, natural climate change and the rate of climate 
change. The fact that Article 2 was the result of a political compromise and hence 
open to a number of interpretations made it weaker; 
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• Third, with regard to the criteria mentioned in Article 2, 38% of the interviewees felt 
that the ecological risks should be the most important for interpreting Article 2, 34% 
argued in favour of ensuring that food production is not endangered and 28% argued 
in favour of prioritising sustainable economic growth;  
• Fourth, in determining which climate change risks were completely unacceptable, 
stakeholders had diverse opinions ranging from irreversible outcomes; loss of  
inhabitable land in some parts of the world; loss of growth opportunities in  
developing countries; and high net mitigation costs; 
• Fifth, in analysing which policy outcomes were unacceptable, the stakeholders  
concluded that the non-participation of Russia and the United States in the Kyoto re-
gime was unacceptable. Furthermore, policy steps that did not prevent irreversible 
outcomes were unacceptable. Other unacceptable outcomes included those that did 
not lead to policy decisions, or execution of policy decisions, inequitable distribution 
of burdens and policies that limited the growth opportunities in developing countries; 
• Sixth, in terms of who should pay for reducing emissions, the bulk of the interview-
ees focused on a range of ideas which included the polluter pays principle, the ability 
to pay principle and the need also to focus on technological developments; 
• Seventh, in terms of major anticipated controversies underlying Article 2, there was 
consensus that this would be on the division of responsibilities between countries, the 
definition of dangerous, the interpretation of the criteria of Article 2 and the tensions 
between them, and the role of scientific uncertainties; 
• Finally, the importance of Article 2 was also linked to global security issues, trade 
issues and North-South power relations.  
It should be stated that there was a slight bias in the interviews towards more ‘green’  
answers, because of the number of stakeholders interviewed from each group. Most  
responses came from NGOs, whereas the government representatives were the least  
responsive. 
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These interviews were followed by a stakeholder workshop. There were 21 stakeholders 
present, a chair from the Netherlands’ Senate (Eimert van Middelkoop), and the project 
team consisting of 13 researchers.  
Table 7.1 Numbers of participants in the first workshop. 
 Government & politicians Industry NGO Scientist Project team 
Chair 1     
Stakeholders 4 4 6 7  
Project team     13 
 
The participation at the first workshop indicates a bias towards scientists and NGOs. In 
the second workshop, the bias was corrected towards more industry and government  
representatives. This bias is the result of the self-selection of stakeholders. Those  
interested in the climate change issue are willing to make time to discuss it; those not  
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interested are also less interested to spend time to oppose such a discussion. Such biases 
are inherent to the stakeholder process and the researchers need to be constantly aware of 
this.  
The purpose of the workshop was: 
• To provide all participants with current scientific insights on climate change and its 
impacts;  
• To provide participants with a background on the perceptions of the interviewees on 
Article 2; 
• To introduce them to the methodology of the workshop; and  
• To secure a list of possible indicators of climate change.  
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The workshop began with a debate between a prominent climate change sceptic (Hans 
Labohm) and the Netherlands Royal Meteorological Institute (Koos Verbeek; see Chap-
ter 2). The underlying intention was to let the stakeholders decide for themselves 
whether they consider climate change a serious problem or not. Sceptics of climate 
change form an important segment of stakeholders in society, and it is important to listen 
closely to their arguments. The key arguments of Mr. Labohm and the responses of Koos 
Verbeek are summed up in Table 7.2 (Gupta et al., 2004). 
Table 7.2 Key elements of the debate between sceptics and believers. 
Issue Hans Labohm Koos Verbeek 
IPCC reports are consensus reports; 
consensus is not science 
IPCC scientists are reputed scientists, 
the reports are subject to extensive  
review; they provide an assessment of 
the best available science; consensus is 
not about the science as such, but about 
the assessment of the scientific litera-
ture 
Consensus 
The summary for policymakers is po-
litically scrutinised before being ap-
proved 
IPCC authors have a veto right on the 
policymakers summary and will not 
approve the text unless the language is 
acceptable 
Uncertainty The frequent use of the word uncertain 
in scientific reports shows how unreli-
able the science is 
Uncertainty is a very respectable word 
in the scientific world; does not show 
the dubious nature of science, but its 
complexity 
Empirical 
evidence 
The difference between surface tem-
perature as measured and measure-
ments via the use of satellites; the latter 
shows that there is nothing to be 
alarmed about 
Satellites measure the average tempera-
ture in the area 0-8 km above the 
ground; and cannot be compared to 
ground temperature  
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Issue Hans Labohm Koos Verbeek 
Exclusion of urban heat island effect The measurements are corrected for the 
urban heat island effect 
e.g. McIntyre and Mc McKitrick Is being studied, but is an exceptional 
report and no other scientists support its 
conclusion (see also Chapter 2) 
Astrophysics and geologists;  
For example geologists show that CO2 
increases following a temperature rise 
and not the other way around 
They will be included in the next round 
of IPCC; there are different processes 
at work; one relationship does not ex-
clude the other. It has been shown 
without doubt that increase in CO2 
leads to an increase in temperature, but 
that does not mean that in some cir-
cumstances there may be a reverse rela-
tionship  
Exclusion of 
some science 
 
The role of water vapour Water vapour is a natural GHG gas; 
when the temperature increases the 
concentration of water vapour will also 
increase 
IPCC scenar-
ios 
Are based on unrealistic expectations of 
growth in the South 
Yes, no ‘barbarian scenarios’ were 
taken into account based on a collapse 
of the economic growth in the South; if 
that happens, the emissions will also 
fall. 
Cost-benefit Kyoto implementation is very expen-
sive and the results (a reduction of 
0.02) cannot even be measured on a 
thermometer and is hardly a first effec-
tive step towards the long-term goal. 
Yes, but Kyoto is only the first step; if 
Kyoto sends a strong message to soci-
ety that we need to find alternative ap-
proaches, this will lead to technological 
development and the costs of emission 
reduction may as a result decrease. 
Risk Is a fact, and not something to be de-
termined by a handful of stakeholders 
Risk is a matter of perception and indi-
viduals make risk based decisions eve-
ryday; stakeholders help to determine 
the kinds of arguments that exist in a 
society in relation to how risk should be 
framed. 
Please note: Text in italics show the responses of other participants. 
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Following this debate, the participants were informed about the different impacts of cli-
mate change, the economic aspects as well as the role of indicators (see Chapters 3-6). 
Fact sheets were provided to the participants that covered climate change in general, the 
Third Assessment IPCC Report, climate change targets and GHG emissions, biodiversity 
and ecosystems, fresh water, coastal areas, health, recreation and tourism, and macro-
economic effects (see Appendix I).  
This was followed by the formation of three break-out groups with a comparable hetero-
geneous composition. However, one group had an industrialist as Chair, another a  
government official and the third an NGO representative. The idea was that possibly the 
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chairs of the groups would have their own bias in dealing with the issue and that it would 
be important to see such a bias emerge. Each group was supported by members of the  
research team.  
The group chaired by the government official first discussed the concept of indicators 
and its usefulness for such an exercise. An indicator presupposes a clear cause and  
effect; climate change does not yield information that can be used as such; the question 
is then what is the role of indicators? Is it to discover undesirable effects in time? The 
link to climate change can be subsequently researched. Indicators could lead to a number 
of different strategies and one can then compare the strategies in terms of costs. The 
most important role of an indicator is in communicating complicated information with 
society. The information in the break-out group has been structured and presented in  
Table 7.3 in normal text. It differs slightly from the dynamics of the group but is com-
prehensive in covering the issues discussed. The group short-listed ten categories of in-
dicators and commented on what they thought would be unacceptable thresholds. The 
focus was primarily on the impacts in the Netherlands, although on some issues they also 
discussed the international consequences. The second break-out group was chaired by a 
person from the NGO world. The second group identified ten indicators as critical shown 
in Table 7.3 in italics. The third group was led by industry. This group spent more time 
discussing the point of the exercise and then identified six possible indicators shown in 
bold in Table 7.3. The group felt the need to focus on indicators for Netherlands and 
Europe. 
Table 7.3 thus integrates the results of the three working groups. It shows that 18  
indicators were short-listed by the group. It also shows that there was considerable over-
lap between how the groups thought. But some of the comments also reveal that the  
participants were not fully able to internalise the information provided to them. The  
discussions revealed some normativism (e.g. people should have access to water), practi-
cality (e.g. it should be easy to communicate to stakeholders) and attributability (e.g, can 
the impact be attributed to climate change?). 
 
Table 7.3 Indicators and possible thresholds in the break-out groups. 
Indicator Unacceptable threshold Focus of the discussion 
Liveability  When it is threatened; such as when  
rising waters affect property 
Both national and international 
Sea-level rise/ floods So high and so fast that the physical 
risks are unacceptable to society 
NL can probably cope with some 
sea-level rise by raising barriers’; 
Easy to communicate to society 
Rivers Navigability – minimum and 
maximum levels  
National 
Climate Change in precipitation, amount, 
extremes and variations 
National  
Water quality Rise in blue algae and botulism National 
Water security  People should have access to wa-
ter  
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Indicator Unacceptable threshold Focus of the discussion 
Irreversible events in 
climate system 
If the Gulf Stream current turns 
cold; etc. 
Not enough research here; a rea-
sonable expectation of an irre-
versible event should be enough 
to lead to precautionary action 
Important, but difficult to com-
municate 
Food production If insufficient amounts at low qual-
ity can only be produced 
If global food production or distri-
bution is affected 
Global; Can hunger be attributed 
to climate change or other causes? 
Reduction of agricultural output 
as a result of less water can influ-
ence social change. 
Security Breakdown in the feeling of secu-
rity; Regional instability; Risk to 
sustainable development in regions; 
Will be affected by changing food 
production zones (e.g. in the Sahel); 
loss of income from decreasing 
fisheries; changes in social instabil-
ity 
Both national and international 
Biodiversity/ Ecosys-
tem 
High rate of loss of biodiversity 
Not more than 0.1 degree C per 
decade; Critical changes 
Both national and international; 
However, can biodiversity loss be 
attributed to climate change? 
Vulnerable groups Unacceptable risks to vulnerable 
groups  
National;  
North-South and popu-
lation groups 
Extreme differences; increases in 
North-South gaps 
Changes in North-South relations 
and gaps is difficult to measure so 
that is not a good indicator 
Temperature rise  Too abstract for social actors 
Economic system Irreversible changes in the eco-
nomic system; if the primary sec-
tors (e.g. agriculture) of an econ-
omy are affected by climate change, 
then there will be major economic 
destabilization.  
 
Employment Loss of jobs  
Costs-Benefits  A proactive approach irrespective 
of the costs is necessary 
Health  Was not named as indicator and 
that was probably, speculated the 
group, because it is not seen as so 
important. 
Adaptation  A vulnerability indicator is impor-
tant to understand if people can 
cope with adaptation. 
Note: Text in normal indicates results of group 1, italics, result of group 2 and bold results of  
   group 3. 
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In the plenary session that followed, participants felt the need to classify the criteria. 
They identified four key scientific criteria (representativeness for a larger set of impacts, 
attributability to climate change, measurability, and reliability) and three social criteria 
(direct relevance to the Netherlands, understandable and appealing) for evaluating the 
quality of an indicator. 
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In the plenary discussions, several issues came up for discussion, including the need to 
have indicators that are newsworthy (e.g. malaria in the Netherlands), the role of the  
fossil fuel industry, and indicators that show whether action can have other benefits. It 
was also considered very important to focus on avoided costs or benefits of taking ac-
tion. But every industry and administrator will have to take the costs of measures seri-
ously into account. 
In general, the stakeholders had the feeling that the Netherlands is possibly able to cope 
with a vast range of effects, so that the effects on the Netherlands per se can never be a 
driving force for action. Having said that, there were three important points to note: 
• The loss of biodiversity is not taken into account; 
• The Netherlands cannot be seen as an isolated actor in the international society, and 
it needs to take into account effects that occur also primarily outside the Netherlands; 
and 
• The costs for adaptation for the low-lying Netherlands would not be negligible.  
These three reasons were seen as key reasons for taking action. It was also seen as  
important to ensure that the US and Russia came back into the system. It was argued that 
one of the ways to do that was if the key large developing countries argued that climate 
change could potentially destabilize their economies and political systems. It was further 
pointed out that it was vital that development and climate change policy was integrated 
from the perspective of the developing countries. 
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In order to be in a better position to discuss impacts and indicators, the participants asked 
for further information on: 
• Information about how to communicate to the public on climate change; 
• More specific information on the costs and benefits of climate policy at the national, 
EU and global levels; 
• Further information about how specific ecosystems will be harmed;  
• Information to develop the indicators further;  
• Information on how to develop the issue linkages with local pollution better. 
In particular, it was suggested that the researchers needed to concentrate further on a few 
points: 
• How can the indicators be better classified?  
• Under what conditions can we expect abrupt changes and economic destabilization? 
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• What are the effects with low probability but high impacts? 
• How do uncertainties change? 
• When do climate variability and extreme events become dangerous to societies? 
• What are the costs of the impacts for the Netherlands and for other countries?  
• Is it true that the Netherlands can actually cope with a rising sea level and that the 
citizens will not protest? 
• How do we combine absolute changes and the speed with which changes take place?  
• What role can business actors play, what do they already do and why?  
• How can one anticipate climate changes?  
• How can different impacts be combined?  
Following the workshop, the project team tried to find answers to the above questions 
from existing literature, but did not undertake new research. 
0&
 


=,:,2-	
The second workshop was again chaired by Eimert van Middelkoop. The participation at 
the second workshop was more limited than the first and the aim was to correct for some 
of the imbalances in the first workshop (See Table 7.4).  
Table 7.4 Participation at the second workshop. 
 Government & politicians Industry NGO Scientist Project team 
Chair 1     
Stakeholders 2 4 3 1  
Project team     10 
 
The purpose of the second workshop was: 
• To provide feedback to the questions raised at the first workshop; 
• To see if there was an effective way to classify the indicators identified at the first 
workshop; 
• To come to an identification of threshold values for the important indicators, and 
• To see if there was any way to provide an intelligent response to the current climate 
change targets of the Netherlands. 
The meeting began with a presentation by Eimert van Middelkoop. He made a  
presentation of the current political context in the area of climate change, which is char-
acterised by: 
• An expectation that Russia will ratify the Kyoto Protocol soon30, making it relevant 
and urgent for the European Union to start preparing for follow-up measures; 
• The political target of the EU is that temperatures should not be allowed to rise  
beyond 2 ºC; this target will be revisited in the spring of 2005; 
                                                   
30
  See also Environment Daily, 24 May 2004. 
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• The political target of the Netherlands is that temperatures should not be allowed to 
rise beyond 2 ºC, which is approximately 550 ppmv CO2 equivalent;  
• The Netherlands’ government had just informed the Parliament of its intention to  
investigate the possibility of reducing emissions by 30% in the developed countries 
by 2020 in relation to 1990 levels as a first step towards achieving the long-term  
objectives.  
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At the first workshop, participants had identified four key scientific criteria (representa-
tiveness for a larger set of impacts, attributability to climate change, measurability, and 
reliability) and three social criteria (direct relevance to the Netherlands, understandable 
and appealing) for evaluating the quality of an indicator (see 7.3.4). After several  
preparatory iterations, based on discussions with scientists and stakeholders, the project 
team finally prepared an ideal-typical (yes-no) classification of the indicators into four 
categories. This two-by-two matrix attempts to classify the indicators in terms of their 
scientific robustness and their social acceptability. The purpose of this table was to  
provoke discussion and to stimulate the process of understanding how to best further the 
research on indicators. It should be noted that in the preparatory stages of the workshop, 
the project team added a few indicators to those selected by the stakeholders in the first 
workshop, on the basis of their own scientific assessment. The classification is shown in 
Figure 7.1. 
Two break-out groups were formed, again with a comparable heterogeneous  
composition. The two break-out groups discussed the classification and its purpose.  
Key concerns were articulated as follows:  
• There should be a clearer differentiation between national and international aspects; 
after much discussion, the group agreed that there should be first a national  
discussion and this should then be followed by an international discussion;  
• All indicators should be classified in a way that they appeal to different stakeholders, 
since stakeholders have different perceptions, and in a way that is related to their  
impacts. The classification suggested included: health, ecology, security and the 
economy; 
• Others felt that some indicators represented irreversible events, others reversible; 
• Some argued that the time-frames of the impacts (long-term, short-term and  
continuous) were not adequately taken into account; 
• There were concerns about how economic indicators should be dealt with: were they 
inherently a part of the other impacts, or were they to be generalised into macro-
economic indicators; and  
• Caution should be exercised in the identification and classification of indicators; 
• At a more detailed level, there were questions about whether absolute and relative 
sea-level rise were classified correctly, whether the reversal of the Gulf Stream was 
classified correctly, etc.; 
• There was some discussion about whether some indicators were too all encompass-
ing (water quality), and some were too specific; 
• There was some concern that some indicators were at different points of the chain of 
effects;  
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• Some felt that a focus on a “yes-yes” category was useful as a way of prioritising 
some of the indicators; others felt that many important issues (North-South; security; 
macro-economic effects) might be lost in the “no-no” category; 
• Some felt an important reason for selecting an indicator was whether the impact 
could be easily addressed; 
• Some felt it was important to distinguish between primary and secondary impacts; 
• Some felt that an ideal typical approach did not adequately capture the level of  
nuance in the indicators and that a more scientific approach would be more  
appropriate; while others felt that the purpose was clear and that maybe some more 
work needed to be undertaken to make the classification more comprehensible and 
transparent. 
                                                                                    Scientific criteria 
 Yes – Scores high No- scores low 
Yes – 
Scores 
high 
Health: 
- Water quality 
                -  Water temperature 
                -  Access to drinking water 
- Spread of infectious disease 
- Death by heat waves 
- Lengthening of the pollen 
season 
Ecosystems: 
- Change in the flowering time 
of plants/trees 
- Disappearance of species 
Security:  
- Melting of glaciers 
- Absolute Sea-level rise  
- Rate of Sea leve lrise 
- Floods 
Economic: 
- Navigability of rivers 
 
Health: 
- Access to food 
- Global access to drinking 
water 
Ecosystems: 
- Change in biodiversity 
Security: 
- Disintegration of the 
West Antarctic Ice sheet 
- Prevention of disasters 
- Number of storms 
- Feeling of security 
Economic: 
- Effects on work 
- Effects on vulnerable sec-
tors 
- Effects on the growth of 
global or national income 
 
 
So
ci
al
 
Cr
ite
ria
 
No- scores 
low 
Economic: 
- Productivity of land 
- Rate at which the beaches 
disappear 
 
 
Security: 
- Impacts on the Gulf 
Stream 
- Instability because of 
North-South problems 
Economic: 
- Macroeconomic effects 
 
Figure 7.1 An ideal typical classification of indicators. 
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In the second set of break-out groups, the participants were asked to reflect on threshold 
levels for the different indicators. In focusing on the Netherlands, the groups collectively 
came to an assessment of 21 indicators and discussed what could be seen as acceptable 
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and not acceptable risks to society. The results of this discussion is shown in Table 7.5. 
What becomes apparent from the table is that the task was much more labour intensive 
than the time allotted for the exercise. The stakeholders took some time to warm up to 
the exercise and were then able to come up with ideas in relation to the first set of indica-
tors, but were unable to complete the list. They, however, did generate a number of  
arguments about how such threshold levels can be identified. (a) Acceptable risks in-
cluded incidental impacts, and in the case of sea-level rise a rise of 20 cm per year. (b) 
Unacceptable risks included structural impacts; impacts that affect the basic comforts of 
life that people are already used to; negative impacts on electricity production; on the 
Wadden Sea, where legal norms are exceeded, where it leads to zero growth in national 
income even if only for a period of one year. At the international level, there was a  
feeling that there should be no increase in world hunger, lack of access to water and 
more global inequity. 
There were also some discussion points: 
• In determining what is a threshold level, should one take into account what is likely 
to happen, or should one begin from what is desirable? The conclusion was that in 
such an analysis one should begin from what is desirable, although in some situations 
one was also implicitly taking into account what was feasible; 
• The focus, in the first place, should be on impacts in the Netherlands, but that does 
not mean that the international consequences are seen as irrelevant; 
• Risk is equal to chance multiplied by effect; hence, if the effect is not acceptable, we 
should not talk in terms of acceptable risk.  
In the third and last session of the day, a presentation was made on linking indicators 
back to emission scenarios (see Chapter 5). Following that, there was discussion in  
relation to four questions. This is summed up in the next section. 
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In response to the question on whether it is useful to have a long-term target in the first 
place, the feelings expressed were: 
• In theory, a long-term target is useful because it ensures that countries are on the 
right path especially since the responses in the system are slow and long-term, it 
helps to match long-term scientific with short-term political scales, and provides the 
justification for short-term action. Some stakeholders raised doubts as to whether the 
long-term targets really affect the negotiations, which sometimes end up in horse-
trading; 
• In practice the long-term target does not necessarily pose a problem for industry 
stakeholders, since their activities are mostly in line with current short-term targets. 
However, this does not automatically imply that the long-term targets will be accept-
able. For the insurance industry, there is no real problem, because if the impacts  
increase they will increase the premiums; in other words they can adjust fairly easily. 
At least that was the perception shared at the workshop. The willingness of society to 
pay the increased premiums was not discussed. 
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Table 7.5 Indicators and risk levels. 
Type  Indicator Acceptable risk Not acceptable risk 
Water Quality (the number of 
weeks one cannot 
swim) 
An increase of 50% 
from current levels; on 
a local basis and only 
incidentally 
An increase of 200%; 
Structural effect  
annually;  
 Access to clean water That there is a tempo-
rary ban on washing 
cars; or watering gar-
dens 
That children cannot 
take baths; or you 
cannot drink water 
from the tap; 
That international  
targets are at risk 
Limitation of indus-
trial activity  
(navigability and 
water temp.) 
Navigability of rivers 
(in weeks) 
Incidentally More than a 
month/Two weeks 
 Water temperature An incidental rise 
leading to fish kills 
Structural rise leading 
to loss of biodiversity; 
Code red: Electricity is 
rationed, because of 
the impact on electric-
ity production 
Sea-level rise Absolute (m)  0.5 (1 metre and above 
is seen as too  
expensive) 
 Rate (mm per year) 20 cm per century > 50 cm per century; 
> 3 mm per year,  
because of the devas-
tating effects on the 
Wadden sea 
Food Distribution  No increase in world 
hunger 
 Productivity of land  Structural loss to  
agricultural land 
Health Spread of infectious 
disease (e.g. Lyme 
disease) 
Doubling of the 
chance of sickness 
If adaptation is no 
longer possible; or  
adaptation is greater 
than the costs 
 Death from heat waves Mortality should  
remain stable 
No increase in  
mortality 
 Increase in the length 
of the pollen season 
 Structural increase in 
chronic sicknesses 
Irreversible events Melting of glaciers   
 Melting of the Antarc-
tic 
0% >0% 
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 Impact on the Gulf 
Stream 
<0% >0% 
 Disappearance of  
species 
 Where the legal norms 
are exceeded 
Tourism Rate at which the 
beach disappears 
 When it affects  
tourism 
 The number of major 
skating events 
(Elfstedentochten) 
 < 1 every ten years 
Economic Effect on income  No growth as result of 
impacts for one year; 
If Netherlands com-
petitiveness is affected 
 Effect on work and 
sectors 
 Income inequality in 
NL must not increase 
Security    
Ecosystems    
Note: Text in italics is the contribution of Working Group 2; and normal text is the contribution 
   of Working Group 1. Source: Dalenoord et al. (2004). 
The critical issue of the Ministry of Economic Affairs appears to be the effect on the 
Netherlands’ ability to compete on the international market, especially in the context of 
US non-participation in the regime. 
In response to the question of whether the focus of a long-term target should be on con-
centrations, temperatures or something else, the arguments were as follows: 
• A focus on global mean temperature is useful in that it is logical from a scientific 
perspective, closer to the impacts, representative of a number of impacts, easy to  
verify, and understandable; even if it is not entirely appealing and too abstract for  
society; 
• A focus on concentrations is useful because it relates quicker to emission levels, 
even though it is more abstract for society and somewhat further away from impacts. 
In response to the question, what is our opinion on the 2 degree Celsius target of the 
Netherlands’ government, the responses were: 
From a scientific perspective,  
• Beyond 2 °C global warming in relation to pre-industrial levels, there is consensus 
that the climatic system could become unstable and irreversible impacts may become 
inevitable; 
• It should be noted that 2 °C, still implies huge losses to some low-lying countries and 
some ecosystems;  
• The 2 °C target may have already been exceeded if the sensitivity of the climate  
system to emissions is higher than currently expected; in other words if the current 
emissions of aerosols is masking the enhanced greenhouse effect to some extent; 
However, the IPCC has not yet made any firm assessment of the situation as yet; 
• Taking all the above into account, it was agreed that on the basis of the current  
science, a 2 °C target in combination with current expectations that this coincides 
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with a 500-550 ppmv CO2-eq. concentration level seems to be the most reasonable 
long-term target for the Netherlands. 
From a political perspective, there were some discussions: 
• Modifying a 2 °C target to a 3 °C target would reduce the urgency for action and  
increase the risk of instability in the system; this risk was not seen as politically  
acceptable. Besides, beyond 3 °C the biosphere could become a source rather than a 
sink of GHGs; 
• Reducing a 2 oC target to something lower does not seem at all feasible, especially 
because of the short-term implications.31;  
• Should the science indicate that the climate system is more sensitive to emissions 
this would only imply that the urgency to take measures will increase drastically. 
This is an additional argument for not relaxing the 2 °C target; 
• The perspectives of other large EU member states on the issue strengthens the politi-
cal argument that the 2 °C target is a proper one, since the Netherlands is not alone in 
this perspective. 
0&	

	
Parallel research undertaken by a student involved in the project focused on how other 
EU countries were looking at the issue of long-term targets. The initial research results 
show that some countries have targets while others are willing to accept the EU’s 
judgement (see Table 7.6). 
The table indicates that the larger and prominent EU member states (UK, Germany and 
France) and some smaller countries (Sweden) support far reaching long-term targets. 
Other EU member states, including the new member states, are not undertaking any in-
dependent research on to the subject but seem to be (willing to) accept the position of the 
EU. 
The following figure shows the current commitment to long-term targets and timetables. 
 
Figure 7.2 The current commitment to long-term targets and time-tables. 
                                                   
31
  Even a 2 °C target appears less feasible in the Dutch context, according to a selection of 
Dutch stakeholders (see Hisschemöller & van de Kerkhof, 2004, on the feasibility of a –30% 
target in 2020). 
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Table 7.6 Perceptions of other EU countries on targets. 
Countries Current perspective on long-
term target 
Internal process of  
articulating the target 
Comment 
Proactive 
Austria Supports EC position; but 
thinks it may be too weak 
Within the government, 
discussions on whether 
limit values on emis-
sions of concentrations 
should be developed 
No real stakeholder 
process 
Denmark No official position; beyond 
support of the EC position 
No process in place cur-
rently 
Although the original 
position was based on 
stakeholder dialogue, 
the current government 
is sceptical 
Belgium No formal position; accepts 
current EC position 
Presently seeking advice 
on a long-term target 
from the Federal Coun-
cil for Sustainable De-
velopment. 
Stakeholder involve-
ment important. The 
Federal Council for 
Sustainable Develop-
ment, a stakeholder 
body provides advice  
France Stabilization levels should 
not rise above 450 ppmv 
CO2;  
French position outlined 
by President Chirac and 
in speech by French 
minister to IPCC ple-
nary in Jan. 2003 
Implication is global 
emissions must halve 
by 2050; Annex I emis-
sions must decrease by 
50% in this period. 
Germany Supports EC position ; ex-
amining potential of stabi-
lizing concentrations at 450 
ppmv CO2. 
Germany willing to re-
duce emissions by 40% 
in 2025 if the rest of 
Europe reduces by 30%. 
No stakeholder discus-
sion; recognizes origi-
nal EC position as sci-
entifically incorrect. 
Netherlands Supports EC position;  Exploring a –30% re-
duction in 2020/ 1990 
Stakeholder discussions 
in process 
Sweden Goes beyond EC position; 
supports a –60% reduction 
of CO2 in 2050/1990 
  
UK Supports EC position; -60% 
target of CO2 in 2020/1990 
Based on internal dis-
cussions of science 
No stakeholder in-
volvement in discus-
sions. Far greater reli-
ance on science than on 
the need for social sup-
port 
Reactive 
Czech No formal position; accepts 
current EU position 
No formal internal 
process 
No real role for  
stakeholders 
Estonia No formal position; No formal internal 
process 
No real role for  
stakeholders 
Finland Supports EC position No real internal process Includes consultation 
with stakeholders 
Italy  No internal discussions  
Malta No official position No internal discussions Sees sea-level rise and 
water as key indicator 
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Poland No official position No internal discussions  
Portugal No official position; supports 
EC conclusions;  
  
Spain No official position; new 
government 
No internal discussions  
European Level 
European 
Commission 
8% reduction in 2008-2012; 
1% reduction annually till 
2020;  
No real discussion on 
Art. 2 
 
European 
Parliament 
Stabilizing at 550 ppmv 
CO2-eq.;  
  
European 
Council 
Less than 2 ºC; 550 ppmv 
CO2 
  
Source: Compilation from Laschet (2004) and Ott et al. (2004). 
0&.3
	

The interviews and workshops lead us to the following conclusions. There are enough 
reasons for key actors in the Netherlands society to pursue an articulation of the global 
long-term targets. A combination of political and scientific reasons led participants to 
conclude that the 2 °C target should form the long-term goal of the Convention, and that 
a –30% reduction in 2020 for the EU countries possibly is an inevitable short-term target 
that is consistent with that goal. The long-term target did not pose any major problems to 
industry. While for some industry (e.g. insurance) the short-term target did not pose any 
key problems, others had some reservations about participating if other major actors in 
the world did not also do so. On the other hand, arguing on the basis of what is seen as 
necessary to avoid major damages and also what is in line with the current proposals of 
large EU member states, the –30% target seems reasonable. A recent research document 
also concluded that –30% reduction is both technologically feasible and affordable if  
undertaken in combination with emission trading (Bollen et al., 2004). However, another 
report that evaluated the short-term target through a stakeholder process of –30% argued, 
inter alia, that a –30% target was not as feasible as previously suggested and advised the 
Netherlands’ government not to go into the negotiations with such a target  
(Hisschemöller and van de Kerkhof, 2004: 3-4). On the other hand, from the perspective 
of what is seen as necessary, this project argues that if we wish to keep to a 2 oC target, a 
–30% target must be seen as a short-term goal. 
The workshops also identified criteria for the evaluation of indicators; they identified 
key indicators and provided a set of reasoning about when indicators may be useful and 
when not.  
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This chapter integrates the information provided in the earlier chapters in order to assess: 
• The indicators for impacts of climate change; 
• The threshold levels of what is seen as dangerous from a Netherlands’ perspective in 
relation to the indicators; and hence; 
• Key arguments in support of a long-term target on climate change. 
This chapter also takes a less nuanced and more ideal-typical approach to collating the 
information in order to make it more accessible to the general as opposed to the special-
ised reader. 
Before proceeding further, it may be useful to say that a debate on the perspectives of 
climate scientists and sceptics allowed the stakeholders to ask critical questions in order 
to understand whether there is a critical climate change problem. The debate and  
discussions revealed that in the national context: 
• There is consensus in the science about the existence of human-induced climate 
change. There is a link between emissions of GHGs, increased concentrations of 
these gases and a rise in temperature and other related impacts; 
• There are uncertainties relating to the exact nature of the impacts; 
• Sceptics have essentially three types of arguments, focusing on the uncertainties as if 
they mean unreliable science, focusing on the dubious nature of the combination of 
different types of science, and focusing on the high costs of taking action;  
• The question-answer session revealed that the stakeholders believe that there is a  
serious problem, even if there may be some uncertainties; and that inevitably the cost 
of taking action will influence the way risks will be perceived. 
This chapter takes the information from the stakeholders and scientists and tries to  
combine the cumulative knowledge. It first identified the key indicators climate change 
for the Netherlands (Section 8.3). It then uses the arguments of the stakeholders to look 
at the various ways of classifying the indicators and examines the advantages and  
disadvantages of each (Section 8.4). On the basis of the input from the stakeholders, it 
ranks the different indicators from a social perspective (Section 0). On the basis of the 
input from the scientists, it ranks the different indicators from a scientific perspective 
(Section 0). It then presents the indicators in a matrix of scientific and social criteria 
(Section 8.7). It combines the available information on threshold levels to provide data 
on what is acceptable and not acceptable for the Netherlands, and provides the reasons 
for each (Section 8.9). It then proceeds to make links to the concentration levels where 
that is possible (Section 0). It then provides recommendations for further research  
(Section 8.10), as well as policy recommendations (Section 8.12).  
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Before delving into the details, it is important to remember that there is a clear chain of 
impacts in the climate change system and there are a number of positive and negative 
feedback effects. This can be summed up as follows: 
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Figure 8.1 A simplistic representation of the cause-effect chain. 
Emissions lead to increasing concentrations of GHGs in the atmosphere, which leads to a 
change in the radiation balance of the atmosphere. This leads to climate change, which 
has a number of impacts on society and ecosystems. This is a simplistic presentation of 
the chain of events. At the same time, from the indicators we can back-calculate the at-
mospheric GHG concentrations and the relevant emission level (see Chapter 5). 
The following sections first evaluate key indicators of primary and secondary impacts, 
before making a correlation to temperature and concentrations.  
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The stakeholders identified 19 indicators (see 7.3.3); we have split some of them into 
two indicators for the sake of clarity. As a result, we have reached a total of 24  
indicators. These include 21 national level indicators and 3 international level indicators: 
• Water quality: The problem of blue algae and botulism are seen as serious threats to 
water quality in the Netherlands and will affect the recreation and tourism industry 
by making water unsafe to swim in; 
• Access to water: There is an expectation that the quality and quantity of water  
available to the households may be reduced by climate change, leading to restrictions 
in water use;  
• Navigability of rivers: Climate change is expected to have an influence on water  
levels in the navigable rivers thus influencing transport in the rivers and the transport 
sector as a whole; 
• Water temperature: The rise of the water temperature may both affect biodiversity 
and fish stocks and have socio-economic impacts, through the rationing of electricity 
related to cooling water availability; 
• Agricultural productivity: Climate change is likely to influence agricultural  
productivity by influencing the quality and quantity of water available for crops;  
• Absolute sea-level rise: Climate change is expected to lead to a rising sea-level; this 
continuous rise is expected to have a continuing impact on the Netherlands, long  
after concentration levels are stabilized; 
• Rate of sea-level rise: An absolute sea-level rise implies that the sea-level is rising 
continuously. This is of immediate relevance to defining response actions of society; 
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• Spread of infectious disease: A rise in local temperatures may be accompanied by 
the spread of infectious diseases; the most serious identified threat was the Lyme dis-
ease spread by ticks. This could influence both the health sector and recreation  
possibilities; 
• Death from heat waves: Another potential impact of the rise in summer temperatures 
is the rise in death rates especially of senior citizens. This may, however, be  
compensated by a decrease in death rates in the warmer winter months; 
• Increased length of the pollinating season: It is anticipated that the length of the  
pollinating season will increase; if so this will have immediate impacts on chronic 
sicknesses such as allergic responses and asthma; 
• The rate of disappearance of beaches: A rising sea-level can be dealt with by build-
ing dikes and dams (although at considerable cost), but not without severe conse-
quences for beaches in the Netherlands. This will have impacts on the recreation and 
tourism sector; 
• Reduced opportunities for ice-skating: With warming, there will be reduced  
opportunities for ice-skating and especially the 11 cities ice-skating event that the 
Dutch are so keen on; 
• The effects on national income: There is an expectation that unilateral policy action 
in the Netherlands will have negative impacts on national income;  
• The effect on other macro-economic factors, such as employment, vulnerable sec-
tors, growth rates: Some sectors may in particular be vulnerable especially if energy 
prices rise as a result of energy related choices. As a counter effect climate change  
measures may have a positive spin-off; 
• Floods: Extreme events will lead to, inter alia, floods in the Netherlands. Such  
flooding can have large consequences on infrastructure as well as human health and 
society;  
• Storms: Other extreme events include storms. These are not expected to have quite 
as severe an impact as floods in the national context; 
• Changes in the biodiversity: The biodiversity in the Netherlands is expected to 
change with the changing environment; 
• Melting of glaciers: Glaciers are projected to continue their widespread retreat dur-
ing the 21st century; 
• Disintegration of the West-Antarctic ice sheet leading to a 1 metre extra sea-level 
rise per century for many centuries: An important international impact that is of di-
rect relevance to the Netherlands is the possible disintegration of the West Antarctic 
ice sheet and its influence on the Netherlands;  
• Changes to the Gulf Stream: Another impact is the possibility of a major change to 
the North Atlantic warm gulf stream leading to significant changes in the European 
climate; 
• The disappearance of species: It is expected that ecosystems in Europe will shift pole 
ward by 300 kilometres for every degree warmer. This will lead to a gradual extinc-
tion of species in this part of the world. Particularly vulnerable regions in the Nether-
lands include the Wadden Sea.  
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Indicators purely of an international nature that were also seen as critical for the  
Netherlands included: 
• Access to drinking water world-wide: Current access to drinking water world-wide is 
already a serious problem as recognized by the Millennium Development Goals; but 
it is expected that the climate change problem will exacerbate the situation much  
further; 
• Access to food world-wide: As a result of changing temperatures and rainfall pat-
terns, local access to food will also probably change negatively in most parts of the 
developing world;  
• Impacts on North-South equity per se: The impacts of climate change are expected to 
be highly visible in the developing world. Coral reefs are already bleaching, glaciers 
are already melting and rainfall patterns are changing. This is expected to have a 
negative influence on the security in developing countries, and may have negative 
repercussions on the developed world. 
An item that was not brought forward at the stakeholder discussion was the indicator of 
disappearance of nation states resulting from a rising sea-level; or other losses of inhab-
ited land (see 7.2). This may have either been an oversight on the part of the stakeholders 
or on the part of the scientists.  
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The next question is how these indicators can best be classified and organized. The 
stakeholders had made a few suggestions (see 7.4.2). Classification of indicators  
facilitates their analysis. On the basis of the stakeholder and scientific discussions, the 
following systems of classification were seen as possible, each with its own advantages 
and disadvantages: 
• In terms of geographical scale, the impacts may be primarily national (N); national 
and international (N&I); and primarily international (I); 
• In terms of the nature of the effects, the impacts may be reversible (R); or  
irreversible (Ir); 
• In terms of time scale, the impacts may be short-term (impacts already happening; 
ST); continuous (impacts that will continue to be felt now and in the future; C); or 
long-term (e.g. the disintegration of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet; LT); 
• In terms of how people and, hence, politicians prioritise impacts: This was seen as 
important as it is a way to communicate climate change in a manner that is directly 
relevant to people. Although the group identified only four perspectives, in the  
earlier discussions, cultural and equity issues were also seen as important perspec-
tives through which people look at critical social issues. These include health (H), 
ecosystem and environmental effects (Env.); security (S); economics (E); culture 
(Cul); equity (Eq.); 
• In terms of sectors: Most policies are taken on a sectoral basis; and a sectoral  
division of problems makes it easier to access information and to devise policies to 
deal with problems. The following sectors appear to be relevant to the issues being 
discussed: water; food; health; economic; disasters (abrupt events, extreme events,  
irreversible events); ecosystems and environment, and foreign affairs. 
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The following table attempts at summarising the advantages and disadvantages of differ-
ent types of classifications. The stakeholders could not come to agreement about the 
manner in which indicators should be classified. Table 8.1 lists the advantages and dis-
advantages of each classification system, in order to come to an assessment of which 
classification system can serve which purpose.  
Table 8.1 The advantages and disadvantages of different classification systems. 
Classifications Advantages Disadvantages 
Geographical 
scale 
One can show what will directly and 
indirectly affect Netherlands society; 
Climate change is a global problem, 
and there are reasons to justify a global 
approach. 
It is often difficult to separate the 
purely national from the international 
dimensions of the problem, because of 
the close link between the two. 
Time scale Some impacts are already evident – it 
is not as if climate change is something 
that will happen in the future; but some 
impacts will continue long after we 
have stabilized emission levels because 
of the inertia in the system. 
It complicates political discussions and 
often makes communication of the  
issues very complex. 
Political per-
spective 
It is useful to communicate the impacts 
in terms of what people prioritise at a 
personal or at the national level 
It is (sometimes) difficult to explain the 
interrelatedness of perspectives. It may 
also be difficult to assign a certain  
perspective to someone. 
Sectoral ap-
proach 
Policies are often developed at sectoral 
levels, and it is useful to identify the 
sectors so that the impacts and re-
sponses can be related to the sectors. 
The approach does not always match 
political priorities; and the sectors are 
also interrelated. 
Nature of  
impacts 
Classifying into reversible and irre-
versible will help to prioritise the im-
pacts. 
Too simplistic; some reversible  
impacts, may turn out to be irreversible 
and vice versa.  
 
The above analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of the different approaches 
shows that each has something to add and is relevant. This has led us to conclude that 
none of these classification systems should be discarded in favour of another and instead 
we should focus on finding a way to combine the information. We have divided the  
indicators on a sectoral basis, since policies are often made on a sectoral basis. We have 
classified the indicators into 8 sectors (fresh water, seas, health, tourism, economic,  
environmental disasters, ecosystems and environment, and foreign affairs). We have then 
attempted to identify how each indicator can be classified in terms of the different classi-
fication systems (see Table 8.2).  
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Table 8.2 Classification of Indicators. 
Sectoral 
classifica-
tion 
Indicator Geog. 
Scale 
Time 
Scale 
Re-
versibil-
ity 
Political 
perspec-
tive32 
Water Quality (nr. of weeks one cannot swim) N C R H, E 
 Access to clean water N C R H, S 
 Navigability of rivers (in weeks) N C R E 
 Temperature N C R&Ir Env, E 
 Productivity of land N C R E 
Absolute (m) N&I LT33 Ir S SLR 
Rate (mm per year) N&I C Ir S, E, 
Env 
Spread of infectious disease N&I C R H 
Death from heat waves N C Ir H 
Health 
Allergies and other chronic sicknesses as a 
result of the increase in the length of the 
pollen season 
N C R H 
Tourism Rate at which the beach disappears N C R E 
 No. of Elfstedentochten N C R&Ir Cul, E 
Economic Effects on income N C R E 
 Effects on employment and sectors N C R E 
Extreme events 
(floods) 
N C R&Ir S, H, E Environ-
mental 
disasters Extreme events 
(storms) 
N C R&Ir S, H, E 
Change in biodiversity N&I C Ir Env, E, 
H 
Melting of glaciers I ST34 Ir S, E 
Disintegration of the Antarctic I, N LT Ir S, H, E 
Impact on the Gulf Stream N LT Ir S, E, 
Ecosys-
tems and 
environ-
ment 
Disappearance of species N&I C Ir Env, E 
Access to drinking water I C R Eq, H 
Access to food I C R Eq, H 
Foreign 
Affairs 
Social instability through North-South im-
pacts 
I&N C R Eq, S, E 
 
                                                   
32
  On the basis of recent arguments the project tem has chosen for highlighting one political 
perspective as dominant (shown in bold). The scores have been assigned on the basis of the 
perspective given in bold.  
33
  Sea-level rise is a continuous process, but continues long after other effects are dealt with. 
We differentiate here between the rate of sea-level rise which is seen as a continuous process, 
and the absolute sea-level rise which is here marked as long-term, primarily because we want 
to emphasise the long-term effect. 
34
  The argument for seeing the melting of glaciers as short-term, is because the glaciers are  
already melting, and once the damage is done they cannot continue to re-melt. 
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At the workshops, stakeholders argued that for a successful indicator, it must both appeal 
to society and be scientifically sound (see 7.3.4). In terms of appealing to society, an  
indicator must have a salient characteristic that is emotionally moving, and be under-
standable. We embark from the starting point that the selection of indicators show that 
these are all relevant for the Netherlands. However, some may be more important than 
others from the perspective of social actors. We have made some generic assumptions: 
• For example, we assume that where there are clear national impacts, citizens will 
tend to give that most priority, where there are only international impacts, citizens 
will give it a lower priority;  
• Where the problem is seen as continuous, people are likely to prioritise them over 
only short-term problems and these will likely be seen as more important than long-
term problems;  
• Irreversible problems are likely to be more of a priority than reversible problems; 
• During the workshop, it was persuasively argued that different social actors have  
different perspectives and different issues will be seen as more or less important. 
Nevertheless, we argue below that involuntary health risks are likely to be the top 
priority of residents. If one has a larger exposure to a chronic sickness, this affects 
one’s ability to function in ones private home (as parent, partner, or child), and in 
one’s professional function. Economic risks have been selected as the second prior-
ity; because national income, employment effects and others are generally seen as  
vital in the society and often as a key reason for taking or not taking action. Cultural, 
equity, ecosystem and security perspectives are in general seen as third priority, since 
for most people, their own health tends to come first, followed by the effect of the 
economy on their lifestyles.  
We have in any case made our prioritisation transparent; and if there are good reasons 
for changing these, these can always be undertaken (see Table 8.3). The fourth column 
shows how we value each of these aspects of the indicators.  
The valuation (+,++,+++) in the fourth column of Table 8.3 is then applied to each indi-
cator in Table 8.4. We then add up the total number of plusses and rank the indicators on 
the basis of assessing who has the highest number of plusses (see Table 8.5). 
The purpose of undertaking this exercise is to see which indicators are in a position to be 
better communicated to the public in order to increase their awareness of the problem 
and their commitment to deal with the problem. In the column Political perspective, if 
there was more than one relevant perspective, we have given the value that the most  
important perspective had (e.g., if both health (+++) and economy (++) are affected, we 
have given the value +++). However, in some cases we have selected a dominant  
perspective and then the value assigned was that of the most important perspective. 
From the total valuation, represented by the total amount of plusses an indicator has been 
given, a ranking can be made. Most important are the indicators with the most plusses; 
least important are the indicators with the smallest number of plusses (see Table 8.5). 
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Table 8.3 Prioritising indicators from a socio-political perspective. 
 Top Priority Second priority Third priority Valuation 
Geographical   
National x   +++ 
International and 
National 
x   +++ 
International   x + 
Time-scale  
Continuous x   +++ 
Short-term   x  ++ 
Long-term   x + 
Reversibility  
Irreversible x   +++ 
Reversible   x + 
Perspective  
Health x   +++ 
Economic  x  ++ 
Cultural   x + 
Equity   x + 
Ecosystem   x + 
Security   x + 
 
Table 8.4 Prioritising indicators on the basis of social criteria for national scale. 
Sectoral 
classifi-
cation 
Indicator Geog. 
scale 
Time 
scale 
Re-
versibil-
ity 
Political 
perspec-
tive 
Total 
1+2+3+
4 
Rank 
Quality (the number of 
weeks one cannot swim) 
+++ +++ + +++ 10 2 
Access to clean water +++ +++ + +++ 10 2 
Navigability of rivers +++ +++ + ++ 9 3 
Temperature +++ +++ ++ + 9 3 
Water 
Productivity of land +++ +++ + ++ 9 3 
Absolute  +++ + +++ + 8 4 SLR 
Rate  +++ +++ +++ + 10 2 
Spread of infectious  
disease 
+++ +++ + +++ 10 2 
Death from heat waves +++ +++ +++ +++ 12 1 
Health 
Allergies and other 
chronic sicknesses as a  
result of the increase in 
the length of the pollen 
season 
+++ +++ + +++ 10 2 
Rate at which the beach 
disappears 
+++ +++ + ++ 9 3 Tour-
ism 
No. of Elfstedentochten +++ +++ ++ + 9 3 
Effect on income +++ +++ + ++ 9 3 Eco-
nomic Effect on work and  
sectors 
+++ +++ + ++ 9 3 
Ecosys- Extremes (floods) +++ +++ ++ ++ 10 2 
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Extremes (storms) +++ +++ ++ + 9 3 
Change in biodiversity +++ +++ +++ + 10 2 
Melting of glaciers + ++ +++ + 7 5 
Disintegration of  
Antarctic 
+++ + +++ + 8 4 
Impact on the Gulf Stream +++ + +++ + 8 4 
tems 
and en-
viron-
ment  
Disappearance of species +++ +++ +++ + 10 2 
Access to drinking water 
(globally) 
+ +++ + + 8 4 
Access to food + +++ +++ + 8 4 
Foreign 
affairs 
Social instability through 
North-South impacts 
+++ +++ +++ + 10 2 
Note:  +++ good; ++ medium; + poor. 
 
Table 8.5 Ranking of the indicators by social criteria. 
Score (number of plusses 12 10 9 8 7 
# Indicators 1 9 8 6 1 
Ranking 1 2 3 4 5 
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A successful indicator also needs to meet scientific criteria. The key scientific criteria 
which were identified by the stakeholders, including scientists are representativeness,  
attributability, measurability and computability. These criteria were evaluated as good 
(+++), medium (++) and poor (+) on the basis of the best available scientific judgement. 
When this is used, the sum of the valuation can be used to make a ranking. This ranking 
can be found in the last column of Table 8.6. 
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Having first undertaken a ranking of the indicators on the basis of scientific and social 
criteria, we now attempt to further integrate this information in a matrix. 
Table 8.8 integrates the scientific and social ranking, but can also be read diagonally. 
The top left corner indicates indicators that are both scientifically sound and socially  
appealing. The bottom right indicators are less directly attributable to climate change and 
perhaps less appealing as social indicators but are nevertheless seen as important by  
social actors. Reading from top left to bottom right, one can classify the indicators into 7 
categories of priorities. 
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Table 8.6 below incorporates threshold levels of risk for the 7 categories of indicators on 
the basis of the stakeholder discussions. It uses their arguments to extrapolate threshold 
levels for other indicators (see 0). 
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Table 8.6 Prioritising indicators on the basis of scientific criteria for national scale. 
Sectoral classification Indicator Representative Measurability Computability Score Rank 
Quality (the number of weeks one cannot swim) ++ +++ ++ 7 2 
Access to clean water +++ +++ ++ 8 1 
Navigability of rivers (in weeks) +++ +++ ++ 8 1 
Temperature +++ +++ ++ 8 1 
Water 
Productivity of land ++ +++ ++ 7 2 
Absolute (m) +++ +++ ++ 8 1 SLR 
Rate (mm per year) +++ +++ ++ 8 1 
Spread of infectious disease ++ +++ ++ 7 2 
Death from heat waves +++ +++ + 7 2 
Health 
Allergies and other chronic sicknesses as a result of the 
increase of the length of the pollen season 
+++ +++ ++ 8 1 
Rate at which the beach disappears ++ ++ + 5 4 Tourism 
No. of Elfstedentochten ++ +++ ++ 7 2 
Effect on income +++ ++ + 6 3 Economic 
Effect on work and sectors ++ +++ ++ 7 2 
Extreme events (floods) +++ +++ + 7 2 Environmental disasters 
Extreme events(storms) + ++ + 4 5 
Change in biodiversity ++ ++ + 5 4 
Melting of glaciers +++ +++ ++ 8 1 
Disintegration of the Antarctic ++ ++ + 5 4 
Impact on the Gulf Stream +++ ++ + 6 3 
Ecosystems and  
environment 
Disappearance of species +++ ++ + 6 3 
Access to drinking water ++ ++ + 5 4 
Access to food ++ + + 4 5 
Foreign affairs 
Social instability through North-South impacts ++ + + 4 5 
Note: +++ good; ++ medium; + poor. 
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Table 8.7 Ranking of the indicators by scientific criteria. 
Score (number of plusses) 8 7 6 5 4 
#  Indicators 8 6 6 2 2 
Ranking 1 2 3 4 5 
 
Table 8.8 Prioritising on the basis of the ranking of scientific and social criteria. 
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Table 8.9 below incorporates threshold levels of risk for the 7 categories of indicators on 
the basis of the stakeholder discussions. It uses their arguments to extrapolate threshold 
levels for other indicators (see 0)  
Table 8.9 Potential threshold levels for each indicator. 
Priority Indicator Acceptable risk Not acceptable 
Access to clean drinking 
water 
That there is a temporary ban 
on washing cars; or watering 
gardens 
That children cannot 
bathe; or you cannot drink 
water from the tap; 
Death from heat waves Mortality remains stable An increase in mortality 
A 
Allergies and other 
chronic sicknesses due 
to longer pollen season 
 Structural increase in 
chronic sicknesses 
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 Rate of sea-level rise 20 cm per century > 50 cm per century; 
> 3 mm per year, because 
of the devastating effects 
on the Wadden sea 
Water quality (number 
of weeks one cannot 
swim) 
An increase of 50% from cur-
rent levels;  
An increase of 200%; 
Structural effect annually  
Navigability of rivers Incidentally less load Over four weeks less load 
Over two weeks less load 
Water temperature An incidental rise leading to 
fish kills 
Structural rise leading to 
loss of biodiversity; 
Code red: Electricity is  
rationed, because of the 
impact on electricity  
production 
Spread of infectious  
disease 
An increase in the chance of 
falling ill 
If adaptation is no longer 
possible, or if the costs for 
adaptation are out of  
proportion  
B 
Floods Incidental increases Structural increases affect-
ing property values 
Productivity of land Incidental losses Structural losses  
Absolute seal level rise Marginal increases > 0.5 m too costly 
Effect on work and  
sectors 
Marginal changes Income inequality  
increases 
Disappearance of species Incidental losses Where the legal norms are 
exceeded and structural 
losses 
C 
The number of major 
skating events (Elfsteden 
tochten) 
Less than current levels Less than once every ten 
years 
Effect on income Incidental loss of income No growth as result of  
impacts for one year; If 
Netherlands competitive-
ness is affected 
Change in biodiversity Incidental changes Loss of key species and 
ecosystem functions 
D 
Melting of glaciers Incidental changes Structural large-scale 
Impact on the Gulf 
Stream 
Negligible chance Increase of probability 
Rate at which the beach 
disappears 
When the beach can be easily 
replenished 
When replenishment is too 
expensive affecting  
tourism 
E 
Instability through 
North-South impacts 
At current levels Should not increase  
structurally 
Disintegration of the 
Antarctic 
Negligible chance Increase of probability 
Global access to drink-
ing water 
Should meet Millennium  
Development Goals 
Should not become worse 
than today 
F 
Storms Current levels Should not increase  
structurally 
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G Access to food Current problems When this leads to interna-
tional instability and sig-
nificant increase in finan-
cial inequality 
 
4&2-		

Local climate thresholds for impacts need to be converted to global indicators, because 
of the larger-scale context of global warming and climate policy. For example, tempera-
ture change averaged over the Netherlands is projected to increase with a factor of about 
1.1 as compared to the global mean. When local impact thresholds have been translated 
to global indicators, the latter need to be related to GHG concentration targets, before the 
implications for near- to mid-term emission pathways can be determined. The dominant 
uncertainty in this step is in the value of the climate sensitivity. This is the equilibrium 
global-mean surface-air temperature increase resulting from a doubling of the CO2 
(equivalent) concentrations in the atmosphere compared to pre-industrial levels. By use 
of recent probability estimates of this parameter, risk assessment becomes possible, 
which is a useful method for evaluating policy options in the context of major uncertain-
ties (see Chapter 5). In this approach, the question is not which concentration level  
results in limiting global-mean temperature to a maximum defined by the impact thresh-
olds. Rather, questions like this need to be rephrased to which concentration levels result 
in a probability of at least x% that global-mean temperature will be limited to a  
maximum defined by the impact thresholds. Obviously, setting threshold levels and  
assigning a pursued probability level (x%) is the task of policy makers and stakeholders. 
The following section attempts to make a link between the impacts to the temperature 
levels. We have tried to classify the different impacts of climate change that are likely to 
occur at different levels of temperature increases. This was a complex effort and tries to 
incorporate both the science and the perceptions of climate change. We have used a  
colour code to show the impacts that appear to be unacceptable. 
Figure 8.1 is a first attempt to present clearly a set of ambiguous impacts, and it thus 
faces the limitation that it might be presenting the information incorrectly. Nevertheless, 
in the interests of presenting science in an understandable manner to the public we have 
developed this figure and are willing to modify it as and when more information  
becomes available. 
The figure below shows that beyond 2 ºC, there are too many risks for the Netherlands. 
Chapter 5 argues that for stabilization at 550 ppmv CO2-eq. the probability of limiting 
temperature increase to 2 ºC is about 33-50%. For stabilization at 650 ppmv this  
decreases to less than 10-33% (see 5.5). Hence, this chapter recommends that from a 
Netherlands’ perspective global concentrations need to be well below 550 ppmv CO2-eq. 
This is in line with the current thinking in some other EU countries and the European 
Council’s decision (see 7.5). 
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Figure 8.1 Perceived reasons for concern in the Netherlands.  
Note: Perceived reasons for concern in the Netherlands. N.B. impacts are for 2100. 
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What became amply clear in the course of the project was that although there is  
considerable general information on climate change science, specific information on the  
impacts of climate change on Netherlands society and their possible costs was relatively 
much less available. The project team identified the following gaps in the available  
scientific literature: 
• Further scientific research to increase knowledge about regional climate change and 
the associated impacts; 
• Considerable uncertainty exists in the estimates of the probability distribution of the 
climate sensitivity. An evaluation of the differences between currently applied  
methodologies and an assessment of the associated reliability is recommended; 
• In the past decade, most research efforts have been put into estimating mitigation 
costs associated with stabilization of GHG concentrations. New research is required 
to evaluate peaking and overshoot profiles that might provide more cost-effective  
options to achieve the same long-term climate targets; 
• Probability estimates, concentration estimates, and assessments of emission path-
ways and associated emission reduction costs are currently performed as single  
issues by different (modeling) tools and research groups. An integrated (modeling) 
framework capturing all these issues is required in the light of inconsistencies like 
different baseline scenarios, reduction options, greenhouse-gas mixtures and climate 
system characteristics; 
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• Further scientific research and discussions with national stakeholders on further 
elaboration of and the robustness of the threshold levels for the indicators is needed; 
• In addition, in order to gain momentum for the political action needed, global  
science-policy dialogues on long-term climate targets need to be supported. This is 
necessary since the negotiations are continuously focused on short-term goals and the 
long-term perspective is often lost. 
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This document comes with the following policy recommendations:  
First, the research indicates that the state of the current science and the initial discussions 
with stakeholders show that there are good reasons to support a 2 °C limit to the increase 
in the temperature by the end of this century; although there are some doubts about the 
potential to make the link with GHG concentration levels, the project team supports the 
idea that a 2 °C limit corresponds to a 500-550 ppmv CO2 equivalent concentration  
levels. This conclusion was reached based on some arguments. The scientific arguments 
were: 
• Beyond 2 °C global warming in relation to pre-industrial levels, there is consensus 
that the climatic and ecological system could become unstable and irreversible im-
pacts may become inevitable; 
• It should be noted that 2 °C, also implies huge losses to some low-lying countries 
and some ecosystems;  
• The 2 °C target may already have been exceeded if the sensitivity of the climate sys-
tem to emissions is higher than currently expected; in other words if the current 
emissions of aerosols is masking the enhanced greenhouse effect to some extent; 
(however, the IPCC has not yet made any firm assessment of the situation as yet); 
• Taking all the above into account, it was agreed that on the basis of the current  
science, a 2 °C target in combination with current expectations that this coincides 
with a 500-550 ppmv CO2-eq. concentration level seems to be the most reasonable 
long-term target for the Netherlands. 
From a political perspective, there were some discussions: 
• Modifying a 2 °C target to a 3 °C target would reduce the urgency for action and in-
crease the risk of instability in the system; this risk was not seen as politically ac-
ceptable. Besides, beyond 3 °C the biosphere could become a source rather than a 
sink of GHGs which could lead to fast, additional increases in atmospheric green-
house gas concentrations and further, strong temperature changes; 
• Reducing a 2 °C target to something lower does not seem at all feasible, especially 
because of the short-term social and economic implications35;  
• Should the science indicate that the climate system is more sensitive to emissions 
this would only imply that the urgency to take measures will increase drastically, and 
this is an additional argument for not relaxing the 2 °C target; 
                                                   
35
  Even a 2oC target appears less feasible in the Dutch context, according to a selection of 
Dutch stakeholders (see Hisschemöller & van de Kerkhof, 2004, on the feasibility of a  –30% 
target in 2020). 
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• The perspectives of other large EU member states on the issue strengthens the politi-
cal argument since the Netherlands is then not alone in this perspective. 
Second, the current medium-term target under discussion, of reducing emissions by 30 
% would appear to be consistent with the long-term goal of a 2 °C target. It would also 
appear to be the next logical step from the Kyoto target. However, this target was never 
specifically studied under this project. The research concludes that from the perspective 
of scientific consistency with the long-term goal and from the political perspective that 
many neighbouring countries are thinking along parallel lines, this short-term goal would 
appear a reasonable aspirational target, even though there are some reservations about its 
actual feasibility in the short-term. 
 
Hisschemöller, M. & Van de Kerkhof, M. (2004). Europa, Nederland: How verder na Kyoto? 
Aanbevelingen van stakeholders voor het Nederlands EU Voorzitterschap, Platform  
Communication on Climate Change, RIVM. 
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1. Climate change; 
2. The Third Assessment IPCC Report; 
3. Climate change targets and GHG emissions; 
4. Biodiversity and ecosystems; 
5. Fresh water; 
6. Coastal zone; 
7. Health; 
8. Recreation and tourism; 
9. Macro-economic effects. 
For details in the Dutch language, see the IVM website: http://www.vu.nl/ivm >Research 
projects>Re-evaluation climate targets. 
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Artikel 2 van het Raamverdrag van de Verenigde Naties inzake klimaatverandering 
(UNFCCC) luidt: 
Het uiteindelijke doel van dit Verdrag (…) is het bewerkstelligen, in overeenstemming 
met de desbetreffende bepalingen van het Verdrag, van een stabilisering van de  
concentraties van broeikasgassen in de atmosfeer op een niveau waarop gevaarlijke  
antropogene verstoring van het klimaatsysteem wordt voorkomen. Dit niveau dient te 
worden bereikt binnen een tijdsbestek dat toereikend is om ecosystemen in staat te stel-
len zich op natuurlijke wijze aan te passen aan klimaatverandering, te verzekeren dat de 
voedselproduktie niet in gevaar komt en de economische ontwikkeling op duurzame wijze 
te doen voortgaan. 
1. Wat is volgens u het grootste gevaar voor de Nederlandse samenleving ten gevolge 
van klimaatverandering? 
2. Denkt u dat de drie genoemde voorwaarden in Artikel 2 (“ecosystemen in staat stel-
len zich op natuurlijke wijze aan te passen”, “verzekeren dat de voedselproductie niet 
in gevaar komt”, “de economische ontwikkeling op duurzame wijze te doen voort-
gaan”) voldoende zijn om een niveau te bepalen waarop de concentratie  
broeikasgassen “gevaarlijk” wordt? Bevat het artikel onvolkomenheden en/of ont-
breken er andere condities in het artikel? 
3. Zijn alle drie de voorwaarden even belangrijk? Hoe zou u ze eventueel rangschikken 
(bijv. 1. ecosystemen, 2. voedselproductie 3. duurzame economische ontwikkeling)? 
4. Wanneer wordt volgens u niet meer aan de voorwaarden van artikel 2 voldaan? 
(M.a.w. moeten alle ecosystemen in staat zijn zich op natuurlijke wijze aan te passen 
of slechts een deel? Moet de voedselproductie overal verzekerd zijn of slechts op  
bepaalde plekken in de wereld? Moeten alle vormen van economische activiteit zich 
duurzaam ontwikkelen of is het niet ernstig wanneer dit op een andere manier  
gebeurd?) 
5. Wat is volgens u een onacceptabel klimaatrisico (in de zin van het vermijden van 
maatschappelijke gevolgen)? 
6. Welke gevolgen/uitkomsten van het internationale klimaatbeleid zou u niet  
acceptabel vinden? Aan welke voorwaarden moet het klimaatbeleid volgens u  
voldoen? 
7. Het stabiliseren van de concentraties van broeikasgassen op een bepaald niveau door 
het verminderen van emissies brengt kosten met zich mee. Tevens brengt het  
aanpassen (adaptatie) aan de effecten van klimaatverandering kosten met zich mee. 
Hoe moeten deze kosten wereldwijd verdeeld worden? 
8. Wat zullen volgens u de meest controversiële aspecten zijn bij het bediscussiëren van 
artikel 2? 
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9. Welke overige beleidskwesties zouden volgens u ook betrokken moeten worden in 
een discussie over en/of een interpretatie van artikel 2? 
• Internationale handel (WTO); 
• Nationale veiligheid; 
• Internationale veiligheid; 
• Internationale machtsrelaties; 
• Religieuze of ideologische principes; 
• Culturele verschillen; 
• Overige, te weten: (graag specificeren). 
10. Wat is naar uw mening het belangrijkste dat besproken moet worden tijdens de 
workshop? 
11. Weet u andere personen die geschikt zouden zijn om te benaderen voor de  
workshop? 
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